


A. J. ILLINGWORTH



# POLITICAL JUSTICE

A TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVE  
CASE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE SOCIETY



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*What experience and history teach is this — that  
people and governments never have learned  
anything from history, or acted on principles  
deduced from it.*

— GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

\*

# Preface

**W**ILLIAM GODWIN is known for being a man of many talents. A philosopher, journalist, novelist and political radical, he lived in an age in which many of the ideas we take for granted today were first being formulated. That age was the Enlightenment, a time marred by bloody revolution but elevated by new philosophies, insight and debate. In his seminal work of political philosophy, *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, Godwin attacked the political institutions of Britain in his day and became father of English radicalism, which has gone on to influence anarchists and communists alike. Godwin's optimism, looking forward to an age where human reason and individual morality will supersede the need for government, religion, law and private property, may seem ridiculous at first reading to many people, but it is in fact a primitive expression of what would develop into the utilitarian morality of liberalism; and it is precisely these ideas which are beginning to permeate our modern society. What is concerning for ideological conservatives, however, is that whilst the ideas of Godwin are beginning to come to fruition, the advancement in human reason and goodwill is not happening in tangent with them, as Godwin claimed. This poses several worrying problems for humankind's future.

Godwin's work was first introduced to me by a university lecturer who claimed to be a 'revisionist Godwinian' and willingly accepted the label of 'radical leftist'. Whilst it is difficult to judge Godwin by his own time given the vast differences between his and ours, it is my opinion that it is worrying not only that Godwin's ideas are being applied by the modern left in all aspects of life, including treasured academia, but also that these irrational ideas are swaying the people of the West and now existentially threaten Western identity. In the left's ideal world,

the goodness of humanity is boundless; in the real world, humanity is much more flawed. It is my contention that Jacobinism never died in European politics; it merely changed its forms over time. The culturally Marxist policies seen in the modern British Labour Party and American Democratic Party, and even in the socially liberal policies of 'liberals' in other parties of both the political left and right, owe some debt to Godwin's radical Jacobinism. It seems to me that the very substance of leftist political radicalism is a dangerous and damaging ideology which must be challenged and opposed wherever it rears its head, and thus I felt there was a justification for writing this book. This work will primarily be dedicated to analysing the principles of government and society in roughly the same order as they are presented in Godwin's *Political Justice*, comparing them to our own modern world, identifying where traditional conservatives can offer an alternative and refuting the dangerous fantasies of the modern New Left, from the perspective of the New Right.

It goes without saying that this book is written from at least a partly biased perspective. There would be no value in seeking to refute other philosophies if the author did not hold a differing view. If I had to place myself within a particular philosophical school, then it would be right-Hegelianism, or Burkeanism. I have experienced quite enough rejection from the mainstream British right to term myself a traditionalist conservative with a small 'c' by now. The German idealist philosopher Hegel identified History as the greatest teacher, and that it is the role of the historian to look back at the events, deeds and works of history; identify what is beneficial to modern society and what is damaging; and apply them as appropriate. Hegel himself also saw the value in the state and in the law of nations and would have disagreed with Godwin on many levels. It is perhaps ironic then that a different, more left-wing reading of Hegel's ideas went on to inspire leading communists such as Engels. We might contend that it is Godwin's philosophy, when read more closely, that should be credited with fatherhood of the modern political left, at least in Britain, rather than a

devious and radical reading of Marxism proposed by the thinkers of the Frankfurt School and implemented following the Second World War.

I shall offer the reader a few fair warnings. Whilst I am not assuming that the reader has read Godwin's *Political Justice* cover to cover, it goes without saying that this work, which critically examines the same issues as the other, will make some frequent references to it and its ideas. I will do my utmost to explain and dissect these points the best I can, but a vague familiarity with the political ideas of modern cultural Marxists, or at the very least with the ideas of the mainstream political left, should be made beforehand. In today's age of the Internet and Google search, this is no difficult task. Occasionally I may also reference other philosophers and political thinkers (I have after all jumped straight in with Hegel, above), but wherever this occurs, again I shall do my best to condense and explain the ideas I am referencing in as clear a way as possible. It may still be worth the reader's time, however, to follow up some of these references on his own in order to fully appreciate the background to the great battle of ideas that was once widespread and arguably continues in different ways to this day. It remains my firm belief that philosophy, especially political philosophy, should be within the reach of every educated mind, and so I shall avoid unnecessary jargon and assumption wherever I can.

With that we may begin, but a final word: this book is, I hope, something a little different. It was very common in Godwin's day for authors to play their ideas off against each other in print and engage in public debate via the medium of philosophical tract in the printed book. Today we have forgotten the power that ideas can serve us. Ideas and visions are what drive our political constitutions, and to become too caught up in policy is often what breeds the sort of disillusionment and apathy that many ordinary people feel in politics today. This, then, is what I commend William Godwin for the most: his work may not be the most famous of all philosophical treatises, but he had the grace and

decency to offer his own ideas into the political mixer, ideas which have not fully left us and have gone some ways toward shaping our current political societies. Perhaps, then, this new work might be the start of something — a willingness to analyse the attitudes and agendas which permeate our political system, rather than the raw actions and policies. Ideas can be dangerous, and they can be liberating. It is the role of the philosopher to devise these ideas, but it is also his role to discover the ideas of others, and even split apart those ideas which he most dislikes, for if he remains cosy and alone in the echo chamber of the people he agrees with, he will never be able to challenge his own assumptions, and indeed, he will never be able to find his conception of the truth, nor save others from being blind to the truth.

Politics, Godwin suggests, is a ‘proper vehicle for morality’, but to achieve the morality we desire, a political author must be fearless. In Godwin’s time, the zeitgeist was very much against him; in our own time, it is more inclined against traditionalist conservatives. I shall not apologise for any of the ideas presented in the book, and so long as there are those who agree that what I propose can be supported with logic and the assent of History, it shall not need any apologists either. If we are to truly understand the value of political justice, we must consider ideological polar opposites, and not hold back in presenting a vision of the future fully steeped in ideological and cultural reasoning.

A. J. ILLINGWORTH

Oxford, MMXVII

BOOK I.  
**POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS**

## CHAPTER I

# Introduction

**T**HE FIRST MATTER for consideration is that concerning political institutions. By *institutions* we mean organisations that create and enforce laws, so for instance our parliaments and the judiciaries. In many countries, and certainly in Britain, our political institutions are centuries old – the English bicameral Parliament having been created in about the 1340s – whilst English Common Law is even older, with the first reference to ‘common law’ being in about 1189. These institutions have of course changed greatly since their first creation, but their heritage remains the same, and their names and fundamental systems of operation are constant, with each generation inheriting the legacy of the last.

There is, of course, and has been throughout history, some disagreement over whether or not political institutions are beneficial to a society. Godwin himself points this out – that there are those of an anarchist disposition, who believe that institutions are the principal medium for corruption and the restriction of mankind’s progression. There are those, on the other hand, who defend them to the last and consider them the most necessary component for a civilised political and civil society. What we live in today is a political society marked by liberal democratic principles, a society where we expect the state to safeguard our persons, by maintaining a police force and defensive military, and our property, by criminalising theft, establishing ownership and property law, and ensuring that transactions regarding the ownership of property are maintained in a way that benefits both the buyer and the seller. We may take these freedoms for granted, but they are an inheritance from our ancestors, the result of hundreds of years of development. Without them, we would not live as happily as we do now when compared with previous centuries. It is therefore

natural that such a state will also be marked by economic inequality, but what is also extant is another sort of equality: the equality of opportunity. Within every community, every citizen has the chance, when the state defends these freedoms, to buy and sell and to exercise the same freedom. In this regard every citizen is equal, even if the buyer must be deprived of some money to make the seller richer. In that transaction, the seller may gain some money, but the buyer may rest assured that he will be protected should anyone try to take the property which he has just bought away from him.

It is Godwin's argument that every government is still prone to error, and of course, to err is human; he is certainly correct. Error, of course, leads to vice, as he puts it, and it is the indulgence in vice that leads to bad government. A question often asked is this: is there not something better than this that politics can achieve? I have heard many modern socialists and liberals ask the exact same question when conservative principles have been put to them. It is not a bad question to ask: since humanity is a race which has always sought to continuously improve itself, why should we not consider whether or not we can do better? The main point of contention between political conservatives and radicals arises in this: whether the progress of humankind is best served within the structure of existing institutions, or whether new institutions, or indeed none at all, should be set up in order to facilitate a new kind of political system altogether. We should of course be eager to explore alternative views, but we should be equally eager to demonstrate how existing structures are just as effective, if not more so, in bringing about positive political change as brand-new ones are. This, then, shall be the principal aspect of the first part of our discussion.

## CHAPTER II

# Reading Political History

**T**HE FIRST PART of Godwin's enquiry is devoted to the history and development of political society, and indeed it is important to consider how political institutions evolved before we can go about defending or amending them. How we go about making our deductions from history, however, depends on how we read and understand the events of history. Godwin's initial assertion, that 'the history of mankind is little more than the history of crimes' is a somewhat broad statement. It is always beneficial to be a little pessimistic of the human condition, and as Godwin himself points out, war frequently marches hand in hand with political advancement. He cites the conquests of Alexander and Caesar, the invasion of Greece by the Persians and the ascendancy of great emperors such as Cyrus as examples, and indeed, in each of these cases thousands of men were commanded in war to gain great power and wealth for their commanders. In each of these cases, great massacres of men took place, and the only consequence of every war was yet another war. For instance, we see that the Hundred Years' War between England and France set the stage for the Wars of the Roses in England, and closer to Godwin's own time, the enmities between nations during the War of Spanish Succession carried over into the Seven Years' War. In our own time we have seen invasions of countries in the Middle East give rise to such hatred among certain inhabitants as to prompt them to seek the destruction of the Western world. The threat of terrorism looms, and much of it is the fault of those who disturbed the haters' original homelands in the first place. Humanity is prone, as we have seen before, to grave error.

Godwin's reading of history, however, is not entirely plausible. He questions how a rational man is able to take up the sword for one monarch over another, why men such as Alexander the Great, who

were only after success for the sake of their own glory, should be supported by so many men, and why rational beings should support rulers with no care for anyone but themselves. This then explains in part Godwin's adoration of the ideals of the French Revolution, which, being a republican movement, intended to place the ordinary man at the head of the political institution, rather than a king or one of his subordinates. Whilst war is, of course, often devastating, the human mind is an incredibly complex tool, and indeed, there are many reasons why a soldier would be willing to fight and die for the success of a king, or for a haughty ruler of any kind, for that matter. Whilst the revolutionaries on the streets of a city seeking to overthrow its king are willing to fight and die for the ideals of freedom and independent nationhood, so too is the soldier of a monarch willing to die for his ruler because he feels as though that ruler embodied the essence of his nation state. It is out of loyalty that men perform the mightiest of deeds. Leaders such as Alexander and Caesar promised some of the most wonderful riches and reforms to their people in return for their support. More often than not, once they gained power, these rulers gave their people what they demanded. Caesar gave his soldiers land and reformed the laws regarding slavery to put many poor Romans into paid work; Alexander allowed his men the opportunity to raid rich cities such as Persepolis and earned them a fortune. Many people simply do not care whether or not a ruler is leading them for the leader's own gain or not, so long as they come out of the situation better off. Godwin questions why rational beings should sacrifice political freedom for the sake of rulers, and the answer is simply that political freedom matters little when compared to wealth. Wars of aggression often achieve little apart from advancing the wealth of the invader, and morally speaking, rational men should reject them. Wars of defence, on the other hand, are less morally troubling.

One of Godwin's most vitriolic attacks is against the Austrian Empress Maria Theresa. He writes, 'What can be more deplorable than to see us first engage eight years in war rather than suffer the haughty

Maria Theresa to live with a diminished sovereignty?’ a reference to the eight-year War of Austrian Succession. However, what Godwin overlooks is the very nature of wars such as the War of Austrian Succession. The war began with a Prussian invasion of the then-Austrian territory of Silesia, which was swiftly followed by several usurpers making tenuous claims to the Austrian throne. For the Austrian people, the Prussians had violated their home territory, and so the fighting of a war was a mere act of self-defence. What perhaps troubled Godwin most was the entrance of Britain into the war, but Britain was allied to Austria at the time, and the purpose of an ally is to defend its friends. Austria was legitimately in danger, and it is legitimate for an ally to assist in the defence of another country. It is in ways such as these that nations are maintained and sovereignty is defended; otherwise, the oppression of foreign nations is more easily propagated. It would be harder for an ally to justify supporting another nation in a war of aggression, since alliances should be by their very institution defensive.

For many of the Austrians defending their home territory, they were also defending their Empress. The concept of monarchy serves not merely as a system of government but also as a rallying point for society. Monarchs are often well educated and wealthy and serve a nation in some way, either by acts of charity or by attending to the nation in times of crisis. Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom is a prime example of this; in a modern age where absolute monarchy is dead as a system of government in the Western world, the benefits of monarchy are truly seen. It is this rallying point around the traditions and culture of the nations that monarchs serve which has inspired soldiers and laymen alike to fight for them throughout history.

This leads us on nicely to Godwin’s next contention: in his day, absolute monarchy was by far the most common form of government, the main exceptions being Britain and the United States, a constitutional monarchy and a republic, respectively. This feudal

system, which, in Godwin's words 'holds a class of mankind down in abject penury', by which we may assume he is referring to the serfdom of many peasants in subjugation to their lords, is of course far removed from the reality of the modern world. It is only right to criticise such systems, for as Britain of the late 18<sup>th</sup> century had proved, the natural state of man was one of political freedom, where the state served only to protect, not to oppress and command its people. It is perhaps surprising, then, that Godwin developed such a hatred of monarchy, considering that his own home country had begun to perfect a system which managed monarchy with democracy, freedom with protection against impingements on that freedom. In fact, Godwin himself quotes John Locke, the father of liberal democracy, who described absolutism as 'more to be deprecated than anarchy'.<sup>1</sup> It is amusing to consider, then, that Locke still considered anarchy to be worthy of deprecation, if not quite so much as absolutism, and thus the father of anarchism faced a certain irony in quoting him.

Godwin urges his reader to consider whether there might be some remedy to war, despotism and poverty. Seeking such a remedy is a noble pursuit, but we must consider how applicable it is to our time. Despotism does not affect the Western world in the way it once did, and poverty compared to that of the 18<sup>th</sup> century is much less dire. Nevertheless, Godwin's arguments stand in some ways: how can we remedy the poverty that does exist, and how can we end war? It seems that even Godwin himself was aware that it might be wishful thinking to eradicate these things from the world completely, but political philosophers must consider how we might reduce them. It is reasonable to deduce from history that a perfect world is never possible, but what is possible is to strive to come close to one. But this political improvement relies on several factors, perhaps the most pressing of all being human nature itself, followed by how we define morality, and then the nature of political institution itself: its costs and benefits, its inheritance and limitations. It is true that the human race is one which constantly seeks to support itself and aid itself in the

pursuit of continuous technological self-improvement (the progress of history is enough for us to see that), but to achieve moral and social improvement, certain other conditions must be met. A political society cannot ever edge closer towards justice (which is a term preferred to the one which has become ever more common: 'fairness') without first establishing its moral boundaries and foundations. A state, however composed, must be ethical; it must have a guiding lantern which leads it into times of darkness and exalts in times of daylight. Without any sort of ethics, political institutions cannot gauge how the law should be made and applied, and men cannot act with any sort of goodwill towards one another. Some may object to trying to find a definitive morality, but without it there is no political justice. We must observe history and use it to plug the moral deficiencies of our own time as much as to identify the moral deficiencies of history itself.

## CHAPTER III

# The Foundation of Morality

**W**HEN WE ARE BORN, we are frequently described as a blank slate. Godwin suggests that when we first come into the world, we are ‘neither virtuous nor vicious’, and to a certain extent this is correct. We may not bring any new ideas into the world with us, but there are certain elements of human nature which are irrefutable. We will all be able to feel similar emotions, be disgusted at certain fundamentals and take pleasure in certain fundamentals. For instance, cold-blooded murder is generally considered immoral as a cultural universal. We punish those who commit it, and those who take pleasure in senseless killing are pathologised. The only reason for this can be that the vast majority of humankind has a sense of some justice and therefore can only be naturally disgusted by murder. Even in a system without law to punish such wrongdoers, blood feuds and desires for revenge are innate in the human spirit. It is therefore true that certain actions are naturally immoral, and humanity will always seek to punish such actions, whether there is law to define such immorality or not.

Godwin’s concept of humankind bringing no naturally new ideas into the world with it at birth is somewhat similar to Locke’s theory of *tabula rasa*,<sup>2</sup> where he emphasised the importance of education, since it moulded a child’s view of morality and placed value on certain aspects of life from early on. But we are not blank slates entirely, and whilst a child may be born without even the faculty of speech, human beings are not born identical to one another either. Even the earliest philosophers identified that different people were disposed towards different subjects and activities in life more than others. Some, such as the Roman thinkers Lucretius, ascribed this to ‘seeds of prolepsis’, naturally placed within each person, urging them towards certain

activities more than others. Education, and the influence of others, or as Godwin puts it, our perceptions of the habits and morals of others, merely serve to shape the nuances of our own worldview, but fundamentally we all have our own irrefutable path, thanks to our genetics. We often find that those who engage in activities contrary to their dispositions become miserable, whilst those who focus on their natural activities are happy. Godwin's assertion, then, is not a fair one, and its inference, that all humans are born intellectually equal, is also false.

Nevertheless, Godwin suggests that virtue is an innate principle to which we are obliged to conform. He describes virtue as actions and thoughts of intelligent beings which benefit other intelligent beings. This is a utilitarian view, but it seems something of a limitation to constrain virtue purely within the bounds of what 'benefits' other humans, or what is 'useful' to them. A thief can benefit his family by stealing money from another, but this should not make him virtuous by any means. Virtue itself is a form of moral excellence, which in the Western Indo-European canon, at least, was used to refer to the power of God. To be virtuous, therefore, is to aspire to be as magnanimous and upstanding as the moral teacher in God himself. Morality has certain foundational absolutes, which our societies have historically often placed in the image of gods so that we might aspire to be like them and achieve true virtue. It was, however, Aristotle who most perfectly defined virtues: that they are derived partly from our upbringing and partly from our natural habits. We can change those habits, but only with persistence and practice; it is a difficult exercise. Equally, if we establish virtueless habits, we will falter and find it harder to train ourselves back into virtue.

We may not, then, be born with an upbringing — that is situational, but we are born with certain natural dispositions and habits. It is the role of education to show us alternatives, and thus it is for our own perceptions to deduce how we might change our habits; whether we

choose to act or not is a matter of free will, but certain innate aspects of human morality will always be present. Corruption of that morality is rare, and when we compare the number of people who commit serious crimes to the number of law-abiding people in a nation, we see that the former is tiny when compared to the latter. Humans, then, are naturally virtuous to some degree, but as creatures of habit, their potential for corruption is just as strong as their innate virtue.

We have refuted the Jacobin philosophy of education, but let us consider the next two questions: are self-preservation and self-love innate in humankind? The former is true for the most part, and it is observed in all animals. It is only when a rational being has nothing left to live for that the trait of self-preservation begins to weaken. Even then it is a difficult force to overcome. When placed in an immediate physical crisis, such as a burning building, men will go to great lengths to escape. Mental crises are more complicated, but even then, we can observe the suicides of great Romans such as Seneca and Cato the Younger, who died in the most gruesome of ways, being unable to kill themselves outright with their initial blow — Cato stabbed to the stomach but was unable to force the blade to his heart; Seneca slashed his wrists but was unable to cut deep enough to cause his death until placed in a steam-room. To face death is difficult for living creatures, and even when death appears to be the only option left to take, self-preservation will do its utmost to prevent the body from doing damage to life. We have a natural aversion to pain and to fear.

As for self-love, this is a difficult concept to define, and it is hard to comment on its prevalence. People are often encouraged to take pride in their work, and in this sense, self-love is common, but it is not innate. Here we may concur with Godwin that acts for the sake of others are virtuous, and so narcissism is not a natural state of humankind. As we have asserted before, humanity always seeks to improve itself; if this is true, then self-improvement cannot be achieved via self-love. It is the love of others that is preached in many

religions, not least by Christ. The love of others is required if we are ever to see any inherent value in improvement as a race in general, rather than as individuals.

What we may categorically deny, by this evidence, is Godwin's assertion that many of these characteristics are not innate but are merely sown in our characters at an early stage. If these things were not innate, there would not be so many culturally universal human qualities. Whilst there are great differences between different cultures, certain human characteristics, both those viewed as vices and those as virtues, are ever present.

It is certainly possible, on the other hand, to corrupt children from an early age. We often hear stories reported of disturbed individuals having come from equally disturbing backgrounds. Whilst these cases are rare compared to the population at large, it proves that these innate qualities of humankind can be suppressed, if the intervention of elders sets bad examples. We spoke of habits before, and so we already know that habits can be changed. But most children abused violently by their parents do not grow up to be criminals themselves but merely suffer from mental ailments which cause them suffering. The image hangs there in their minds of the suffering that was inflicted upon them, whilst the human values of justice hang next to them — here is the source of their suffering, for they cannot reconcile their treatment at the hands of the people who were supposed to provide them with nurture and good habits with innate human justice. Thus we might claim that there is mental suffering in the setting of abhorrent examples to young children.

Godwin then is incorrect in saying that morality is entirely down to the perceptions of the individual. Those perceptions may shape nuances of morality, but humans certainly share particular moral concepts. Let us not then be lectured on blank slates, for there is an inequality at birth by nature of individual disposition, and there is an inequality in the habits, be they virtuous or virtueless, of individuals at

birth, with certain moral ideas lying at the root. However, whilst cultural moral universals are all very well, this does not mean that there is no room for improvement. Morality is only semi-absolute, and there arise issues which cause a divergence of opinion. Let us then consider how we can change the diverse aspects of our moral habits by analysing the various suggestions for moral character-building, and in so doing attempt to find both concurrence and alternatives.

## CHAPTER IV

# Moral Improvement

**G**ODWIN CONSIDERS three potential areas for moral improvement in rational beings: literature, education and political justice. The nature of each of these is such that they serve a great purpose in the furtherance of public debate and moral discourse, and they are to be discussed before continuing. Specifically the relation between literature, public debate, education and political institutions is an intriguing one, and it is something which we have often neglected in recent years. Yet even Godwin recognised the usefulness of these institutions in promoting the advancement of future generations.

Godwin's grand claim that 'literature has reconciled the whole thinking world [in matters of knowledge]' is not far off the truth. It is often the written word which carries some of the most insightful thoughts. Whether in the form of fiction or non-fiction, it has always been published works which authors have used to express their opinions on history, social customs, politics and the like. Great works of fiction can be lengthy commentaries on deep-rooted problems within our home countries, or indeed philosophers may publish works expressing their own opinion in the most wild and abstract of ways, if they so wish. It is the freedom to publish that has given rise to so many mass movements and important conservative as well as radical ideologies. Without a free press, the American and French revolutions may never have been fomented; agitators such as Thomas Paine would have been silenced. Thinkers such as Marx would have been stifled in their advancement of the communist ideology without the freedom to publish works like *The Communist Manifesto*, and of course, modern conservatism would never have found its feet, at least so quickly, without Edmund Burke's freedom to publish his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. In the realms of fiction, Dickens used his

narratives to comment on the treatment of the poor in Victorian England, and Disraeli wrote novels exposing the political divisions between rich and poor; in more modern times, D. H. Lawrence struggled to break the sexual mores of his time in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. It has always been literature of all kinds which has stimulated public discourse, political ideology and deep thinking.

So we come to appreciate the value of opinion. Since literature, being a product of the authors' imaginations, is surely also subject to the personal opinions of the authors, it is a source of opinion. Political discourse can only be founded upon differing opinion, and thus debate. The great pamphlet battles between gentlemen of differing opinions in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century proved the power of written opinion in political debate. It is only by debate and opinion that we may resolve our minds in such a way that we either reinforce our own opinions or are inclined to change them. It is a wonderful tool in the search for truth, or in the case of our discussion, the search for political justice. The more we debate, the more likely we are to find some common ground on which we may continue to build the groundwork for a just society and thus allow for the progression of our race. To throw debate and alternative opinion to the wind, to stifle literature and outlaw publications, is dangerous — such things can only gag and bind humanity. We shall surely enter onto the path of our own destruction by closing our ears to the phenomena and opinions which we find distasteful, or even uncomfortable.

Such is the power of literature, and politically inclined literature in particular. A caveat must be made clear, however, if we are to remember that opinion is one of the most valuable aspects of political discourse: the search for political and moral justice, and indeed, philosophical 'truth' as we may refer to it, is marked by a wide range of disagreements. Today philosophers continue to ask the same questions that were asked by the philosophers of over two millennia ago, which surely tells us something about the nature of truth: it is a concept

nearly impossible to define. Opinion and debate may edge us ever closer to finding justice and truth, but it can never find the definitive truth. It will always be opinion that political justice is structured around, even if there is some inherent morality which cannot be changed underpinning that justice. There are so many variables outside of fixed moral questions that we can never find a 'perfect system'. Literature, then, and the opinions which stem from it, cannot and will not ever be the sole answer to moral deficiency; this book is no exception.

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What is the value of education? Literature is only accessible to those who have already been educated, who are literate, and as Godwin writes, it is 'inadequate for reformation' of those who are morally deficient. Education, being the facilitation of learning by others, also has the power to inform and promote opinion and debate. The Latin word *educare*, from which the word 'education' derived, means to 'lead out' or 'raise up'. It is the role of the educator, then, to lead the young and ignorant out of their childhoods and into the knowledge which will prepare them for the real world. It is as much the role of education to present virtue to children as it is to give them knowledge of the abstract. To instil certain moral virtues in young people, or at least to show them the varied philosophies that thinkers have proposed concerning virtue, is to create a generation that values those virtues which they were taught. It is most important to teach creativity and critical thinking in order to promote a wider moral discourse within the young. There is therefore much onus on teachers, for they may carry either the moral successes or the moral decadences of the age upon their shoulders. So it is indeed an engine of unlimited power, but the purpose of education cannot be fully understood under the theory of *tabula rasa*; indeed, it is difficult to tailor education to the needs and desires of individuals when we assume that each person requiring education is just a blank slate.

Today, we often think of education in terms of starting broadly and then allowing children to specialise in areas which they enjoy the most, or find most practical, as they grow up. Some would rather cut out much of this broad teaching and educate via focussed and practical means from a young age. However, look inside any primary school, and you are sure to see children colouring in or painting in at least one of the classes, even if it is only the nursery. Children, when given the opportunity, will attempt to show us the world as they see it. We may look back at the oddly drawn paintings of cars and trees that we made whilst toddlers and laugh, but the reason we did this in the first place was that we wished to try to capture for a moment something which we perceived before we had the full faculties of speech and writing. The truth is that we all have some element of creativity, and whilst some of us may lack the talent to be the next van Gogh, we are all able to draw or paint something to represent the world as we see it. To cut out the arts from education simply because they are considered less practical than subjects such as maths and science is ridiculous. We live for what we love, and whilst we may not all love creation, we can all appreciate the objects of creation. In starting broadly, we give our children the chance to appreciate as much as possible later in life, no matter what specific subject they might choose to specialise in once they are older. It is perfectly possible for a mathematician to admire the composition of a musician, just as much as it is possible for the musician to appreciate the logical deductions of the mathematician, even if he cannot understand them himself.

By denying the child the chance to learn the arts such as music, fine art, language and literature, we deny our own civilisation the next generation of artists. Whilst this is primarily an aesthetic question, it is my own firm belief that artists and philosophers have just as much to offer society as scientists and architects. Without the proper tools in education to facilitate artistic thought, we will confine the next generation of children to a horrid life of minimal contemplation, monotony, dullness and abject slavery. To look at the faces of

commuters in today's metropolises is to look upon the faces of the disappointed: it is necessary for all of us to work, and without education we cannot ever hope to do so, but if all our life is work, within a routine that never stops, within employment which we cannot shake off, then we are either machines or we are slaves. To remove the chance for the young to learn the arts of expression, the knowledge of old and the powerful nature of human interaction outside of the scientific world is to condemn them to live this sort of life. We risk stifling our own civilisation by obsessing about false notions of practicality — it is certainly not a reason why human beings live. We do not live for monotony or slavery; we live for each other.

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Finally we shall consider the role of political institutions. Political institutions are structured and indeed effective forms of national government. Godwin praises, for the most part, the efficacy of political institutions. Political institutions are those things which create and enforce our laws: Parliament, the judiciary, the police. Institutions govern the behaviour of individuals, and as Godwin states, they 'keep men pliant'. On the one hand, we may consider this to be a restriction on our freedom, and Godwin certainly would be no stranger to defending the endless powers of free human reason. Nevertheless, if a political institution is inherently, by nature of the men who run it, or by nature of the laws it enforces, virtuous, then surely political institutions can be nothing but a force of virtue, and thus, moral improvement?

It should be natural for a political institution to operate within a communitarian system. Our parliaments represent the people at the level of national community, individual police forces serve local communities, and the courts are divided up to hold jurisdiction in different parts of the country. Thus, it can be said that political institutions serve local agendas, which look ever upwards towards the national community as a whole. Political institutions, by their very

nature, hold communities together and maintain the rule of law within them. Without communities there would surely be nothing but a faceless society, where individuals alone define their own actions not by any care or attention given to those they know, or those who might be trying to make similar decisions around them, but purely by selfish ends, driven by nothing but an interest in the self. Self-love is a sure path to vice, as it throws true virtue out of the window and replaces it with vice as a means to further self-love. Political institutions, then, not only permit us to live in safety, by protecting our right not to be harmed by those who indulge in self-love, but also reduce self-love in general by those means.

If political institutions are secularised, in the sense at least, in Godwin's terms, that they are not plagued by 'superstition', then provided that they are imbued (usually by cultivating these same virtues in those who run the institutions) with the political virtues of liberty, justice and security, they may actually further the cause of reason among the people whom the institution serves. A judge should not be swayed to pass a judgement by superstition and fear of supernatural reprimand but by the interests of virtue itself. Political institutions ensure that the judge will condemn the thief, not because he will be struck dead by God if he does not but because the thief is an affront to God by the very nature of his misdeed. In short, the thief has harmed his fellow members of the community by taking what is not his — it is virtuous, therefore, for the judge to protect his community by using his institutional power to condemn the thief. As such, the moral quality of the whole community is improved by the punishment of the thief.

There is of course great risk associated with political institutions: that they may present and reinforce by their actions incorrect or irrational moral values. Godwin considers the Catholic belief in transubstantiation — that those taking the Eucharist in church are not eating bread but the physical body of Christ, not drinking wine but the

literal blood of Jesus. It does not take much power of reason to dismiss such notions, but the belief in this as an article of faith was reinforced by centuries of institutionalised practice. With the separation of Church and State becoming more common, if not officially, then at least unofficially such as in Britain, compliance with such beliefs is no longer enforced. It is certainly true that in any sort of moral or factual quandary, political institutions can harm reason and virtue as much as promote them. But take away political institutions and we take away the means to change such virtues. The replacement of the Church with an independent civil judiciary with a firm belief in liberty and justice is enough to remove more troublesome religious prescriptions and begin the path to a morality based on community, mutual security and cooperation within the nation, to which religion may be a mutual friend but not the sole governor. Whether or not the individual derives his morality from God, the nation (rather than human souls) as a whole is more easily and effectively improved when independent political institutions strive for virtue. Political institutions may occasionally encounter individuals who propagate false virtue, but the medium is there to work within an institution to change it, rather than tear it down and be left with nothing.

Godwin's suggestion that political institutions 'give permanence to our errors' is itself erroneous. Political institutions have changed greatly over time, since as Godwin himself claims, error draws attention to its own erroneousness. Vicious conduct demands its own destruction. For instance, the election of members of Parliament used to be limited to only about 300,000 people at the time of the Great Reform Act 1832, in a country of 24 million;<sup>3</sup> that is 1.25% of the population. Today, after years of reform and recognition of what was perceived to be an error, we have universal suffrage for both men and women. We never used to have a police force, and county sheriffs struggled to prevent organised criminals such as highwaymen who plagued British roads. The introduction of local 'runners' and then the police force did much to curb organised crime, and crime today is

much lower than in the past because of it. Political institutions do change, then, and usually for the better after long and considered periods of time when reform can be taken seriously. Political institutions are therefore not dens of either virtue or vice but instead show a fluid development between both. They remain to this day one of the most effective instruments in the promotion of moral virtue and a politically just society on account of their defence of many of our most treasured rights.

## CHAPTER V

# The Influence of Institutions Refuted

**I**T IS THE OPINION of many on the left that political institutions serve little but to defend the interests of those few into whose hands is concentrated the vast majority of wealth and property. In Godwin's time, as is becoming more and more true today, the disparity of wealth between those at the bottom and those at the top of our societies was profound. Whilst those at the top are no longer the aristocracy of despotic monarchies of Europe, we have created for ourselves a new aristocracy who continue to hold the majority of the world's wealth. Celebrity, politician and similar exalted social concepts are all guilty of this. Of course, there are also many differences now to Godwin's time: we have a much more generous social welfare system, the standard of living of those in poverty is much more hygienic and tolerable than it was in the late 18th century, and government is much more representative than it was, considering the expansion of the voting franchise to all. But Godwin's criticism of the inequality of property is not necessarily fair on political institutions.

It would not be fair to criticise political institutions for protecting the wealthy from the crimes of others. Whilst many of the poor of Godwin's time were driven to crime in order to survive, that is indicative of wider social problems with poverty and the failure of governance rather than the failure of political institution itself. The court cannot be blamed for upholding the law. As we have discovered in the previous chapter, it is perfectly reasonable for the rule of law to be enforced, and the thief, no matter what his motives, does not excuse his crime purely because he suffers from poverty. Given the differences in the poverty of Godwin's day and today's relative poverty, we may

also make the argument for economic inequality in general. It has generally been proved that the free market (in its truest sense of being generally free) has benefitted the citizens of the world most effectively when all have the freedom to participate in such markets and when trade in those markets is conducted in a virtuous way. The latter statement is crucial: a market cannot, in fact, be free if those conducting trade within it are not virtuous. It is therefore disappointing to look upon many modern markets and see the outward unfair trading that goes on. But within any truly free market, a degree of economic inequality is required for there to be any incentive to trade in the first place. The very concept of economy relies on certain people having something that others want; otherwise, there would be no reason for the ones wanting to strive to obtain what they want. To quote the famous actor Morgan Freeman in a recent interview in response to the assertion that certain people could not bring themselves out of poverty because of the place and situation in which they were brought up: ‘Man, the bus runs every day.’<sup>4</sup>

Godwin goes on to describe what he considers to be the ‘tyranny’ of the rich, enforced by their creation and administration of the law. He claims that the rich are ‘directly or indirectly the legislators of the state’. He is correct in the sense that the wealthy have a great deal of influence on legislation, and they always have. However, we can contend that what Godwin is describing is not a free society. The wealthy may be able to pressure and influence political institutions in order to corrupt them and swing them towards their influence, but many constitutions explicitly stipulate a separation of powers in order to prevent much of this corruption, and it is the right of every citizen today to lobby their government or their representatives. It is only when the wealthy begin to exclude the rest of the population from lobbying or legal and political representation that Godwin’s criticism becomes pertinent. This sort of society is not a free society, but the political institutions under which Godwin lived certainly operated relatively freely in Britain. So whilst the assertion that political

institutions only serve the interests of the rich is false, it is also true that we should take some heed of Godwin's assertion and consider it a warning for the future. The abolition of institutions such as legal aid by modern government should be opposed seriously and considerately, since this is certainly a sign that we are on the path which leads the rich to exclude poorer citizens from using the institutions created to serve the interests and security of all.

Many of the laws which Godwin cites as favouring the rich over the poor, such as the game laws forbidding a farmer from shooting an animal from a rich man's estate which is preying on livestock from his farm, have since been abolished and replaced in favour of the farmer, and rightly so. Such is the nature of men's realisation of political justice. Nevertheless, there is one further point worth considering: that regarding opinion and wealth. It is as much the case today as it was in the age of Godwin that there is a certain extant snobbery which considers the opinions of those without certain items of property or without wealth in general to be less relevant than the opinions of those who are wealthy and therefore might be considered by some to be better educated in political matters. The prevalence of this worldview has been seen very recently in the general elections of 2015 and 2017 as well as the European Union membership referendum of 2016. It is unfortunate that a sizeable number of people, as seen most obviously in the 'anti-Brexit marches' in London following the referendum result, were of the opinion that those who disagreed with them were 'exploited' and 'misinformed'. In political discourse, no matter what the opinions of the individual are, such snobbery is an active danger to a democratic system. Soon enough, might not the time come when such individuals consider silencing those whom they consider to be the source of such 'misinformation'? As we have already affirmed, to ban the literature or opinions of those who hold differing opinions can only serve the hindrance of progress in political justice.

Monopolies held on political opinion and economic control can

never allow for a clear path to a free and just society, and in this respect, Godwin is correct. More often than not, it is those who are wealthier who are quicker to jump on opportunities to silence and control those beneath them who express dissent. However, the solution is not the destruction of our political institutions and the creation of new ones from square one, or none at all in their place. We cannot blame political institutions for upholding and representing the law as they were set up to do; it is merely the actions within or upon those institutions which can do damage to our quest for political justice. So it is the duty of citizens seeking such justice to operate against such forces within the framework of political institutions. Such institutions, as we have said before, have been inherited by us from our ancestors in order to serve the interests of all in the nation. Let us then make use of those institutions created to serve us, and work to achieve more political justice from whatever (however little) has been left to us, rather than destroy them and be left with no justice whatsoever.

## CHAPTER VI

# Perpetual Human Improvement

**W**E HAVE TOUCHED before on the nature of humanity as a race that perpetually seeks to improve itself and build upon the innovations of its past generations. If history can teach us anything, then it is this inherent nature of improvement. Let us follow the example of Godwin, then, and continue by examining humanity's ability for perpetual improvement.

No matter how much we may criticise what we now perceive to be the moral deficiencies of history, no matter how much we are dissatisfied with certain customs and actions of our ancestors, none can deny the leaps and bounds that mankind has made in its progress throughout history. The journey from caveman to skyscraper-dweller has not been a smooth one, nor has it been especially quick, but it is no less remarkable because of this. Whilst other animals act on instinct and learn by repetition and the black-and-white nature of pain versus reward, our capacity for reason and logic places us on a higher plane when compared to most other living creatures. Whilst it does not eliminate our slavery to instinct completely, and it is by no means a universal tool in overcoming earthly obstacles, it does give us a certain thirst for understanding, or as many philosophers have called it, 'truth'. Human history has progressed on a generally positive incline since the first appearance of the race, both in terms of the structure of its civilisation and in terms of its adaptation to its environments. Once again, we need only observe the differences between the caveman and the Persian farmer, the medieval farmer and the 18<sup>th</sup>-century Enlightenment gentleman, or the Victorian prude and the modern human to see these positive changes throughout time. Sure enough, this progression has been by no means a purely straight line. There have been plenty of bumps along the way; the Dark Ages following the

fall of the Roman Empire, when much classical knowledge was lost, attest to this. It was not truly until the destruction of Constantinople and the discovery of lost books that the thinkers of Europe began to exploit these new ideas and technologies to the full. But even in the medieval period, great writers like Dante, Petrarch and Chaucer still came and went, and have made significant contributions to literature and philosophy. The very fact that the Dark Ages set mankind back by some ways in terms of its progression did not stop great men from continuing to strive for greater things. Thus, no matter what setbacks humankind faces, it still desires to seek yet more knowledge and wisdom for itself.

We may easily counter Godwinian assertions that institutions harm the further progression of humankind by pointing out that almost all of the progress made by humanity across known history has taken place within the institutions which it created for itself, even if they might be flawed, and even if they might have faced certain setbacks. Reason can only extend as far as the human can think and understand the knowledge that has already been presented to him. It is necessary to discover new sources of knowledge if our powers of reason are to begin finding new wisdoms to apply to that knowledge. Anything that we might assert to be true before we have knowledge of its nature is nothing other than pure abstraction. It is abstraction that we shall consider next — for it has been a pet hate of conservatives, and love of radicals, for at least the past three hundred years.

Abstraction can be defined as an idea which has not yet been proved or created in practice and exists solely as a concept within the mind. For example, I might claim that it is possible to breed a flying pig, but this is purely an abstract idea, and is extremely difficult if not impossible to prove in practice. Equally, I might claim that it is possible to obtain political justice by abolishing political institutions, but this is difficult to prove to be pragmatic, since civilised society has always operated according to political institutions. Even supposedly

'barbarian' nations of antiquity had governmental and judicial structures of some primitive kind. The only time when political institutions did not exist was before civilisation existed, and our ancestors were first experimenting with the ideas for institutions by trial and error in order to find the right system. Here is the crux of the matter: there is simply no need for abstraction. All of the work trying and testing ideas for institutions and governments has been done by those who came before, and we would do well to appreciate the work they have done. New and innovative ideas can only be given practical assurances if they build upon or work within pre-existing institutions, seeking to improve them in some way in light of comprehensive evidence which can be supported either with fact or with convincing logic. This is how human civilisation has improved upon its pre-existing institutions for thousands of years.

Godwin considers language to be one of the most powerful tools in human advancement. Indeed, we have already discussed literature at length and the power of the written word. Language has certainly done well in furthering the course of ideas and the development of those ideas into coherent and practical institutions, but to place so much emphasis on language is potentially to miss far more important arguments. He considers the differences between hieroglyphic writing and alphabetic writing and draws the difference in societal progress at this distinction. For instance, he remarks that societies with alphabetic writing systems outperformed those cultures such as ancient Egypt, and these civilisations themselves had evolved from using pictures to represent sound (he considers hieroglyphics a separate language in and of itself, running concurrent with the real sounds of the language) to using an alphabet. He then concedes that China, for instance, still uses a hieroglyphic writing system, but considers this to be a cultural difference, yet observes that Chinese symbols are easily corrupted by the common people in everyday usage into new ones.

Godwin's argument is not wholly sound. Hieroglyphics may look

alien to the user of the Roman alphabet, but this is purely a cultural distinction. The Roman alphabet itself is derived from a hieroglyphic writing system used by the ancient Phoenicians, in which 'A' (*aleph*) represented an ox, 'B' (*beth*) a house and so on. Letters are really symbols, and however speech is conveyed in written form, it continues to have the same relevance to human knowledge and progression. So what if the letters are arranged left to right, right to left, top to bottom? So what if the image of a snake represents 's', an ox 'a'? It is first speech that comes to us and then the ability to write. How we write is irrelevant. There have been great works written in Chinese, the *Art of War* of Sun Tzu, the *Analects* collected from Confucius; in Egypt, the most beautiful poems have been transcribed, such as those from Deir el-Medina.

It is always content that has value, and in this vein, Godwin misses the most important mover of human progress, which is the nature of this content: reason and thought itself. If we did not have rational minds, we would not be able to undertake a comprehensive review of political justice; whether we could write it or not in this way or that does not change the fact that our nature allows us the ability to consider political justice at all. It is our minds that allow us to consider the notion of 'justice' in the first place rather than simply be driven to seek retribution at our own hands. We may well have to if the institutions of justice are not present, but we ensure that justice is always present in our society by maintaining institutions which uphold and propagate the notion of it. It is too sorry a thing that terms such as 'justice' and 'political freedom' are bandied around much like playthings in modern political discourse. These are in fact deep-seated philosophical ideas which have been established and discussed over millennia. To simply stand before a crowd and claim to be a pursuer of 'justice' is not enough, for we must know what that justice is we seek. This is why we are rational beings, since in order to properly achieve justice in society, we first move ourselves to define it. It may not be an easy task, but it is in this vein that humans have the capacity for

perpetual improvement. We may never achieve true justice in its purest form, but by continually striving for it as well as other virtues, humanity has pulled itself out of caves and into skyscrapers. That struggle, to continually strive for improvement, even if it can never be fully achieved, is the most effective form of self-improvement.

So Godwin is correct in many senses. Humankind has strong powers of improvement, but it would be dangerous to risk those powers on abstractions which would require us to begin from those same first steps our ancestors took when the quest for truth was first begun. It is only right for us to pursue our own betterment, but it is equally right to do so within the context of the betterment that has already been provided for us via the legacy of our ancestors. No one is arguing that there is no room left for future improvement, but if the arguments of thinkers such as Godwin are to be believed, then there is no point for us, in his own words, 'to look back', since he would apparently present us with a brand-new set of principles which do not even attempt to build upon the past but rather offer a radical new vision which has not yet been tried.

## Perception and Liberty

**T**HE ROMAN philosopher Lucretius considered that the mind, as well as the eyes, had the capacity to ‘see’, albeit in different ways to the senses. All human understanding is built upon perceptions of some kind, be they physical forms manifested in sight, sound, smell and touch or purely mental perceptions. But these physical sensations can as much affect the mind as they can affect the body — Godwin, for instance, points out that corporal punishment affects the mind morally as it affects the body physically; that is to say that by associating the pain of being beaten with a certain action deemed to be immoral, our minds work in such a way as to prevent us from being beaten again, and avoid the action previously undertaken. Of course, corporal punishment is not used in most modern schools any longer, but similar punishments are exacted on animals, which associate the loud assailing of their ears by shouting or a clip on the snout with a certain ‘bad’ action, which trains them against misbehaving again in the future.

Of course, this sort of thing is only effected immediately after any sort of misdeed, since retrospective punishment would only be effective on those who constantly make use of their reason, thus associating a past deed with a present punishment. Most of us are not like this, so it is only partly true that physical perception has a relationship to moral perceptions.

Our ideas are divided into two main categories: our imagination and our sense-derived perception. Imagination can conjure all number of scenarios, be they derived from real people and events or be they the mere creations of the individual’s mind, imagination remains a subjective experience which exists purely within the experience of the one imagining. Our sense-perception, on the other hand, whilst it is

also subjective in the sense that we can only ever see the world through our own eyes and no one else's, is based on the observation of a world which is by nature objective; that is to say, it exists independently, without us. The world is our 'idea' inasmuch as our own perception of the events that happen within it guide our own interpretation of what sort of world it actually is. Hence, there are those of optimistic character and those who are pessimistic; we see men and women who cannot find any inherent reason why they would wish to keep living, as far as they view the world, and there are those who think that life is the greatest gift ever given to man. These distinctions seem to me not to be derived through various interpretations of 'illness' and 'health' of the mind but instead via differing perceptions of events which are subject to change over time and by outside influence once we learn about the perceptions of those around us. This is precisely why the person who sees no inherent meaning in life can be brought around to find some — not because his brain must be suppressed into thinking the 'right way' but because he can be shown that there are other ways of viewing the world, or that there are opportunities within it which he could not see in the past.

In today's world, we increasingly turn towards a system which dictates a 'correct' way of viewing the world. Those who question it or offer alternative ways of interpreting life are victimised for their disagreement. Kierkegaard, for instance, once famously declared, 'But how long is threescore and ten years? Why not end it all now?'<sup>5</sup> If he were to express such sentiment to a doctor today, he would be sectioned and restrained, further adding reason to his legitimate belief that the established view of life was ridiculous. A few years after writing that same tract, Kierkegaard came around to a belief in Jesus Christ: 'to lose your mind and gain God', and finally he found some meaning in life. It takes a small amount of critical thinking, or perhaps not even that, perhaps just reading of different worldviews, to change one's mind. The man despairing over his lack of luck in love need only meet a beautiful woman who loves him back to have his mind changed

on his opinion that no one would ever love him. There are subtle events and thoughts which can influence individuals to make radical changes to their lives, and it is all derived from the way we perceive the world ourselves, and what others tells us about how they see the world. What can we learn from this, more importantly? We can see from this that there is nothing more important than listening to others who hold differing viewpoints to ourselves, since in listening to them we might come to have strength in our own perceptions, or look again at the world and come to a different conclusion to before. Everything is subjective, and thus everything, like the human beings who observe this world, is subject to change. Whether or not the change is subtle or remarkable is irrelevant — change always occurs, it is merely up to us as individuals to decide which one suits us best.

Perceptions may be incredibly subjective, but equally subjective is the nature of the human body itself. Whilst others can influence our perceptions to a certain extent, and thus the pressure of our peers may influence our own free will, our bodies remain our property, no matter what the mind is influenced by. The human body is as much a part of knowing as it is a part of mundane life, and to overlook it is to neglect ourselves in a literal sense. All knowing begins with the body if all knowing begins with sense: I awake each morning, stretch out my limbs and know that I have awoken and I am to face a new day; I open my eyes and see the world around me that I recognise so well, I reach out to touch the glass of water by my bedside and I know that it is there because I can feel it, and I can raise the water to my lips and feel the cool liquid seep down my throat, providing life to each cell it touches. To know about one's surroundings is to know one's body; to know about oneself is to know one's body; to know anything is to know one's body! The body is an object, and exists objectively, without the need for experience, and yet it is our bodies that are the instruments of our every experience — without them we would not exist, and yet even if each one of us were born completely numb, we would still exist in a bodily form. The fact that we are able to interpret the world through

our own minds, and the sensations that our minds receive thereof, is a blessing for which we cannot help but be grateful to whatever force it was that created us.

For us to be able to understand the world through our bodies, however, is dependent upon the laws of nature itself. Isaac Newton was the first to record these laws properly, and we know from his theories of gravity and motion that that no body can move without a force acting upon it. Every sensation we feel, and thus everything we come to perceive about the world, is derived from some power we have acted upon, or via the body we are interacting with responding to the force we place on it. Every part of nature is inspired by force — thus, for humans who feel that force in their nerves, everything is sense-based. Everyone learns about Newton in school, as he rightfully should do, but why not learn also what allows us to perceive the very world in which we live? Why not connect what we feel to how we live? The flowers in the bed of my garden move with the wind, and if I were to set up an object against them, they would move over time to bend away from it towards the sunlight that they need for life — they too can perceive the world around them and adapt to it based on what they feel. Humans, who have far greater powers of mind, can surely do much greater things based on the knowledge of the things they feel! We see every subject with our eyes, yet we pay so little respect to our eyes. Our eyes are the source of everything — the things we feel, and therefore know, would have no form without eyes. Our eyes give us so much more than sight.

We all dream. We close our eyes some nights, and visions appear to us, uncalled for, surreal, sometimes disturbing, sometimes thought-provoking — we all dream, even those who lose their sight. What we have seen gives us the subject of our visions, for everything we see, everything we perceive, sits in our minds and forms the subject of our knowledge. Our knowledge never sleeps, even when our bodies are inert. As greatly intelligent beings, we require great amounts of mental

stimulation, and our minds can never fully stop working — hence they work even in a resting state, and objects of perception we have observed and understood during our time awake come back to us in sleep — sometimes to haunt and frighten, other times to educate, still other times to replicate. The fact is that dreams are nothing more than the projection of our perceptions onto our mind's eye (by which I mean the seat of our imagination, the first category of idea) so that we see, or rather imagine we are seeing, something in our dream, when in reality it is merely an idea wrought into shape by our restless mind. It is easy to understand why the ancients believed that dreams were given to humans by gods, or that spirits of the dead could appear to the living in dreams. All that we try to understand and create visual representations of in our minds on Earth — God, our dead companions and lovers — all these things we perceive. Thus, it is only natural that those perceptions will return to us in dream as their figures form mental pictures for us to look back over. Before we could think seriously about whether or not deities and spirits had a major role to play in our societies, we might well have been disposed to blame dreams on the supernatural, especially if we were of a superstitious mind. But being in the knowledge of the philosophy of sense and perception, and the knowledge derived from it, we can safely say that dreams are nothing more than projections of reality. That does not mean that dreams cannot be inspiring, however.

Aside from time spent thinking and writing, I enjoy musical composition. I like to think that what I write is enough to express what I personally seek to put across in the music, and whilst I would never consider myself a master, I have devoted considerable study to music in order to learn the techniques which the masters used to put their own artistic visions into practice. A number of years ago, whilst contemplating whether or not it was practical for me to even begin planning the composition of an orchestral symphony, I felt so overshadowed by the works of the master composers that I almost gave up on the idea. However, one evening I saw the figure of Ludwig van

Beethoven in a dream, who told me under protest that whilst I didn't think I could ever match, let alone surpass, works such as his, he thought that 'That is no reason to stop you. You won't know until you try.' Did Beethoven come to me in that dream and tell me to write a symphony? Certainly not! I had been listening to the works of the man and reading about him at the time; he was most certainly deeply impressed on my mind's eye. The fact of the matter was that I did want to write a symphony, but my own anxieties and fears kept me pinned down — my dream was a manifestation of my own desire; it was merely presented as an image formed out of my recent perceptions and associations between my own desire to be a composer and the respect I had for the great composer.

A few years after my dream and subsequent composition of the work, the symphony was performed — but not because some other person or spirit told me to 'get on with it'. I reached that stage purely by my own volition, though I needed a few pushes and shoves along the way from my own subconscious perception. There was something inside me which drove me on despite my predisposition to abandon my own projects. It is that same will that has driven me to write this book. But if our sensations and perceptions (derived from the body) are the root of all knowledge, what is it, if anything, that drives the mind separately from knowledge? It is perfectly possible to not be especially intellectually gifted and still live a life which seems at least to be fulfilled. Perception is important in the forming of our worldviews, but is there something beneath that, which permeates the whole of humanity? I have touched before on the idea that there is something which drives us on, something which causes humanity to further itself, create the causes and effects of its own advancement via the medium of family and self-improvement. There is a will, and where there is a will, there is a way.

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To use our reason to understand our perceptions is an intensely

liberating experience. Many philosophers have considered an understanding of the true nature of things to be a source of liberty. We have frequently used the term 'liberty' to define a virtue within political societies, but let us now see what liberty is. Liberty is not merely a freedom of action, as it is often defined in political discourse, but it is also a freedom of the mind. Not necessarily free from influence, since the influence of others can never be truly escaped, but a freedom from constant anxiety. Some philosophers consider embracing anxiety and recognising it as part of human nature to be the only method of ceasing to fear it; others have suggested methods of reducing one's anxiety to the point that it is nothing more than a minor annoyance. In the search for political justice, there is a great deal of anxiety, which presents a somewhat ironic situation when we claim to be seeking out liberty.

To walk with a free mind as well as a free body within society is to go onto the street and be able to be free from the worry that another person might come to harm us. It is one thing to have the freedom to leave one's home and go for a walk; it is quite another to believe firmly in the assurance that we will not be harmed while doing so. It is a question frequently asked: where should we draw the line with freedom? The line must be drawn as much within the grounds of mental liberty as it must within those of personal liberty. It is not the sign of a free society that there is a chance that others, in exercising their 'freedom', have the opportunity to do unto others howsoever they wish. If another man or woman should come to harm at the hands of a fellow citizen, then that citizen should be considered for punishment. Here we find a possible definition for short-term justice; legal justice surely falls within the grounds of maintenance of that mental liberty. So long as I may walk on the streets without fear of being robbed, assaulted or murdered, then justice is being served rightly. Political justice is a much broader term, and in our search for this, we have yet to consider society itself, government and the mechanisms by which these things operate. To achieve legal justice, our mental and physical liberty as defined above must be protected and maintained by the

forces of law already in existence, but to achieve political justice, we must find a system of government which is most effective at creating a state of liberty and keeping it fit to be passed on to future generations.

The philosopher Isaiah Berlin was the first to theorise that liberty falls within two distinct schools. These are the concepts of 'positive liberty' and 'negative liberty'. Positive liberty is generally considered to be the granting to people of the right to fulfill their own potential and act on their free will. It might be defined within the attitude of 'I am my own master'. A positive liberal will generally see social blights as constraints on his free will and will pursue progressive social policies in order to allow certain people to have more of a voice in politics. Therefore, positive liberty has generally been associated with modern social liberalism and the centre to moderate centre-left brand of liberalism that it is associated with.

Negative liberty, on the other hand, is more of an 'I will not be anyone's slave' attitude. It is the belief that people should be free from external constraints imposed by others. For a long time, negative liberty was the brand of liberalism subscribed to by the greatest political philosophers, and its practice can be seen in the policies of more modern politicians as well.

Positive liberty is founded to an extent in modern egalitarianism. Negative liberty's argument for freedom from restraint is founded in moral philosophy. When considering what is 'right' and what is 'wrong' by moral standards, many people are guided by different things. Different religions have different outlooks based on cultural and historical definitions of morality. In Britain, even though we are living in an increasingly secular society, it would be fair to say that the vast majority of British people retain a sense of what is right and wrong, regardless of whether they are religious or not. Generally, we view any sort of harm done to others that could have been avoided to be morally wrong, especially in today's age. It is for these reasons that we have the law — to prevent people from causing harm to others and punish them

by removing them from society and limiting some of their previous freedoms as they learn how to be a part of a functional society.

Civil liberties that are most commonly upheld in Western liberal democracies are entwined with the concept of negative liberty. Guaranteeing freedom of speech, freedom of the press and other such freedoms guarantees no repression or restrictions on an individual's right to present his opinions and conduct his way of life as he sees fit. It was not initially out of ideology that the American revolutionaries rose up against the British but out of a desire for moral treatment. If liberty is restricted, then we, as a people, are harmed. If our freedoms are restricted, then we are either living under a tyranny or we are on the way to living under one. Tyranny of any kind, be it the tyranny of one person or the tyranny of mental fear in lawless societies, is fundamentally morally harmful, because it controls individuals – it does not allow them to blossom freely; it seeks to program and control them in line with the tyrant's own wishes.

Tyranny does not allow for free intellectual progression, nor for the sharing of ideas, and it often degenerates into the physical harming of those who dissent to it. Therefore, for the state to be truly moral, and refrain from the harming of its citizens intellectually and physically, it must firstly guarantee liberty and secondly punish and seek to rehabilitate those who infringe upon the liberty of others, physically or arbitrarily. This is why anarchy is an ineffectual system, since whilst it abolishes the concept of normative law, and citizens of anarchy may have the freedom to act as they please, it cannot guarantee complete liberty of both mind and body. As Edmund Burke said, 'Liberty too, must be limited in order to be possessed.' The boundary for liberty is drawn at harm and unnecessary distress.

Liberty, then, is a philosophy, an idea, and one that has been proved to work in countless societies. Britain, the United States, and several continental countries have all prided themselves on the concept of liberty (though only a few have ever come close to achieving complete

liberty). By this logic, then, libertarian societies (as we might call them) are possible across the globe. The only thing that has held back many societies from striving for liberty within their countries has been the attitudes of their leaders, defined by Godwin as ‘the higher orders who profit by a contrary system’. He is correct, and those ‘higher orders’ care little for systems which benefit those who lie outside of their orders; however, it should be the goal of every society to find a system which benefits everyone, not just the higher orders and not just the lower orders — this has been established wisdom since at least the time of Aristotle. So, a society which operates under the premise of complete liberty, one which protects its citizens from the fear of loss of liberty and security as much as it maintains the laws which have been made to protect its citizens, can be said to be truly just. This situation is ideal for both those of wealthier and poorer disposition: both are protected, and both are afforded the same rights and social potential. In a fully free society, talent can arise from all parts of society, allowing for the enrichment and improvement of that society.

Let it then be said that by coming to know and understand the nature of the world and our moral and physical perceptions, we can work to create the most morally just government by the means of complete liberty.

## CHAPTER VIII

# Luxury and Decadence

**W**E HAVE NOT yet faced what is perhaps the largest elephant in the room: decadence. It is all too easy to speak about the capacity for continuous self-improvement within man but then to look at the state of affairs in the world today and despair. It increasingly seems that such assertions could never bear truth, at least in the times in which we now live.

It has always been self-indulgence which has crippled and destroyed the most stable and respectable of civilisations. The Roman Empire's demise came about with the excessive spending of its emperors and governors and the failure to maintain effective forces for the maintenance of its borders. In the modern age, we frequently hear of those in the news, such as bankers and financial managers, who are paid exceedingly high salaries and bonuses which reward them for no outward achievements other than the destruction of our financial system. It is certainly not a good sign for our times that this sort of situation is now requiring management, and one need only cast his eyes upon the sorry state of national debts across the world to see just how ridiculous this situation has now become. But despair should not be our sole response to the troubles of our times, for whilst we may despair at the luxury and decadence eating away at our national wealth and integrity that we observe around us, we have no choice but to work on, lest we face a total collapse.

Earlier we used the example of the Dark Ages to prove that mankind continues to improve itself exponentially even in ages when it has been set back several paces. Of course, what this undulating line of progress proves to us is that there will be times in which we are required to live on the declining side of one of the undulations. Slothful habits, moral degeneracy and a lack of interest in political justice and the general

commonwealth marks ages such as this. This is of course to be criticised, and it is to be desired to live in one of the inclines of societal improvement rather than one of the declines. What we must never forget in our pursuance of political justice is that mankind will always, as history proves, pull itself upwards, but sometimes it is necessary to fall down in order to pull ourselves up yet higher again. Ages are much like human beings in the sense that like humans, they have the capacity to be worn out, to run out of the energy which first drove their intellectual and social improvements, and as they slow, they begin to lose that verve which provided success. In losing that energy, we may lose some things which were dear to us, but once things become so bad that it would seem there is little further to fall, humankind will realise there is a necessity for another boost of intellectual and moral energy.

In order for this to become a reality, one crucial element is required: undying effort. Those who notice and reflect upon the decline going on around them must refuse to indulge in it with their peers, even if it seems sumptuous and inviting. Work must never cease to criticise the excesses of the age and defend the principles of liberty and justice which have upheld human civilisations for millennia. By these efforts, it may be possible to soften the blow of decline, or if not, then it will certainly be possible to inspire others to achieve greater things once future generations have reached the very bottom of the decline which we have witnessed.

Now of course such declines will affect our political institutions as well as the people within our societies. Justice may seem to weaken and pull away at the edges, and legislation may seem inadequate or may even serve to reduce liberty rather than maintain or further it. To this end, there is little to be done but to criticise and to defend, but once again, we must remember to take heart, for eventually all such attempts at destroying these political institutions will result in such an awful state of society that the original state of these institutions will not be merely demanded by the people of the nation but deemed to be

more than necessary. An age of decadence is a time of immense change, and it may well be distressing to witness; we shall now lay out three key principles by which the progress of mankind and its institutions may be maintained throughout such ages.

We should hold no sympathy for the partakers in decadence; it is one thing to enjoy a little personal pleasure here and there, quite another to spend excessively and debase the body with meaningless and worthless activities and objects which offer no contribution towards moral good. We must continue in our search for truth; it would not be right to surrender — if not in body and expense, then in mind — to decadence, so if society is threatened, we must not be afraid to openly speak out against its threats and continue to promote political justice. Finally, we must not fear the decline; humanity will always find a way, and justice will eventually be served, so use the decline as an opportunity for the good of man — do not be afraid.

Mankind will always be guilty of error, and it is these errors which lead us into situations such as decline. Political institutions and ideas which have been proved to work pragmatically will prevail, however, so long as there are good men present to continue to promote and defend them. The presence of such men, either in large or small quantities, has aided humanity throughout its history, and the quest for truth and justice should not end purely because it is the opinion of some that those values are no longer welcome in our ancient societies.

BOOK II.  
**PRINCIPLES OF SOCIETY**

## CHAPTER I

# Introduction

ONE OF THE chief debates of the Enlightenment was that over the existence of the social contract. Today we take the nature of political society for granted. If you were to ask anyone in a democratic country today whether it is the people who give legitimacy to their government or whether the government itself derives its own legitimacy, that is to say, whether power is given upwards by the people or imposed downwards by government, then I should think most of them would say that it is the people who hold the power and merely consent to others representing their power in legislative bodies via elections. This is generally known as contract theory. For its time, such theory was groundbreaking, for it completely cut God out of the equation; the giver of legitimacy was no longer God but the people. Considering how few of us make the leap of religious faith in the West today, or at least apply that faith to politics, the same holds true for most societies.

The problem with contract theory is that it could be applied to almost anything; all rests on the nature of the contract itself. If the people of a nation were to elect a dictator, such a man could commit all sorts of tyrannical acts merely by claiming that he derives his authority from the election of the people. A social contract, we might then say, is only effective in democratic or representative forms of government. But there is often an objection raised in schools of philosophy — what if there is a benevolent dictator? Absolute rulers are not always evil, so why would the people wish to not elect such a leader? The nature of the sort of contract that a political society chooses for itself depends closely on the sort of moral justice it chooses. We have already considered morality itself to be semi-absolute and viewed political morality to be a certain kind of complete liberty. However, we have yet to consider

contentious points of morality, to discern right from wrong and whether there is a perfect set of morals which binds society together as a whole. Indeed, we cannot have a contract without terms.

In choosing a government of any kind, we are not entrusting our leaders merely with power but with our very morals and social integrity. It is a huge trust to place in others, so let us now consider what sort of morals this society should build itself upon before we even consider what sort of government would best defend it. One thing must be made absolutely clear, however: there is such a thing as society. As Godwin writes, 'society is in every state a blessing'; we may consider society to be that desire for mutual assistance that humankind tapped into in order to begin the first stages of moral improvement and the creation of civilisation. Government, or the direction and restriction of such interpersonal interaction, arose from separate needs which only became apparent when society grew into civilisation.

## CHAPTER II

# Morality and Justice

**G**ODWIN'S OVERARCHING view of morality does some justice (if you will pardon the pun) to morality as a whole. Individuals exist individually, but ultimately they are parts of a whole. Therefore, in distinguishing between what is right and what is wrong, there must be some virtue afforded to society (the whole) by the act of judging between these two. Thus, since politics is a search for another sort of justice — the search for an effective government which offers complete liberty — politics is inexorably linked with moral justice. Moral infringements must be considered a threat to complete liberty because of the fear and instability they offer to that liberty, if not immediately then over the course of time. As such, a politically just government must subscribe to morality, lest it lose the very thing which allows humankind to flourish, and thus itself.

In Godwin's tract, his discussion of justice begins by considering the command 'love thy neighbour as thyself'. It is of course a Biblical command, often known as Christ's 'Golden Rule', and it holds a particularly special place in the conduct of many Christians. However, it is not merely a Christian phenomenon today, nor is it a concept devised exclusively by Christ. Many cultures have taught similar concepts, and there remain similar proverbs and maxims, such as 'you reap what you sow' and 'you get back what you give', the former, for instance, quoted from the Roman orator Cicero.<sup>6</sup> The foundation of society pivots around this: that my neighbour, or as we might call him today, my fellow citizen, shares certain rights with me, certain political aims (such as liberty, or perhaps more broadly, happiness) and certain values and characteristics; hence, I owe my fellow citizen a certain respect in the same manner that he owes me respect, and by respecting each other and recognising that we both must seek a path to happiness,

we might help each other and more easily come to find what it is that we seek. Justice, then, is as much about benefitting each other as it is benefitting ourselves, for it is only through benefitting one another that we can benefit society as a whole, since individuals are part of the whole. This is the foundation of nationhood as a whole. Some have called this sort of relationship between fellow citizens to be the ‘first-person plural’<sup>7</sup> which binds me (the individual) to my neighbours (the nation).

Understanding the value, role and place of each individual within society is crucial in the search for justice. The truth is, whilst there is an inequality of nature in man, that some will not have the capacity for the judiciary, whilst others will be adept farmers, and still others will have the capacity not for farming but for architecture, but the role of every labourer, be he a physical or mental labourer, serves some benefit to his nation. Both the bricklayer and the philosopher contribute; the philosopher to the search for truth, the bricklayer to the housing of his fellows. Work should not simply be a means to an end; it should be an act confirming the binding of society. This is why we must consider a crime against the bricklayer just as serious as a crime against the philosopher. It matters not that the bricklayer’s name might not be remembered by history, for he made a contribution to his country no less worthy of respect than that of the philosopher. So even in a world of inequality, each part of society relies on the other for its survival. There would be no homes without bricklayers and no ideas without philosophers.

An objection often raised is this: why cannot the bricklayer be a philosopher too? Or the philosopher a bricklayer? Perhaps they could be either, but one cannot be everything. As we have stated before, there is a certain inequality of aptitude in humankind. We may have varied interests, but interest is quite different to aptitude. There is no reason why the bricklayer could not have an interest in philosophy, but if he has an aptitude for philosophy, he should not be wasting his time

laying bricks; rather, he should be debating and adding to public discourse on ideas. Equally, those who offer nothing original or nothing rational and worthwhile to philosophical discourse should spend their time on other things which suit them better, and which serve to benefit society in other ways. Morally, the bricklayer and philosopher are equal, even if they are intellectually unequal, and so in a just society, both should be treated equally by the law.

Next we may consider the following hypothesis: ‘My mother is a murderer and a thief. I commit no such crimes as she does, and live a virtuous life, yet I still respect my mother despite her crimes and refuse to turn her in because she is my mother, and she bore me, endured much pain to raise me and even had to steal to feed me sometimes. Without her I would have perished. I love my mother. Am I correct in doing this?’<sup>8</sup>

This poses interesting dilemmata. On the one hand, this man’s mother has broken the law in the most grievous of ways. She has infringed on the liberty of others not merely by the acquisition of unowned property but also by the unjustified removal of life (by which we define murder). Yet we are under the impression that without these actions, the mother would not have been able to raise her child, and her child, rightfully respecting his moral duty to love and respect his mother, will not report her crimes. A just response would seem to be as follows: the man has every right to love his mother, for she has indeed endured both the hardship of childbirth and of life in general in order to raise her child. No son could ever do anything but respect his parents for the work they put in to keep him happy and prepare him for life in mainstream society. However, the very fact that the man can continue to respect his mother for her status does not excuse her crimes. He may continue to love her, but if he is just, he should turn her in. Why? Because her actions serve only the damage of complete liberty, and if her example is not punished, further such damage will be more readily inflicted by others. If this man recognises justice and his

fellow citizens and feels a connexion with them, feels that he owes them security and liberty in political society, then for their sake he will help justice to be served. The fact that his mother was forced by whatever need or poverty to rob and to kill for her children must not go unnoticed either, and surely proves a certain deficiency of government or society, which must be taken note of. By punishing those who, out of whatever good or ill will, damage the complete liberty of society, but also recognising that the means for such damage often comes from deficiencies of society itself, we and our neighbours may begin to work to remove the means for damage in the future. Thus, justice also produces the means for self-improvement.

There is one further brief enquiry to be made about this contention: the man states, 'I commit no such crimes as she does, and live a virtuous life'. We have already defined virtue as that which benefits our fellow man, for if virtue is moral excellence, then it is proof of one's ability to excel to put something towards the benefit of mankind. Therefore, given the arguments we have put forward above, we might contend that this man cannot be considered wholly virtuous if he continues to refuse to turn his mother in. It would be an asset to his nation and a proof of his virtue if he were to remove that moral blight upon his nation, the one who has murdered and taken what is not hers to take — not only property, but life itself. Perhaps, then, we would be more correct to assert that one can be virtuous not merely by abstaining from vice but rather by being unselfish: going out of one's way to help one's fellow man and serve the progress of humanity in doing so is true virtue, for it is removing thought of the self and instead focussing entirely on the benefit of those other than the self. Of course it will be impossible, due to human nature, to remove all thoughts and actions conceived purely for self-benefit, but to strive for virtue, we must adopt the helping of others as our primary philosophy. In this way, we can strive for the creation of completely libertarian societies and a progressive and more virtuous race of men.

This principle of virtue, however, presents us with yet more dilemmata: ‘If a man in greater poverty than I approaches me and begs for something, am I, if I am a virtuous man, obliged to give him whatever he asks for, since I should strive to cast off all thoughts for self and think entirely for the sake of others?’

The answer ‘yes’ to this conundrum would seem to be consistent with the principle of virtue that we have laid out before; however, if we think more deeply about what such action would mean in the context of society, it is in fact not so. If this man were to acquiesce to every request that each beggar made to him as he passed, then we would end up with the same situation as we began with, the roles simply reversed — the richer man as beggar and the beggars as richer men. So, to cast one’s cares from oneself onto others does not mean to cast one’s property onto them. We have already discovered that the freedom to own private property is a crucial component of complete liberty in a nation, so instead of impoverishing himself, the man should instead use his other political rights to petition his government to house the beggars until such time as they can find income and pay for housing of their own.

A caveat: whilst there is a moral duty of government to ensure that each citizen has the opportunity to enjoy liberty and happiness, there is a certain culture of dependence which grows from having the state provide things such as housing and income for long periods of time. A just government would be strict in its provision, for whilst it has a moral duty to do so, it also has a moral duty not to kill off its people’s aspiration by providing for them. Short-term economic support can be justified, so long as it really is short-term, and the opportunity for self-provision and aspiration can be offered to the neediest. Due to the natural inequality of man, there will always be a divide between rich and poor — how we approach the problem of provision, however, is merely a question of scale and extent. If the gap between rich and poor is remarkably large, then government has probably created far too

great a culture of dependence.

It is Godwin's claim that money, either that earned by one's own labours or that inherited from ancestors, should be considered a general trust for the betterment of humankind. That is to say, a man should not be able to spend his own money at his own will, but rather he should only be permitted to spend it on things that are considered to be 'beneficial' to others, or indeed, if his neighbour lacks £100 that the rich man can spare, provided there is no better use for the money, the neighbour has a strong case for the money to be forcibly moved from the rich man to him. Such ideas are in fact a threat to liberty itself. Contrary to Godwin's claims, such policies can never further complete liberty in a society, since it does not merely remove the freedom from the individual to exercise his own discretion with his own money and property, but it also exerts a mental oppression — a fear that the citizen will never know what forces might descend upon him to order him to spend his money on this or that thing, purely because it is deemed to be 'beneficial' to others. It is in fact a tyrannical and despotic notion, rather than one of liberty, to force anyone to spend his money in a particular way. Now, if a man has money to spare and wishes of his own volition to use it for charitable means, then that is a different matter entirely. He may choose to house the beggar because he can afford to, but in a society which holds liberty as its chief aim, no one has the right to claim that he is owed an amount of anything purely because he lacks it. Such entitlement swiftly leads to the destruction of liberty and the enforcement of tyranny, since the only way to claim property rightfully owned by others is either by theft or legal theft, such as via state confiscation of goods. The question of whether or not the rich man should petition his government, and then whether the government should help the beggars in their time of need, is purely a matter of morals. The virtuous man will, out of his concern for fellow citizens, surely campaign for better treatment of those beggars, and the virtuous government, wishing to offer complete liberty of mind and body to all, including those deprived citizens,

should surely set about its own charitable means to pursue this end.

It is generally a falsehood of great evil to assume that an equality of property or income will assist in the progress of mankind. In a world in which property, both financial and otherwise, is constantly adjusted to ensure that no one has want of anything, there is indeed no point in humankind striving for anything. If the progress of humankind is the most crucial goal of virtue, then an egalitarian society has failed in coming close to that goal. When all own the same, there is no need to strive for higher ends; there is no need for others to seek wealth, to be morally upright or to use their wealth for virtuous ends. If all simply 'have the same', then humankind is shackled in the pool of its own mediocrity, or indeed, as is more likely the case, poverty and tyranny. It has often been the promise of tyrants throughout the ages to offer equality, to offer a society where none shall ever have want of anything ever again, but in every case, it is the sorry truth of nature that the citizens have been stripped of any semblance of liberty, while the implementers of this new 'society' have ruled over them with absolute power. As we have said above, there can be no freedom in such a system, since a demand for the property of others leads only to despotism and control of the citizens within society.

When citizens are pitted against each other in struggles of entitlement, they do nothing but damage their society. One man will claim that he is entitled to the property of another, and that other man will then seek to defend his own property, and bitter moral wars ensue over who has the right to what. Such systems only destroy society, and all connexions with our fellow citizens are destroyed over squabbles that are petty compared to what could be achieved under a system of complete liberty; we shall explore this further in Book VI. The most effective societies are indeed those whose members are bound to each other by moral obligations, not by legal obligations regarding wealth. Any attempt to enforce such wealth obligations is by no means just, for it only destroys liberty, happiness and the progress of mankind; it is

the mark of tyrants and tyrants alone.

## CHAPTER III

# Suicide and Lawful Killing

AS A RESPONSE to a similar excursus in Godwin, we shall consider the morality of suicide and the potential for what we shall call 'lawful killings'. The question posed regarding suicide is: 'Do I have the right to destroy myself to avoid pain or disgrace?' Godwin's conclusion is 'Probably not' for the pure reason that the destruction of one's own body provides no further opportunity for the benefit of others, thus rendering suicide a selfish and virtueless action. Our conclusion must be drawn from the perspective of those who believe in complete liberty, however. On the face of things, the destruction of one's own body does not harm anyone else directly, though it may of course cause great distress to the loved ones of the deceased. Often, those who commit or attempt suicide are subject to extreme forces of mental pain and feel that they have no other means of escape from such pain, or even that they are doing others a service in death by alleviating the burden they place on them.

As we have stated before, the choices we make when liberty is afforded to us must primarily be guided by our moral judgement. If we destroy our own bodies, then it is indeed true: there is no way we could ever know whether we could get better, nor would we be able to help our fellow citizens after our death. But the decision whether or not to destroy oneself lies solely with the individual. It may seem perfectly moral to the individual to destroy himself, if it appears to him that the world is treating him immorally, or that he is placing undue restrictions upon others. The moral burden then, or rather, the virtuous course of action, is not to be borne by the suicide; it is to be borne by those that know the one contemplating such an act. The moral virtue lies in the role of others persuading the suicide not to do such a thing for the reasons we have established: the waste of life that

it would be, the goodness he could no longer offer the world if he left it before his time, et cetera.

Therefore, we may say this: Does the individual have the right to take his own life? Absolutely. Should others stand idly by whilst another person decides that he should take his own life? Absolutely not. Often, the victimisation and abandonment of the mentally ill by society does little to aid the virtuous in these causes. So long as society is inhumane, insofar as the suicidal are labelled as so radically different to the rest of us so as to deserve disrespectful treatment, few will ever be saved, and the onus of such vice will lie on none other than those who prevented them from being saved.

What must never be tolerated in a libertarian society, however, is assisted suicide, or euthanasia. This can only ever be virtueless, because in a free society where privacy is closely guarded, a law permitting such things would only ever cloak those who wished to engage in calculated murder. Let us imagine a situation: There is a father, disabled and apparently dying; he is in so much pain that he is not even able to speak. His son opts for him to be administered a lethal dose, and the father dies, passing all of his estate to the son. Given human nature, would not even a fraction of the son's mind be turned to the great personal gain he could achieve by deciding the time of his father's own death, rather than waiting to see whether he might recover? No matter what doctors say, miraculous recoveries do occur. But let us assume that this is an inadequate offering; what would such a premise lead to? Would the elderly be smothered in their beds at night by wicked souls on the premise that they were 'doing them a favour' by ending their misery? Grave vice, such as the end of life before the right time, can only ever lead to yet more vice. The source of the vice must be rooted out by the virtuous, and if it is virtuous to encourage others to live as we have asserted above, then it is right to cut out the source of this vice: the desire to die before one's allotted time.

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What of other forms of legal killing? Godwin considers duelling to be an immoral form of killing, and indeed, I am glad to say that duels are almost entirely extinct in modern society. Such practices are derived only from barbarian societies which did not have an established judicial system, and thus justice had to be sought by other means. The rule for any society should be: if death can be avoided, let it not occur. Thus, murder should be punished. What then of a man defending his property or person from an intruder or assailant? What if he kills the intruder? If the killing is by accident, say, as a result of wounds inflicted, then does the defender not have a right to be excused of such killing? The thief was the first to assault his fellow citizen, thus severing his connexion with his citizenry and his nation — he has attacked not only a man but also liberty itself. It would be preferable if the defender could wound or arrest the assailant until such time as he could be brought to justice, but in the heat of armed struggle, this is much easier said than done. In all cases, the man or woman wronged should be given more benefit of the doubt than the criminal.

Our logic still stands, however, and a virtuous man would attempt to keep his assailant alive. All virtuous men would seek to bring those at fault to justice. If we can bring a wrongdoer to justice, he may be punished and rehabilitated enough to do some good, show some virtue perhaps, in the society to which he is reintroduced. I say again: if death can be avoided, let it not occur.

## CHAPTER IV

# Duty

**M**ORALITY IS a broad subject to discuss, and our attempt to provide a thesis for morality in the previous chapter will no doubt be inadequate in places, presumptuous, and imposing. Godwin himself finds this difficulty in establishing rational ways to create an abstract morality. It is for such reasons that people often used to turn to religion for a source of moral guidance and support, since the edicts of a bishop are far easier to follow than a comprehensive ethical system devised by oneself. But a comprehensive ethical system is necessary in any society, since it defines the duty that we owe each other as citizens of such societies.

Let us consider the following hypothetical problem: A man is put on trial for murder. The man is innocent of the crime he is accused of, but the evidence presented to the jury at the time provides a strong case to prove he is in fact guilty. The presiding judge would have no choice other than to suggest a guilty verdict, and a just jury would have to consider the interests of their fellow citizens and return a guilty verdict — condemning an innocent man. These sorts of miscarriages of justice are uncommon, but certainly not unheard of, yet unlike what Godwin and many on the left suggest, the practice of law is not an abstract science. He is right to assert that it is the duty of each citizen to pursue justice — for a jury to acquit the innocent and convict the guilty — but such verdicts are not formed from the hypocritical opinions of individuals on a jury panel, as he seems to suggest. Law takes the furthest precautions to ensure that it is an empirical science, founded upon hard evidence and provable fact rather than mere opinion. This is precisely why accusations made against individuals are not enough to stand up in court, precisely why the baying of the mob for arrests and convictions is not heeded — all accusations must be

supported with evidence, lest the conviction be even more unjust. Of course, miscarriages of justice occur from time to time, and this is why we must rule out capital punishment as a potential option after conviction. An imprisoned man can be released when later evidence comes to light; a dead man cannot, his life and potential for virtue merely wasted.

When we speak of duty, this is what we refer to: if we are bound to our fellow citizens by the values of our nationhood, we have a duty towards them, to ensure they enjoy maximum liberty where it is due and offer maximum virtue to their nation. An objection may be raised: that this could apply to anything! Indeed, Godwin mentions the Gunpowder Plot of 1605; surely those men who sought to blow up King James and his Parliament must have thought they had a duty to their fellows to do so? Surely they thought that the restoration of Catholicism to the Kingdom of England was the best thing for their fellow countrymen? Our initial rebuttal might be that since we have already established the principles of virtue to be the furtherance of liberty and human progression, an act of wanton killing such as this remains a criminal and undutiful act; rather than approach, petition and turn their fellow citizens to their side, these men chose to kill them instead, a gross act of barbarism, a gross vice! But let us approach this from yet another angle yet still.

In the civilisations of antiquity, duty was not merely a concept; it was a principal obligation of the citizen to his nation. Duty was not defined individually but by the spirit of society itself. In ancient Athens, it was the duty<sup>9</sup> of every citizen to participate in democracy and other public affairs, and those who did not were branded *idiōtai*, the origin of our own word ‘idiot’. In ancient Rome, those men who raised traditional families, embodied the Roman spirit of virility, honoured the gods, fought for their country in war and engaged in public political discourse were called *pious*, from which the English ‘pious’ is derived. Some of the most common words in the English

language are derived from the loftiest values of the ancients. Why then should it not be our duty to participate in the affairs of our nation, to defend it in war, to debate ideas openly with others and raise families to participate in it in the future? We owe it to our fellow citizens, and this is precisely why the ancients developed these concepts. They recognised that a functional society could not exist without connexions between their citizens, without a burden of duty placed on everyone. We owe the defence of our nation to our citizens for their security, we owe participation in political discourse to them for the discovery of the truth of what might benefit society in the future and we owe our society children so that our virtuous works might be continued in the future.

A sense of duty between citizens is what breeds general good. We serve the commonwealth of our nation, and therefore mankind, through our actions. The truly virtuous man feels that he is owed nothing by others but owes them his duty to further their causes justly. Duty imbues a certain magnificence to man — he accepts gifts only when others offer but gives the gift of his just and moral behaviour freely out to others. When such men walk the Earth, the race of men is most certainly uplifted. It is one thing to be a virtuous person; it is quite another to feel as though we owed that virtue to our fellow citizens; otherwise, what is the point of common citizenship without a sense of duty towards those who share that privilege with us?

## CHAPTER V

# Equality

**W**E HAVE ALREADY considered whether or not man is 'equal' in an abstract sense; are we born equal; can we achieve equality? Of course no two human beings are the same; some are born physically weak and some strong. How much of this state of inequality in mankind, however, is natural, and how much artificial? Is it virtuous to endeavour to reduce inequality, and indeed, is it even possible for us to do so?

Many thinkers on the left suggest that man, in his original and most primal state, was more equal. Before the modern age, many of the instigators of modern inequality, such as luxury and varied wealth distribution, were not present. Indeed, the early caveman recognised that it was more beneficial for him to hunt in a group rather than on his own, and it was only right for him to share the animal he hunted with those who helped him hunt it. Some of the potentially corrupting influences of civilisation were not present in early men, and so in this sense we might consider them to be more equal. This being said, we cannot say that life for early men was better than for mankind today; they may have been more equal out of necessity, but it was these same early men who chose chieftains from among the strongest and split apart to form nations as their villages became towns; their chiefs established laws and customs between tribes became irrevocably distinct. So perhaps mankind before civilisation was 'more equal', but that does not prove that mankind is in fact equal as a whole.

We may also consider the proposition that 'all government is founded in opinion'. That is to say, citizens only consent to their government's rule because they believe it to be most beneficial to them. If this opinion were taken away from them, all men would be of equal mind to remove their government. But this could be said about any

system, no matter whether good or bad. A good government can be viewed by some as bad, and a bad government viewed by some as good. The nature of society, where men hold differing opinions on account of their natural independence and nuance, dictates that opinions will always be divided as to whether or not government should be improved or maintained, and it will, due to this division of opinion, be impossible to tell which party is right and which wrong. So much for the fundamental equality of interests.

Moral justice poses a harder dilemma entirely. We know that virtue, the improvement of others, is the driving force behind a moral form of political justice. However, if we were to ask someone who disagreed with our methods of implementing political justice, we would likely find that both we and the man we are arguing with agree that we are all seeking moral ends; we merely disagree over what is and is not moral. There is, then, outside the morality which is considered absolute across human civilisation, a moral inequality amongst mankind. We must be wholly convinced that our version of morality is superior, and others' inferior, if we are to ever have the willpower to seek to implement it within a society. Whilst this does not necessarily mean enforcing morality (indeed, we cannot claim to be virtuous if we enforce something on others — persuasion is a virtue), it does mean that we must have enough confidence in our rational system to seek to build institutions around it.

The institutions of society itself are naturally hierarchical and have developed not out of imposition but by assent. The social contract, as we know, is founded upon assent, and if we see therefore that human beings across history have assented to societal structure and hierarchy, then it must follow that it is a natural inclination of mankind to produce hierarchy as a result of its own inequality. We have come to realise over time that without structure, no decisions can be made to suit society; without dividing roles between separate (and unequal) aptitudes, we cannot ever progress to something better than the status

quo.

We are all endowed with reason and the ability to make logical judgements, but we are not all able to exercise it to the same level. This is not necessarily a failing of education (though of course it is possible for young people to be given a poor education), for it is simply the case that since we are all born different to one another, our brains must also be constituted differently from each other's. We often find ourselves in situations where, when presented with a complex idea, we say to our fellows, 'I don't understand'. There are many people, for instance, who excel at mathematics but say 'I don't understand philosophy', whereas there are others who live for philosophy but fail to understand the finer points of mathematics. To say that we are all capable of exactly the same if we taught in a certain way is nothing more than fantasy.

Nations are distinct in their character, history and people. Can we consider them all equal? In the sense that each nation on planet Earth contains human beings, we might suppose that they are, but they differ, and with difference comes divided opinion, and if there is divided opinion as we explored above, then there must be an inequality of opinion. The citizens of one nation might consider themselves better for various reasons than another, but the other nation which they criticize likely thinks exactly the same of them. It is precisely for these reasons that nations were formed, as a result of their unequal states. By laying claim to a territory which can be governed in a certain way in accordance with the customs of a people, they can avoid a large amount of inter-cultural dispute, fragmentation and eventual separation that almost always occur in nations of mixed values. It matters not which country is superior, and which inferior; it only matters that they are unequal, and for this reason they govern themselves separately and prevent those who would seek to destroy that system of government from entering their country by means of borders and defences. When this system breaks down, society itself divides and breaks down in turn.

Man is not, therefore, fundamentally equal. This does not mean that unequal men cannot cooperate in society — we have seen that it is precisely because they are unequal that they choose to cooperate and form societies. Indeed, it is fair to say that without the natural inequality of man, there would be no society, since there would be no reason for men to support one another in the betterment of their race if every one of them were equal.

## CHAPTER VI

# Human Rights

**H**UMAN RIGHTS have a contentious history. What started out as ‘the rights of man’ became a codified document which many countries assented to follow after the Second World War, but to this day the question of its legitimacy is a matter of some debate. The question raised is: do all human beings have certain rights which every one of them deserves, and should these rights be the foundation of every society, no matter what cultural or historical traditions it may be founded upon?

Society is founded upon the concept of justice, that is to say, self-maintenance, and the development of complete liberty through a system of legal constitution and virtuous government. What we describe as our ‘rights’ can be described in two separate categories, however. We are often described as having legal and moral rights. Both of these tend to change over time, and whilst both may overlap, moral and legal rights may not be the same at any given time. It may be the parents’ moral right to raise their children as they see fit, for instance, but the state may legislate to remove that from their legal rights. Legal rights, therefore, can be restricted and can be manipulated to suit the agenda of a government, whether that government is good or bad.

Is it always correct for the law to remain in line with moral rights, though, and are human rights important to force legislators to protect certain moral rights?

Societies and movements which have recognised the value of liberty as a virtuous spirit of government have produced legislation or declarations which lay out fundamental moral rights to which their citizens ought to be entitled. The British Bill of Rights, prefigured by the Magna Carta, and the *Rights of Man* by Thomas Paine which

influenced the American and French Revolutions are examples of such sentiments. Today, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines several broad principles; I shall name just a few of the most important here: the Right to Equality, the Right to Freedom from Discrimination, the Right to Life and Liberty, the Right to Freedom from Slavery, and the Right to Freedom from Torture or Degrading Treatment. The foundation of these rights is said to be derived from ‘universal aspects of human behaviour’, and in general they have been approved out of their humanitarian considerations following the wake of the Second World War. However, when ‘rights’ as broad as these are defined, they are left open to very awkward and varied interpretations. We have already reached the opinion in this book that humans are not equal, but they deserve equal treatment in matters of law, for example. Should the Right to Equality refer specifically to the opportunity for liberty, to equality under the law or to the universal physical and moral equality of mankind itself? The last-named is blatantly impossible to achieve; the former two are more realistic and justifiably virtuous. Equally in matters such as Freedom from Discrimination, the terms used are not clear. Is a society not allowed to discriminate against those who would seek to deconstruct its liberty and wear away at the fabric of society? If we follow the principle of universal equality, society would be forced to do this, and indeed in many countries today this is the case; this is not a moral justice, however. Is it not the moral right of every man to live in his own society and be free from the fear of its destruction?

What we seek to define for the purposes of the ‘greater good’ is often contradictory. We might well wish to treat every cultural group with the same respect in the interest of equality, but when we see a different group mutilate the body of a criminal rather than attempt to place him back on the path of virtue, we would be rightfully disgusted and seek to resist such situations in our own society. In modern society, the debate over introducing legal euthanasia is beginning to gain traction, and yet we exalt the Right to Life — why should we allow others to help remove

that life? If life is sacred purely for its value as an instrument of virtue, then it should rightly be preserved. In short, it is impossible to treat equally what is not the same.

It would not be correct, on the other hand, to say that the human race proves that it deserves no universal rights at all. We have already discovered that a politically just society is founded on virtue. The selflessness of citizens, the connexion between them which recognises that they exist for society as a whole rather than for an individual tunnel-vision version of life, forms the foundation of a good society. What we should have the right to, then, is not abstract ideas but tangible ones which human nature has genuinely proved to be functional.

The Right to Complete Liberty is perhaps most important, supported by the Right to Equality under the Law, the Right to Representation and the Right to Express Opinion Freely. These are just a few rights which support the continued progress of mankind, and through which citizens may live happily in the pursuance of virtue. Moral rights are those which governments should seek to align legal rights with, since the maintenance of moral rights can only lead to moral societies.

Moral rights are any rights which align with our principles of virtue and thus promote and maintain virtuous activities within a society. We might say, then, that it is a moral right for a child to have an education, but it is the moral right of the parent to guide that education so long as what they choose does not cause harm to the child or educate them in ideas which encourage violence or damage towards society. Equally, it is the moral right of an unborn child, once it has quickened in the womb, to live, for the reason that life is the only instrument of human progress and virtue, and no matter what handicaps may hold human life back, some good is always possible, just as we may still cast light into a dark room by lighting a small candle.

The risk with defining 'human rights' comes when in our attempt to define those rights, we become obsessed with the nuances of the terms

we use. For instance, in the pursuance of the Right to Equality, as we call it today, we may stray from the maintenance of citizens' moral rights. Since it is the duty of every country party to the Declaration of Human Rights to encourage such rights to be followed in every country on the planet, if deviations like this are widely propagated, we swiftly descend into a situation where moral rights are attacked across the globe for the sake of pursuing an abstract quality with no real bearing on the true state of human nature. It is therefore much more productive to encourage nations to advocate for moral rights among the citizens, and to ensure that a virtuous society becomes their principal aim, rather than cast a net around the whole of humanity based on a single interpretation of those abstractions and declare that deviations from these human rights deserve punishment. In a tolerant society, we may encourage, but unless harm is done, we may never enforce.

## CHAPTER VII

# The Value of Private Opinion

**W**E HAVE ALREADY faced the dilemma whereby we have had to find a working definition of virtue and morality, since without one we would be subject to the differing opinions of men. 'One man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist', etc. But if we are finding a system which we might subscribe to as the 'most virtuous' or 'correct' way of running a country, we risk coming across as tyrants ourselves. Every society faces the problem where restricting the opinions of dissenters is tyrannical, but allowing others to be persuaded by their alternative arguments risks the constitution of society being changed. What is the value of private opinion, then? Why should it be permitted, and how can free debate serve the progress of mankind rather than hamper it?

The human race's intelligence when compared to other species of animal is so remarkable that we have often placed our creation at the level of the actions of a divine being. Whether or not this is the case, we should consider the gift of reason and intelligence a blessing, since no similar power on the same scale can be laid claim to by any creature besides humankind. What is becoming increasingly troubling in modern societies is the tendency towards the belief that opinion cannot vary, and a single way of viewing the world through the eyes of 'progression' is acceptable. We have already found that all political society is founded on the principle of the progression of humankind — even a conservative society, which believes that its progression is best found in established traditions. The distinction between 'progressive' and 'non-progressive' politics is therefore an artificial one, since political society is by its very nature progressive in accordance with human nature. Opinion merely differs on the means of obtaining the most effective and useful progression possible. It is dangerous to

assume that just because a certain set of opinions are removed from one's own that there is no truth in them. There is even in the most outwardly repulsive and seemingly useless opinions some grain of truth, or some personal meaning which is worth hearing, or else a fellow intelligent being would not hold them. It is therefore important to analyse every opinion that we can get hold of if we are to seek political justice, since society cannot operate without the opinions of its citizens to shape it.

'Progressive' politics, as we wrongfully call it, is something more akin to the politics of revolution, since it assumes that certain policies are necessary in order to 'liberate' certain sections of society from an oppressor. What this sort of politics does highlight is the downtrodden nature of several different groups of society. Often, attention is drawn to the poorest, and this should concern any society. As we have learnt earlier in our discussion, virtuous citizens have a duty to petition their government, and government has a duty to ensure that the opportunity for the enjoyment of liberty is offered to every individual in society in order to aid the makeup of the whole. We can find common ground in debates such as these, and whilst the radical may believe in liberating the poor by means of destroying the wealth of the rich (as both Godwin and Marx suggest), even if we disagree, we cannot deny the truth in some of what the radical says. The fact that the radical wants to enforce a certain solution on society which involves redistribution of wealth is a difference in opinion where the radical considers his position more virtuous than that of his opponents. If we follow the system of ethics that we have already established, and therefore oppose the proposition of this radical, then what engagement with him in debate proves to us is the existential threat to the completely libertarian society that we seek to defend.

The expression of private opinion, then, is important for the sake of maintaining a completely libertarian society. By hearing the views of those who express discontentment with it, we may do ourselves

favours by identifying the true deficiencies of society and may set about correcting them. Equally, it should spur us on, when we hear what the proposed alternatives are, to persuade and campaign for the protection of the rights which we know to be the best structure in which to nurture virtue and human progress. Our virtue system itself will also continue to develop as time goes on and new moral challenges are faced by society. Political discourse and engaging debate will be necessary to find the truly virtuous path as a result of these challenges. If only those of both radical and conservative persuasions would recognise the need for discourse!

At which point, however, does private opinion become dangerous? Never, if truly private, is the answer. The freedom to express truly shocking, perhaps even violent, opinions in a confidential and fully private setting should be the right of every citizen living under liberty. A publicly expressed opinion urging citizens towards acts of vice should be the sole concern of crime and punishment. If life is sacrosanct, then expressing the opinion that others should end the life of an individual or group cannot be tolerated. It is one thing to express the public opinion that a group or individual should be brought before justice; it is quite another to encourage heinous sins which can only damage the structure of society and its capacity for self-improvement.

Godwin considers many institutions on which a society is built to exist merely as a child of personal opinion and considers concepts such as law as a deterrent against future crimes to be nothing more than a construct which works against society itself. Private opinion is one thing, and whilst there may always be those in a society who believe that there should be no institutions, that society itself should not exist as an organised entity and that the populations of Earth have sold themselves into slavery by permitting it, the minority of such opinions proves the opposite of their beliefs. The rational nature of humankind urges us to question the nature of how we structure society and government, yet everywhere there is society. Society is structured in

the way that it is, not out of an organised attempt to restrict the human race but out of an attempt to further itself. There is therefore in most societies a consensus built on cultural and historical traditions which dictate the defining points of their societies' constitutions. In Britain, for instance, calls for the abolition of Parliament and the institution of absolute rule are unheard of; equally the opposite: calls for the abolition of all government and institution of absolute freedom is also unheard of. Societies form a majority consensus over time based on the inheritance of their ancestors.

To place absolutely every part of society down to a mere construct of subjective opinion is nothing more than *reductio ad absurdum*, but private opinion must remain the driving force of mainstream political discourse. Modern times have shown an increasing intolerance of traditional interpretations of society, with many conservatives being dismissed as having views taken from the wrong century. What those who seek to implement a virtuous society where moral improvement is politics' principal aim must remember is that capitulation of their opinion is the path to defeat. Those with serious opinions to offer to political discourse must be firm in their advocacy and constant in their principals. As politicians in recent ages have proved their mettle to be grounded on weak foundations, through consistent falsehoods and misconceived policies which seek to benefit interested individuals rather than society as a whole, alternative viewpoints must be consistently offered if political change is to come about.

It is a cutting indictment of modern radical leftist politics that it is creating the precise conditions for an unsustainable society. When they talk of freedom, they offer restrictions, and when others speak about the defence of their society from the cultural changes which will lead to the deconstruction of the liberty that has been enjoyed for hundreds of years, 'progressive' politicians dismiss it with vague notions of egalitarianism.

In our study of society, we have found that moral virtue and

common values are the glue which binds the individuals together into an effective whole. True, or complete, liberty can only flourish within this context, and warped notions of 'freedom' without restriction, without proper punishment for vicious conduct, will only lead to the undoing of society itself. Individuals do not owe each other anything but their virtue, but society owes itself a great deal. It is impossible to force individuals to conform to a moral code of 'fairness' or 'equality', since it is inequality itself which is the foundation of society in the first place. Without inequality, there would be no need for society. It is recognising this, and our need for society itself, that should drive us towards more virtuous actions on behalf of our fellow citizens. That notion of citizenship, of participation in a grander endeavour, is what has bred liberty and held strong societies together. Once individualism is pursued to such an extent that cohesion no longer matters, and the individual no longer feels part of society, he feels as though there is no virtue to be had in supporting that society, and we lose all chance of real 'progress'.

Society is fundamentally virtuous as a concept, but without virtuous men and women to live in it, it becomes nothing more than a space in which individuals live to be governed by tyranny rather than held together by a love of liberty and justice.

BOOK III.  
**PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT**

## CHAPTER I

# Introduction

**T**HE PROBLEM OF government is a troubling one for every political philosopher, and opinion remains divided over one of the largest political issues of all time: the question of whether government should be 'big' or 'small'. What is the role of government, and what should be its scope? Traditionally speaking, the right wing of political thought has often been called the home of the small state, but this distinction is rather artificial. On the one hand, we might think that a belief in liberty should lead us to favour a state which is restricted in terms of its power, in order to ensure the maximum freedom of its citizens. However, this is not so clear-cut; if, as we have already considered, complete liberty walks hand-in-hand with morality, then the state must have a moral onus placed upon it, an onus as great as the one concerning the maintenance of liberty.

The distinction between the political 'right' and 'left' itself is somewhat misleading. Modern political parties in Britain, for instance, have proved that a hodgepodge of various political ideas from both the right and left can be frequently employed in order to deceive members of the electorate of various political persuasions into voting for a party with a particular label. The Conservative Party in Britain has attracted much criticism for retaining the 'Conservative' label, when it fails on many counts to stay true to right-wing ideas traditionally considered to be conservative in nature. In order to examine the purpose of government, we must examine the nature of different forms of government and consider their advantages and disadvantages. Before we enter the detail, however, we shall introduce the topic with a brief history of the driving force of governmental competition today: the battle between conservatives and radicals, traditionalists and reformers.

Modern conceptions about conservatism and radicalism were born out of the struggles of the French Revolution in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. It seems only right, then, that the main focus of our critique of political justice is driven by Godwin's text, a prime example of the political radicalism which gave birth to modern left-wing politics. Even the terms 'right' and 'left' are derived from the positions in the debating chamber of the French National Assembly in which radical Jacobins and conservative Royalists sat.

For a long time, in Europe, the dividing line between radicals and conservatives was drawn between those who supported the establishment of republics and those who supported the old order, the monarchies and aristocracies of Europe. Today, with monarchy and aristocracy having lost power either formally or informally, this distinction is no longer always useful. It has been said that conservatives gradually came to defend capitalism rather than aristocracy as the power of their traditional supporters waned, but this is not completely true either. Conservatives are defined purely by their name: they are those who wish to preserve traditional societal structures, morals and customs out of the belief that these are the best framework in which to encourage liberty and the betterment of mankind. Radicals are those who seek the *radix*, the root, of society, and tear it up to reform the function of society in its entirety.

Sometimes, however, the distinction becomes turned on its head. When radicals succeed in reform, they themselves may become the conservatives, seeking to preserve the changes they have made, and conservatives may have to become radical in order to remove or reverse that change. Political distinction is constantly in flux.

It is not always very easy, then, to define a particular set of values as 'conservative' or 'radical'. In laying out the principles of an effective government, we must have our critique of society in mind. We must consider how institutions relate to government and whether there is a particular form of government which can be considered the most

perfect, either as a hybrid of many different institutions which have been proved to be effective in certain areas or as a single system which has either been tried and tested in the past or can be proved to be effective by other reliable means. We must ask whom a government should serve and who should constitute it; should it have a relationship to religion, or should it be purely secular? If it makes a conservative to look at the past in order to consider the most just political society for posterity, then that must make us conservatives; if we are forced to change an existing and defective order to implement these measures, perhaps that makes us radical conservatives as well.

## CHAPTER II

# The Social Contract

**W**E HAVE ALREADY considered the social contract briefly. It is the principle that government is founded upon the assent of its people to hold power on their behalf. But the social contract itself presents problems; it is of course just a theory and is not defined by any real, signed contract. If we assume that the social contract is a legitimate principle of government, then who are the parties to the contract? If every citizen is a member of society, then surely every citizen is part of the contract, yet a contract must be made with someone else. The question we face is this: what is the value and purpose of government?

It is certainly not true that each successive generation gives assent to their government to continue to govern in their place as soon as each member of that generation becomes politically conscious. Of course, the principle of 'consent' is a difficult one, since we can all attest by personal experience that we do not so much consent to our governments' existence but rather somewhat apathetically come to terms with the fact that they exist, that we must tolerate their edicts and that we may influence them under a democratic system from time to time in an election. This is not really a system of 'consent'. If the people were truly the givers of consent to their government, then they would recognise that government may only legitimately act within the bounds of the customs of a particular society, and that if power truly lay within the hands of the people, they would be constantly on edge to keep up with new political developments. Some philosophers have tried to solve this problem by describing the unwritten state of governance to be a system of 'tacit consent' between the people and their government, but again, this is not really consent but a kind of wary tolerance.

Another problem with defining a set of ‘unwritten rules’ as the foundations of a government is that we face a dilemma once these rules are broken: since they are unwritten, a break with convention within this ‘contract’ cannot be considered explicitly unlawful, since the rules were never perfectly defined in the first place. It is also difficult to define exactly how unwritten rules may be broken, since due to the subjectivity of human opinion, different men may consider different unwritten rules to be the most just in constituting a social contract.

Social contract theory itself was developed in the late 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> century as a rival to the long-established principle of the divine right of kings, which stated that the monarchs of Europe had a legitimate right to rule their people since they could explain their power as a gift bestowed upon them by God. If we believe in an omnipotent God, perhaps it is right that ultimate power is held by him? Is the social contract signed with God, then? Obviously not. The Western Christian tradition is rooted in the belief that God gave man free will, and if this is true, then society, which is made up of individual members of mankind, should have the right to freely choose their government. This has been established over many thousands of years of development, and the governmental traditions of every nation have been shaped by separate historical events and demands of their people over time. In this case, we cannot say that one particular perfect form of government can work equally effectively in every single nation, even if they are capable of the same political goals; and yet, if monarchy is the tradition of a nation, it should not be so easily dispensed with in the name of ‘the people’ or otherwise.

The social contract is not inherently wrong in its placement of authority in the people of a nation as a whole. However, it is not so much a contract as an interested co-existence between the people of a society who are not in government and those who are in government. Therefore, it is hard to draw up a perfect ‘contract’ to suit the needs of

every citizen, whose agendas and opinions may be distinct. What citizens of countries need more than abstract notions of a non-existent 'contract' are principles which define the goals of all government and a promise to adhere to certain virtues in the pursuit of their aims. Documents such as the American Declaration of Independence expressed sentiments of that nation's zeitgeist, expressing the purpose of an American citizen to be 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'. Each nation has its own individual structures and traditions, but every government, in order to be truly virtuous and seek the path to political justice, must be governed by a set of principles which it owes to its citizens. Just as individual citizens have a sense of duty towards their fellows, and thus to society, government is not exempt from duty. We can express this duty in the form of a written set of principles to replace this contract. Burke famously defined the conservative approach to the social contract as a political understanding between those who are currently living, those who are dead, and those who are not yet born. In this sense, the social contract is a product of history: an organic development which should be free from radical change, but which exists for the sake of the common-wealth of those who live within it. When, as it so often seems in modern Western society, that contract is abused by forgetting the dead and the unborn, a selfish contract is the result, and one which has a troubling tendency towards vice.

Based on what we have considered to be the purpose of human civilisation, and how we have sought moral virtue, a just government should guarantee the following to its citizens:

1. To recognise that power is bequeathed to government by inheritance, not created by it, and is ephemeral.
2. To recognise that the purpose of government is to defend the rights of those in society.
3. To recognise that the goal of society is complete liberty.

4. To defend society from existential threat.
5. To defend the institutions which uphold the fabric of society.
6. To act according to moral virtue.
7. To be just.
8. To never remove the rights which centuries of political discourse and institution have proved to be virtuous, and allow mankind the freedom to better itself.
9. To support those whom society has failed by ensuring an equality of opportunity.
10. To ensure representation for every part of society that has shown a commitment to its values.

To ensure that a government has these principles in mind when it comes to govern offers a new take on the social contract. Governments should not merely operate on the basis of unwritten laws of power but guarantee certain rights and create explicit goals not merely in terms of policy but in terms of the human population which it serves.

By expressing goals such as these, the tyranny of a majority opinion and oppression of a minority opinion can be for the most part avoided, since it continues to allow for the free expression of opinion but lays down certain human goals and natural laws within which government is obliged to act. So long as the principle of virtue is considered sacrosanct, government can set itself any legitimate goal. If personal interest is championed, and virtue is not considered important in the conduct of government, with nothing more than vague abstractions offered to the public, then government cannot be said to be a valuable part of any political society.

In the spirit of Hegel, it is more appropriate to say that a written constitution or set of constitutional laws should be the embodiment of the spirit of a society, and that this constitution may only be added to, and never have any of its tenets removed. Government is merely a part

of the whole that is society; it is not above it. Therefore, government is obliged to act for the benefit of humankind, through the medium of the authority given by the society it serves. If virtue and liberty are the strongest bonds within a society, then these must also be the strongest bonds in any kind of contract between the people outside of government and the people within it.

## CHAPTER III

# Political Promises

A CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT between government and people requires the affirmation of promises. It has become all too common to hear sources of political discontent come from the tendency amongst politicians to promise policy changes and fail to deliver. It is a sorry reflection of the immorality of government that this has to be the case; indeed, if the very relationship between a government and its people relies on a promise, how can we bring ourselves to trust an organisation inundated by those who break promises?

The truth is that promises are necessary in government. They are necessary in electioneering in order to garner votes, but they are a fundamental part of the relationship between government and people. Godwin considers promises to be incompatible with the advancement of humankind, since they cannot be relied upon and depend solely upon the expectation of action rather than an indicative action itself. Humans can promise to do both good and bad things and then fail to do either. Promises are also difficult to keep in political society, where opinion and circumstance may change without warning; something promised in the past may be impossible to implement once the time actually comes to implement that promise.

We should therefore make a distinction between necessary promises and unnecessary promises that governments might make. Our primary concern should be the following question: is it moral for a government to make promises?

Once again, we must return to the concept of virtue. Let us imagine a situation where a particular crime, say, armed robbery, has increased by a significant amount. Some politicians might promise to reduce the

crime by punishing those involved to deter further acts of violence, whilst others might believe that deeper social issues require addressing in order to reduce the prolificacy of that particular crime. It is right for government to promise action, and to follow through, but it is much more than simply 'right' for a government to act against an increase in a particular crime: it is a moral imperative, and it is a moral imperative to both punish the perpetrators *and* to address the social issues which create the crime. Often, crime arises from society failing to be able to offer liberty to the most downtrodden.

Social issues such as crime can be treated as one-off incidents which government can promise to address. It is consistent with virtue to pursue a policy of protecting citizens from the moral encroachments of others upon their liberty. When long-term promises are made, the moral imperative of government to follow through on a promise falls away from a practical perspective but is strengthened in the eyes of those to whom it is promised.

The British welfare state, which has its origins in the Liberal reforms of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, but properly became established in the late 1940s following the end of the Second World War, is a prime example of a long-term government promise which is now proving to be the undoing of virtue itself. Promises were made to supply free healthcare at the point of use, a generous government pension for every worker employed by the state and welfare handouts to those on incomes which failed to provide for the most needy. It sounded just at the time of implementation, but now that we have reached the modern period, we have discovered that government is habitually spending beyond its means, and the welfare system created in the '40s is no longer sustainable. Huge levels of national debt continue to rise, and government is forced to cut key services, which attacks the downtrodden yet further, in order to create a semblance of fiscal responsibility. Meanwhile, the people have become so accustomed to receiving certain provisions of life from the state that a sense of

entitlement pervades all, and demands for personal provision from the state are all too common. No longer does concern lie in the interests of others, in society or in humankind's freedom progress, but rather in what we might call the 'culture of myself': a constant obsession with what 'I, myself' am owed by the state on account of my identity, my personal needs and my individual situation. Virtue and selflessness are completely replaced with bitterness and division, as government comes to realise that its promises are now unsustainable, but is unable to remove the promise that is so deeply ingrained in the national mindset.

These sorts of promises, which seem doomed to fail and cause great hardship to the people of the nation in the future, prove the explicit value of remaining true to virtue. Failing to align a policy with virtue and failing to consider the long-term consequences of that policy have been the undoing of many admirable goals of society. Our conclusions about political promises are as follows.

Beware political promises — hear this, both government, and people! Government must ensure that promises it makes do not involve a perpetual promise to provide. That is itself an assault on complete liberty, for it removes the autonomy of the individual from himself. No longer will the citizen make his own decisions or govern his own fate; he will merely expect provision and answers from his government. Equally, short-term promises, whilst they may be necessary in order to protect a particular right, or ensure that virtue is upheld for the benefit of society, must be followed through, and must be founded not on the purpose of popularity but on virtue. It may be popular amongst criminals to promise them the vote, for instance, and therefore to expect them to vote for the one who emancipated them, but is it truly virtuous to allow criminals the right to vote? Absolutely not; to commit a crime against society involves punishment by removing the ability to participate in influencing that society until such time as the criminal can prove he will not be a menace and will follow

the path of virtue. Such is the exact point of rehabilitation.

We cannot claim to live in a virtuous society when government consistently makes promises it cannot keep. When a candidate for an election makes a promise, and he or she is elected, he or she has an obligation to keep it. In politics, promises may not be broken: they must come from deep-set concerns, or legitimate interests in the betterment of society, and breaking them is not a matter of political tussle. We are always taught that lying is not a virtue, yet often we tolerate lying too much in political spheres. In politics, principles and opinions are the spirit of improvement, and a corrupt political society is marked by a lack of principles, a lack of opinion and a plethora of deceit. When a government structures its whole agenda around promises, nothing is guaranteed. A good government focuses on what it *can* provide: a security of administration, a set of values and goals. Promises may well be necessary from time to time, but they are not really acceptable in government. Hard principles are what are required. We may even go so far as to say that a political promise cannot be kept at all if it is not backed up by strongly held, genuine principles, rather than pandering to ephemeral notions of 'popularity' or the desire for election, for there is a significant difference between being elected and governing a nation.

## CHAPTER IV

# Political Authority

**W**E HAVE SEEN that the power, or authority, of government is derived from a relationship between people and the government which is concerned with the protection of rights and liberty to allow for the furtherance of certain values with which man may pursue moral self-improvement. The next problem we must trouble ourselves with is the question of why citizens should submit to government authority at all.

It would seem to naturally undermine the purpose of government to hand it authority and then to disobey that authority. However, as we know, there will always be those in society who are dissatisfied with the way of things, and whilst some of these may be obliged to make their complaints known in a civil fashion, others will seek active disobedience to the authority of government. As we shall discover later, civil disobedience, and ultimately armed revolution, should only ever be the last resort of any group of virtuous men who can prove that government is acting against the interests of the people to such an extent that there is an existential threat to society, and all other avenues for legitimate and civil political change have been exhausted and have failed.

But the government cannot hold its authority together, and expect its people to obey it, if it does not adhere to the terms of the constitutional values it has drawn up with the people and sworn to uphold and protect. Edmund Burke used the analogy of a military commander to present a cogent point in this regard:

In the weakness of one kind of authority, and in the fluctuation of all, the officers of an army will remain for some time mutinous...until some popular general, who understands the art of conciliating soldiery, and who possesses the true spirit of command, shall draw the eyes of all men upon himself.<sup>10</sup>

Governmental authority, too, cannot be seen to be worth anything in the measure of guiding a country if those in government are naturally unprincipled and weak. Soldiers will not follow a leader without conviction, nor will the people of a nation have confidence in a leader who sways with the wind and fails to present a coherent platform. The risk for government in examples of poor leadership is the power of their electors at the ballot box.

To properly exercise the authority with which the people have endowed them, the people in government must be principled, and they must be committed to the virtues which have been laid down by national constitutional decree. The government derives its authority not merely from paper documents but from the very spirit of the nation. Since direct democracy is incredibly difficult in greatly populous nations where the people cannot gather together in common political cause, as they did in ancient Athens, representative democracy creates the need for new breeds of politically minded men and women. Due to the fact that the people at large must elect representatives to hold their authority on their behalf in a parliament, those people who put themselves forward for election must be wholly sure that they represent the spirit of their constituents, if they can truly claim to have any governmental authority.

If government is truly an instrument of virtue when it expresses the spirit of society, then government authority must be obeyed for the sake of society. If it is virtuous to have government because it protects the liberty of society and allows mankind the ability to better itself, then government authority must be derived from moral virtue. If government has no moral virtue, then it cannot be said to have any legitimate authority whatsoever, and it must be changed either by means of election, petition or organised opposition in order to correct its deficiencies and restore true authority over society.

It is equally possible of course for government to have too much authority. When government overextends, it is generally because it has

impinged on complete liberty, or restricted particular rights for the sake of some ephemeral whim of those with power. When government overuses its authority, it is generally because it has not considered the most virtuous path of conduct. Corrupt influence and viciousness are what detracts from all authority and leads to the mismanagement of society; burdening it with debts, false promises and prodigal spending are all hallmarks of a weak government without virtue, and thus without true authority. Any authority that such a government might have can only be artificially enforced, and so we must consider it unacceptable. If government cannot be seen to be authoritative by nature of its conduct, then it is not worth respecting.

If government has a responsibility to its people — which it does — then authority is held not as an instrument for the means of control but for benefit. The reaction against virtue ethics in modern times is worrying, for while traditional virtue-based morality is often mocked as old-fashioned, it is in fact the binding material within society and the guiding light of good government. What many critics of virtue ethics do not realise is that they are destroying the exact thing they claim to be defending by criticising it: personal liberty. A government with a sense of morality may be seen to be an embodiment of the spirit of virtue in a nation and thereby encourage it through its actions in the defence of the right and means of the people.

Godwin considers that government is a mere contrivance in ensuring the security of people, and that every man should have a share in securing his own security, and as each man is party to the powers of reason, he should have a share in dictating the bounds of political authority. Since, however, we know that men are not equal, Godwin cannot be said to be reliably presenting an alternative vision of political authority. He places individual opinion on a pedestal — in Godwin's opinion, individual opinion should be given maximal liberty so that every individual may define his own life and exercise his own authority. Whilst individual opinion, as we have seen, is important in

political development, individual opinion cannot be allowed to be the only source of authority. If every individual defined his own morality, his own way of interacting with government, and did not conform to a set of rules and values which are common to society as a whole, there would be nothing but chaos, incompatibility and violence, since the differences between his own personal opinions and others' would be great enough to encourage social discord. If one man considers a particular action against another moral, in his opinion, and the other considers it immoral, there will be conflict — this is a society without a governing set of values and without an authoritative government to enforce them.

Authority is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of society, but it must be based on strong foundations. No citizen can respect authority which is not derived from meaningful appreciation of national values and a stable moral code.

# The Purpose of Legislation

**T**HE SUGGESTION THAT government legislation is only ever used for the purposes of treading on those without government authority is ludicrous. Godwin's proposed solution, suggesting that 'reason is the only legislator', is attractive in the sense that we may wish for a time when legislation is only ever introduced out of pure individual reason and the justifiable need for change, but to allow every individual to follow his own laws by entrusting him with the spirit of 'reason' is a justification for a destructive form of anarchy that does not even stand on its own two feet. We should accept the criticism that legislation can be, and often is, used for the purposes of vice or to restrict the rights and liberties of the people of society. As an alternative to current attitudes towards legislation, how can we approach legislation in a meaningful way?

Legislation, as the introduction of new laws, is in effect the introduction by government of new terms to their agreement with the people. Government must bring legislation before the representatives of the people as a whole for consideration before it can be agreed to by a parliamentary body and assented to by the higher powers of state. Legislation, therefore, should not be about promoting a particular agenda or forcing an ideology on the people of society but about changing constitutional and personal legal rules when change becomes a necessity given the changes in circumstances over time; this could be due to changes in technology or popular will, or indeed as a result of extraordinary events which deserve national attention. It is therefore necessary for parliamentary bodies to pay particular attention to any attempt to introduce new legislation. It is imperative that representatives of the people analyse proposed new legislation to ensure that it does not violate or restrict the constitutional agreement

between government and people which maintains the spirit of the nation on which society depends.

New legislation may well be necessary at times in order to defend the rights of the people of society, but it may also be subject to corrupt influence and be used to gradually remove certain rights. It is therefore a matter of virtue for representatives to defend the rights of the people who elected them, for if they do not, they cannot be said to have respected the arrangement between the electors and the elected personnel holding authority in their behalf.

A virtuous government should try to operate on the principle that new legislation ought to be avoided. Changes to constitutional arrangements and long-standing legal traditions often embody the particular cultural spirit of a nation and should only be changed if it can be definitively proved that they no longer work in a beneficial way. It should be every representative's concern to properly consider the virtues and vices of new legislation before lending support or opposition to it, rather than be swayed merely by partisan concerns. Modern legislation is frequently dictated by the practice of parliamentary 'whips', who ensure that members vote for a particular piece of legislation in support of their party's policy. Forcing representatives to vote in a particular way is an easy way to use legislation to follow particular agendas and immoral means.

Often, long-standing laws are changed for the purposes of 'modernisation', but legislation is inherited from our ancestors and must be respected. Change is necessary, but only when virtue requires it. Fixing what is not broken is often the path to tyranny; unfortunately, so long as partisan concerns overcome genuine considerations about the benefits of particular pieces of legislation, there is little hope for meaningful debate and the use of legislation for virtuous purposes, as it was devised for.

## CHAPTER VI

# Obedience

**T**HE QUESTION OF obedience is linked closely with our discussion of authority. Obedience to genuine authority is a necessary part of living in society. We have already considered the case for being obedient to authority based on the principles of virtuous authority, but we must consider this within the context of governmental structures. Why is it appropriate to obey a government that fosters liberty but not a tyrannical one?

It is the natural state of man to live in liberty for the sake of his own improvement, as proved by our readings of history. Whenever man has lived in liberty, by which we mean with the freedom to gain knowledge, express himself freely, give his opinions and move around his homeland without harassment, he has always nurtured the most amazing of advancements: it was the spirit of intellectual liberty that gave birth to the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and it was the recognition that restrictions on religious sects were tearing Britain apart in civil war that gave rise to the tolerance of nonconformist Christian sects in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the finest laws that can ever be legislated are those which align themselves with the nature of man and prevent that which harms the improvement of mankind, so as to allow for the best of situations where we may live most happily.

The truth is that any form of non-democratic government, by which we mean where the government does not derive its authority from an arrangement with its people, cannot have any legitimate authority whatsoever, since it enforces its authority by means of force, which is contrary to virtue and can only ever be harmful to the members of society as a whole. No matter how benevolent a despotic leader may be, he must always enforce his rule rather than rely on the people to applaud it out of their respect for virtuous actions. It is this sort of

government, one that has to enforce obedience rather than gain it by its own virtues, which ought to be actively disobeyed.

Some people are actively obedient to despots, however, and can be rallied behind great leaders in order to further their ends under the illusion of virtue. History has shown us leaders like these from Alexander to Napoleon. Burke writes that 'it is [the people's] attachment to their government, from the sense that they have a deep stake in a glorious institution which...infuses into that liberal obedience'.<sup>11</sup> The art lies in identifying where a government is offering a genuine stake in the institution of government, or excluding the people from their moral right. Obedience to despots often comes from long-established conceptions of duty and loyalty to a particular ruler, or the offer of some sort of benefit which a ruler gives to the people.

Long-standing conceptions of loyalty are often based on religious beliefs, with many of the monarchs of 18<sup>th</sup>-century Europe demanding loyalty from their subjects due to the derivation of authority from God. In more modern times, rulers of supposedly democratic countries such as Hugo Chávez of Venezuela gained a great deal of personal popularity by enacting policies which, for the short term at least, made life easier for the poorest in their countries, who often made up a large portion of the population. What despots can never offer, however, is long-term happiness; they may give money out for free, perhaps food and healthcare, but eventually they must resort to force when they can no longer continue to provide what previously made them popular. Caesar claimed he would reform the Roman republic, and offered his soldiers land and increased pay as a result of his overthrow of the state, and by doing so made himself the precursor to Rome's emperors. Despotism, be it the absolute rule of a single man or the oligarchy of a few interested parties, is by nature a government of trickery and deception. The people, rather than being offered a constitutional arrangement which embodies their values and protects their moral rights, are instead deceived with bread and circuses, popular events

and free handouts; these things may provide short-term happiness, but eventually, when the goods run out, can only lead to misery and discord. When governments offer these despotic tricks, they are owed no obedience whatsoever, for they offer no improvement to their people, and certainly no virtue.

What all politically minded men must obey is virtue. If there is no virtue, there is nothing to obey. A system of government where the people are represented allows the most opportunity for virtue and the benefit of all rather than the few. Obedience is something which must be natural within society, rather than forced. If the law is disobeyed and liberty is infringed, then nature itself has been disobeyed. If the statue of a tyrannical ruler is defaced, can we say that this is vandalism, or is it a gesture that the people seek their natural state of liberty? People must be educated to know that their natural state is liberty, so that if the time ever comes that they feel that they are not in their natural state, they may take the necessary action to ensure that their moral rights are being protected. In states such as North Korea, where a despotic regime has held power for over seventy years, obedience from the people has only been gained after years of harsh treatment combined with a comprehensive re-education of the populace which defines virtue in terms of love and praise for the oppressors. If morality is warped into being centred around particular individuals, rather than the betterment of society, people can easily be duped into believing that they are living in the best possible society already.

If the people of society do not know what morality is, and do not know why certain laws require obedience, they will be consistently oppressed by those who know how to manipulate them into obedience.

## CHAPTER VII

# Forms of Government

**W**E SHALL NOW examine how best to constitute a good government. There is an important caveat to place on this discussion, which is that we should not claim to ever reach a state of perfection in mere theory: there is no such thing as a ‘one-size-fits-all’, perfect government. In the manner of Aristotle, it is best to consider the possible roles and forms of government and consider how a government might best structure itself in order to achieve the constitutional goals we have said it should set for itself in the preceding chapters. We are approaching this subject from a Western democratic perspective, and we should not assume that a culture very alien to ours will consider our reasoning to be valid; however, we have already stated that liberty is a perfectly attainable goal for all cultures. Rather than seeing the following as a model constitution, we should think of it more as a set of guidelines, derived from reason and an understanding of human nature, by which we can more easily consider how governments may be constituted.

There are of course countless different forms of government which have been tried by various civilisations across history. Godwin considers differences in national constitutions to be worthy of scorn, since the primary purpose of government across the world should be the freedom and independent exercise of the human mind — hence, he is not keen to find positive arguments in favour of any sort of meaningful government at all. Since, however, we know that every human mind is different, and every culture is different in terms of customs and history, we cannot say that government can function in the same way in every single state. Whilst a certain concept, such as democratic representation, might be one of the best paths of liberty, the path to liberty must be nuanced. If we consider mankind to be a

fundamentally unequal race due to the differences between every individual, then every culture must have its own nuanced way of structuring a constitution and building up a complex system of governance to further its self-improvement by working upon the inheritance it has received from the ancestors of that culture.

When structuring a government which is based upon representation (which, given the arguments against despotism and in favour of liberty above, we shall consider to be the most virtuous form of governance), we should consider what the word 'representation' actually means. It is one thing to allow people to elect representatives to hold authority on their behalf in a designated chamber of representatives, but we must also consider the role of elites. The word 'elitism' is often considered dirty in modern political discourse, but in truth, elitism can be used for society's advantage.

Ancient poems, such as the Nordic sagas and *Eddas*, the Greek and Roman epics, and the medieval romances, all speak of virtuous conduct, of heroic deeds and a race of strong and intelligent men whose history is defined by their great deeds. Not all of us can be defined by our deeds, and indeed, very few of us will ever be remembered for heroism on the battlefield. The original implementation of aristocracy was a means to honour those who had performed mighty deeds, and the onus fell on those mighty men to educate their sons in their ways so that their virtue might be carried on down the ages. In England, and later Britain, the idea behind balancing a House of Lords with a House of Commons derived from the principle of equal representation for all people. The Houses had equal power — members of the House of Lords, as privileged aristocracy, could not vote in the elections to the Commons, and the House elected by the people and the House of the appointed aristocracy balanced each other out. The idea behind such balanced government, with elites being given a separate institution to the people, is founded in virtuous governmental structure. Aristocrats were often, and for a large part

remain now, wealthy landowners. Does this mean they had the right to absolutely rule those below them? Absolutely not, and hence more and more of the ordinary people were permitted to take part in elections to the Commons, since all citizens as contributors to society have a right to take part in electing those who represent them.

Aristotle was the first to propose a system of balanced government.<sup>12</sup> He saw that the non-elites made up the vast majority of the people in each Greek city-state, and he saw the flaws of the governmental systems which favoured each group of society: absolute democracy allowed the common people to outvote the more wealthy and privileged, while oligarchy allowed the wealthy and privileged absolute power over the common people. He proposed a system of checks and balances where what we might now call aristocracy were represented, and could debate legislation introduced in government, but the people had their own assembly where they might do the same until a consensus was found.

Modern conceptions about aristocracy and the ordinary person are rather vile. Instead of recognising the virtues of this long-established system, thinkers such as Godwin, and his successors in communist and socialist circles, sought to breed hatred between social classes. Privilege is often seen as a 'dirty word' today, but it was instituted as a reward, and remains so. There will always be instances of privilege being awarded to those who do not deserve it, but the solution is not to deny privilege to all. Aristocracy is a useful means to award a certain status on those who have made extraordinary contributions to society, perhaps over the course of generations through inheritance, and it has its role to play in a virtuous society. Aristotle's system allows for complete representation, since it lends weight to the will of both the privileged and the ordinary person. This allows for a perfect balancing act between the two classes, and for cooperation. So long as the two houses of a parliament of these two classes have equal power, and represent the interests of all kinds of people in society, they allow for a

government which does not exclude any part of society from representation.

In the British House of Lords, it was not merely aristocracy who received representation; bishops of the established churches were also allowed seats. This leads us onto our next consideration: should the Church have a role to play in government at all? Secularism is often lauded as a Western value in the modern age, but as we shall discover, this is not necessarily a good thing. Liberty is as much derived from religious tradition as it is from the ideas of man, and religion, whether adhered to in complete consistence with doctrine or followed in more abstract ways, has an important role to play in the moral guidance of government and cohesion of society.

Thanks to the conversion of the Roman Emperor Constantine to Christianity in 313 AD, Christianity was the majority religion of Europe. Today, due to secularisation, this is on the decline. In Europe, a 2010 Eurobarometer Poll found that roughly 50% of European citizens believe in a god, about 25% in a 'spiritual force' of some kind, and the rest did not believe or did not provide an answer. The process of secularisation and separating the Church from the State has been ongoing since the Enlightenment, with philosophers such as Kant realising that the communitarian value of religion was something to be lamented if it was lost, even if the theology of the various European Christian Churches was leaving something to be desired among rational men. We are discussing political justice, not theology, so we would do well to avoid a theological debate, but in the manner of Kant, we cannot deny that whilst religion has been used for the purpose of control and exploitation (as demonstrated by the pre-Reformation Catholic Church), it is also capable of great amounts of good.

Of course, theocratic government is somewhat ironically not a virtuous one. Due to the darker aspects of human nature, a man, such as the Pope in pre-Reformation Europe, imbued with such power over even other monarchs, and told that he has the authority of God in his

hands, would naturally be inclined to abuse his power, and consider himself morally superior to all others. It undermines the very concept of an all-loving, all-powerful God to bequeath that representative power to one man holding influence over all. The understanding of God as taught by Christ is perhaps the most important one for Western democratic states, and indeed, for the purposes of pursuing political justice. We are taught that God gave man free will, which surely embodies the natural state of man well. We may all choose whether to commit immoral acts or moral ones, and whilst we may have the 'freedom' to be immoral, religion also teaches us we may be punished for it — as a virtuous state does to those who commit immoral acts which harm others. We cannot rationally define God as an anthropomorphic deity who clicks his fingers and creates new life, or takes sinners aside to be burnt in Hellfire for a life of sin — God is the spiritual embodiment of the human capacity for moral self-improvement. God is virtue, and he holds out inspiration which becomes moral law. Understanding God is the spiritual way to teach the people the difference between virtue and vice and how to use the gift of free will for moral ends, rather than selfish ones. Jesus Christ is, after all, the embodiment of selflessness, whether one considers him the Son of God or not. Since we are all capable of contributing to human self-improvement, we are all capable of knowing God.

It so happens that Christianity is the religion of Western tradition; it also so happens to be a religion which teaches peace among its adherents. Christ was not a man who infringed on the freedoms of his fellow man. He for the most part tolerated and forgave sin, and merely encouraged sinners to leave their sins behind without prying into their private business, only becoming angry at the desecration of the Temple of Jerusalem — which of course could be interpreted as misuse of property which was not the moneylenders' to be misused (since a temple is of course God's). If peace and the virtuous use free will are the fundamental teachings of Christianity, it is difficult to find fault with this. There may be some who will say 'But how can you rationally

believe in a God?’ or ‘How can you be a slave to dogma?’ but dogma can be effective, if it is truly virtuous. Whether or not we *should* believe in God is a separate argument entirely — the moral value of Christian religion is supportive of virtuous government.

Thus, we must consider the Christian Church, whichever one is traditional to a particular nation, to be of some use to society. In Britain, the model used is most effective, since Bishops do not actually hold any executive power; although they have a place in the House of Lords to add spiritual advice to debate, they are too few to influence the majority of parliamentary votes. The Church does not govern any particular region of the nation or control any group in society, yet parliamentarians must swear an oath of loyalty to the monarch, who in turn must be the defender of the Established Church. To lack a state religion has been much bewailed by other thinkers, with Burke pointing to the excesses of the French Revolution, the violence against peaceful friars, and the confiscating of private property as a result of irreligious and immoral leadership. In other nations, when religion has been applied seriously for the benefit of society, the same moral and intellectual improvements have been seen. At the height of the Arab Empire, the Mu'tazilites understood Allah as a bringer of reason and logic, a teacher and bringer of understanding rather than violence and inter-religious hatred, which allowed for scientific breakthroughs in algebra and astronomy. In India, the Hinduism of the Marathas brought great prosperity, creating a legal code based on religious teachings which allowed for a great empire which lasted nearly two hundred years.

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We mentioned monarchy, and this leads us to our final point. Over the course of history, monarchies have risen and fallen. Most monarchies have died out and had their rule replaced by some form of republican government or non-hereditary head of state. In Britain, the monarchy has largely survived because of its willingness to allow parliament and

the elected government to run the affairs of state. This constitutional arrangement has served Britain well. The fact that some monarchies have been removed is not to be cared for at the present time. For now, we shall use the example of Britain, where republic is sometimes called for as an alternative to constitutional monarchy, and consider why the present system is worth keeping.

Common arguments against monarchy are seen regularly. Monarchy is often seen to contradict democracy, since in a democracy, it is the people that rule in the sense that they elect their governments, and the people are ultimately the ones to whom the government should be accountable. In a monarchical system, the government is constitutionally accountable to the monarch. In the now commonly held belief that equality is important in society, many object to the fact that monarchy demands subordination of the citizen to the monarch. Deference in terms of titles, respect and address is expected in a system where a monarch exists as head of state. It is also argued that since monarchy predetermines who will become head of state, it denies those who may be best suited to the role based on merit and intellect the chance of becoming head of state. Others worry about special powers granted to the monarch such as the royal prerogative, impartiality, and most gloatingly: expense.

Examining these arguments at first glance, it cannot be denied that there is what appears to be a well-reasoned case against monarchy. But let us examine in detail each argument and then consider whether they are true or not, or whether they are practical. Monarchy may in principle be seen to contradict democracy, but we might argue that in fact, it is only in absolute monarchies that this is the case. The establishment of constitutional monarchy in the United Kingdom is direct evidence of the fact that monarchy can exist in tandem with democracy, and very effectively. Whilst the government is legally and nominally accountable to the reigning monarch, as exemplified in the title 'His/Her Majesty's Government', it is accepted under British law,

and common sense, that elected representatives are accountable to their constituents — the commons of Britain, who equate to the citizens of Britain.

As we have already argued, equality is not a natural state of society and cannot be when people are born unequal. When human beings are born naturally unequal, it is natural to assume in turn that institutions will eventually establish some form of hierarchy — in the case of monarchy, with the monarch at the top. However, once again we must consider reality as opposed to possibility. Whilst it is possible that a monarch may establish absolute power, the constitutional position of the United Kingdom acts as a barrier to this. Whilst the monarch nominally has the power to prorogue Parliament and declare wars at will, the monarch does not use them out of convention. Any attempt by the monarch to use them would trigger a constitutional crisis which would ultimately lead to the abolition of the monarchy anyway. It is therefore against the interests of a sensible monarch to unjustly use these powers.

But if the monarch never uses their power, what is the point of having one anyway? Well firstly, one should consider the role of a President (or equivalent) in a hypothetically republican Britain. Due to the historical role of Parliament in British politics, it would be extremely likely that Britain would become a Parliamentary republic on the abolition of the monarchy, considering the example set by Italy and Germany. One must realise that in these states, the President is little more than a figurehead anyway. Presidents are often not actually directly elected by the people but by an electoral college of some kind, and are often old, retirement-age politicians who exercise their powers sparingly. This kind of system would show very little difference to the system already in place with the British monarchy. What is more, such a President would in all likelihood be even less impartial than a monarch. Whilst the monarch is independent of the political system, unaffiliated with the party, obliged to follow the will of Parliament and

not permitted to vote, a President would be a politician and a part of the political establishment. The Royal Estates also bring in income for government by means of tourism and the public's freedom to visit open estates, providing economic incentive for monarchy as well.

It was indeed seen best to safeguard British citizens' rights with constitutional monarchy rather than with republic. If the ideological reasons are not enough, this sapient choice of our ancestors must be respected as the best choice for the country at the time, and therefore must have been considered the best choice for posterity as well.

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In short, government requires balance of representation and balance of power in order that the interests of every part of society might be considered. Mere representation is not enough, however; government must be composed of principled men and women, and it must have a set of values. So long as liberty and moral virtue are imbued within the state, government can act effectively, and with authority. If government fails to recognise that its authority is held purely for the benefit of society and of mankind as a whole, it cannot be a virtuous government, for it is merely the plaything of interested parties, used for personal gain rather than the common good.

APPENDIX TO BOOK III.  
**REVOLUTIONS**

## CHAPTER VIII

# Organised Opposition

**W**E HAVE ALREADY concluded that it can be justified to oppose a government which does not have legitimate authority, by which we mean that it deviates from the values and principles of the nation and actively harms the rights of its citizens. If we are to properly understand what passes as ‘opposition’, when it is appropriate to initiate it and where the lines are drawn in deciding what is dangerous government action, we must now turn our attention to the following: bringing down governments, by peaceful or by violent means.

If I had to make a personal judgement, we are currently living in an era where organised opposition to many governments is both necessary and actively undertaken, though there may be some who disagree with me. Since opinion is the centrepiece of political debate, there will always be people in society who disagree with each other and who might seek to implement different policies in society. This is not what I refer to necessarily, for the situation which we are considering is one in which the government can be proved to be working against the interests of its citizens rather than for their benefit. Signs of this sort of government can often be seen in the character of people in government, who often make unsustainable promises which they do not keep to. They may spread falsehood, or they may present themselves outwardly as virtuous while committing acts which prove they are the opposite. Legislation will often be introduced which restricts the rights to free expression and mastery over certain parts of personal life. Courts will dictate to adults what they can and cannot do, and the state will supervise education to the point that certain subjects are deemed too ‘inappropriate’ for the people’s minds, whilst at the same time, in order to prevent the public from becoming conscious of their vicious changes, the public will be placated with short-term

gratifications and obeisances. Representation will break down as certain individuals are considered more worthy of representation than others, either because they are part of the interested parties of government or because they are part of a societal group which has been deemed favourable for certain destructive reasons. When one part of the whole is favoured over another, we lose our natural state of society; rather than recognising citizens as contributors to society, government recognises them as ‘members of x group’, and thus worthy of certain privileges. The political left uses this, as seen in the principle of ‘liberation’, by which they create false notions of ‘oppressed’ groups of society, to further oppressive agendas by turning a united society into a fractured series of diametrically opposed groupings.

When government can be clearly seen to be using divisive politics such as this to damage the complete liberty of society, then we can confidently say that our government is not virtuous. The reaction, therefore, should be to promote virtue and point out the failings of government at every opportunity. Burke wrote: ‘When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle’;<sup>13</sup> when government seems to be made up only of bad men, there is no choice but combination of the virtuous. First, this should be peaceful, and this is what we mean by organised opposition here.

In this situation, engagement in political discourse should be treated by virtuous men not merely as a right but also as a necessary duty. Associations of such men could be formed to make such discourse easier, with material made available to the public by as many media as is possible to distribute by, so that those who may spend their lives unaware of the political changes might come to realise the threat they face. The people who propagate the arguments in favour of removing moral rights for abstract or unjust reasons must be hunted down and debated, ridiculed and shown to be completely morally worthless. The arguments of the government must be completely and systematically

deconstructed. The obvious result of a successful campaign like this would be the defeat of the incumbent government in election, or perhaps the changing of policies by government to avoid electoral defeat. The latter is of course less preferable, but it is acceptable so long as the changes implemented which threatened society beforehand are reversed.

Now of course any such attempt at opposition will be met with political resistance. Godwin says that ‘every man is bound to resist every unjust proceeding on the part of the community’ — he is not wrong. However, he considers whether political ‘martyrdom’ is acceptable. It will always be hard, even for a corrupt government, to impose death upon its opponents, so long as it retains some semblance of democratic procedure. However, the law may be used, if it is in the hands of a majority government of unprincipled and vicious persons, to persecute the opposition for things which they say, to impose fines on them or ban their publications. One tactic that has been seen against conservative oppositions in recent years has been the use of broad terms generally understood to be construed as negative in order to smear public opinion against certain individuals.

So for instance, if the state is not properly controlling its borders, and so damaging liberty by allowing those people with antagonistic values to enter the country and begin actively working against society or further some selfish economic ends, then it may be necessary to criticise the state for destructive immigration policy. The tactic frequently used is to call such people ‘racist’ or ‘xenophobic’ in order to draw attention to the false assertion that their call for immigration control is derived from an irrational prejudice against foreigners rather than from genuine concern for society. Of course, such tactics should not be welcome in respectful political discourse, but in this situation, we are not dealing with a respectful government. Due to the toxicity of such buzzwords as these, it has become hard to argue for the true reasons why something such as immigration should be properly

controlled, since the label is now associated with the individual attacked, who becomes a martyr for his beliefs. But a martyr is of no practical use once dead — a dead man, metaphorically or otherwise, cannot help a cause by his actions. Martyrs teach us that alternative tactics are required. Often, in the pursuit of virtue, which is what we are concerned with here, we must remain civil and respectful if ever faced with an individual inclined to use these terms. If we are truly to be moral men in the face of potential destruction of society, we must show that we have more respect for others than our opponents, no matter how little respect our opponents may show us. Since these opponents would use moral arguments against us (because being naturally ‘xenophobic’ is fundamentally a moral issue), we would do well to highlight the moral deficiencies of our opponents’ viewpoints. By pulling off the mask of morality that many on the left wear and exposing the long-term damage to a united society that their ideas offer, we can more effectively oppose them.

Burke cited the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as an example of peaceful opposition which brought about regime change. Religion mattered much more in the Glorious Revolution than it would today, but the sentiment was the same. Parliament could not see how a Catholic King could keep his oath to uphold the reformed Church of England, and thus set about removing him in favour of a King who would keep his constitutional duties to the nation. The spirit of Britain at the time was at least in part represented by the Church, and the people of the nation could not feel as though that spirit could be represented, as it should be, in government so long as their King adhered to a religion with a very different philosophy. A more modern example might be the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal, and similar organised movements against oppressive European governments where unprecedented popular movements, organised by groups of well-intentioned men and women against their oppressive governments, brought about democratic reforms and the resignation of many government leaders. It is possible, if due pressure is placed upon

government at all levels of its operation, to force an end to its governance. After all, it is from the people that power is rightfully derived, and therefore government must capitulate to the demands of the people if the vast majority are dissatisfied with the present state of things. When the instruments of government control, such as the military and the ministers and judges of government institutions, are converted to the path of virtue, and refuse to support the deviant ways of a bad government, then can we know that success is a possibility.

Sometimes, however, even organised peaceful opposition does not work. Therefore, we should consider the alternative which certain nations have felt the need to take up in various epochs of world history: armed revolution.

## CHAPTER IX

# Revolution

**W**E HAVE ALREADY stated that armed revolution should be the absolute last resort of good men in any society, no matter how corrupt. However, we cannot avoid the fact that there may come times when there is no other choice. We should now consider, then, when is revolution necessary, how should it be organised, and what differentiates a ‘good’ revolution from a ‘bad’ one?

Revolution has been the pet hate of conservatives ever since Edmund Burke’s lengthy tract against the excesses of the French Revolution was published in 1790.<sup>14</sup> Sometimes, however, if the situation calls for it, even conservatives must rally behind the banner of revolution. The American Revolution is perhaps the greatest example of a revolution ‘done well’. Revolutions are by nature disorganised, steeped in anger and hatred, often without a sense of direction if they lack principles and values. This is the sort of revolution which ought to be avoided.

First, we must consider when revolution is acceptable. Our discussion in the previous chapter showed that organised opposition to a bad government should be the first step, but if this opposition has done nothing to stem the tide of destruction and hindrance of rights, alternatives must be explored. Once a government begins to imprison or legally persecute those who legitimately highlight its immoral conduct, and begins to enact laws which openly violate the liberty of the individual – so perhaps, refusing parents the right to bring up their own children, or legalising certain criminal practices which actively harm other people or the vulnerable – then we can say that we have reached a situation where the government is not merely just ‘not virtuous’ but is actively criminal. If the government is criminal, then the political institutions it runs can no longer offer any justice. This is

when the people must take steps to bring justice into their own hands. In America, the British government imposed high and ridiculous taxes without the people's consent — the poorest were hit, life became miserable, and those who spoke out against the government's policies were persecuted.

When a government is judged to be criminal, good men tend to recognise it. But here comes the crucial distinction between a revolution founded on strong values and one founded on weak ones. In America, for instance, the states sent representatives to a Congress, which decided that the best course of action was to free the Thirteen Colonies from British rule. They recognised that the purpose for which their ancestors had come to the Americas over a hundred years before was no longer viable, that purpose being liberty and a happy life in the New World, an idea born in England and brought to a new land far removed from it. When England itself forgot its purpose as a free country, the Americas had no choice but to pursue it independently. They drew up the Declaration of Independence, which identified the principles and values which embodied the spirit of the American nation. The American revolutionaries had a document which laid out their goals — they knew where they were going and they knew what sort of government they wanted to achieve once the battles were over.

By contrast, the French Revolution arose out of a Parisian mob, which had definitely been wronged and was suffering terribly, attacking the King's prison in Paris: the Bastille. Leaders of the revolution arose with differing visions for the country: there were those who wanted a state-centred secular government with a directed economy, those who preferred a more liberal system and free trade, those who sought to kill the king and those who wished to make France a constitutional monarchy — there was no pre-decided agreement; the revolution had no direction. Thus, the Reign of Terror was the result, with landowners' property confiscated, opponents of the Jacobin regime executed and holy sites desecrated in the name of radical

secularism. There was no attempt to look at France's traditions coherently and seek to establish a set of national values to guide the spirit of the new republic's constitution. What was the result? The tyranny of Napoleon, a new monarchy to replace the old monarchy under a new name: Emperor, for when offered order out of chaos, the people will always choose order.

It was this discord seen in the French Revolution that led Burke to chastise it so greatly. Unlike in the Americas, there was no consensus, there were no common values, and as we know, a cohesive society can only be founded on shared values. Of course, in France the result was numerous counter-revolutions as well by royalist conservatives, which amounted to civil war. The French Revolution was also marked by confiscation of property previously owned by the Church and aristocracy, which was placed in the hands of the state, and later peasants who had no idea how to work the land or respect the great classical designs of French country houses. The destructive forces of revolution had no respect for anything that created a free society — such as the right to private property or the moral guidance offered by the Christian religion which maintains liberty itself. When a revolution is focussed entirely on abstract concepts such as 'liberation of the downtrodden', it cannot properly function; it must be founded on values which embody the nation; it must in other words have a sense of direction. The model followed by the Americans is indescribably preferable to the French one, which offered no coherent plan for post-revolutionary government whatsoever.

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Whilst it is not necessarily our main concern here in discussing the ethics of revolution, a note must be briefly made concerning the practicality of revolution in the modern age. Given the developments of modern society, with tightened intelligence services and the sheer amount of political apathy among many people who could otherwise be of use to mass political movements, upheaval of any kind is incredibly

difficult. The New Left, or Frankfurt School of Marxism, found this in the post-war era when trying to reinvent Marxism into a theory which could be applied without violent revolution. Many institutions in the Western world at the time were inherently conservative, and followed many traditional values which are today derided as ‘old-fashioned’ or ‘not welcome in the 21<sup>st</sup> century’. In fact, it was these values which gave birth to the liberty and security which European had enjoyed for generations. The Frankfurt School undid many of these traditions with a new kind of revolution in Europe and America: by infiltrating the institutions of government and society – the ministries, the judiciary, the legislature and the education system (in fact, even the arts were not left untouched!) – they set about implementing critical theory by insidiously deconstructing traditional inherited wisdoms about morality and liberty. The morally degenerate was lauded as revolutionary and new, and was to be liberated, and any who spoke out against the changes that this brought about were to be criticised and ridiculed for being so very ‘old-fashioned’. Citizenship was no longer a privilege to be held by contributing to certain countries; it was to become a right held universally by all, with differing values and cultures abolished in favour of the ‘brotherhood of humankind’.

Humankind is a brotherhood of sorts, we cannot deny it; but millennia of human evolution have rendered us into separate subraces, nations, ethnicities and peoples, with separate histories and cultures. The recent and artificial forcing together of these nations has seen destructive results: terrorism, a breakdown of social cohesion and the persecution of the dissenters, all in the name of a false conception of ‘liberty’. This is revolution, merely wearing the mask of ‘progressive reform’.

When faced with deceptive forms of revolution such as this, conservatives are obliged to engage in counterrevolution of the same kind. When institutions are threatened, it is not because the destructive forces of revolution wish to reform them; it is simply

because, in the spirit of thinkers such as Godwin, they wish to destroy them. Revolution founded in the destructive spirit of radicalism, such as the French revolution, seeks only to further an immoral agenda: the agenda of control realised in the terrors of undemocratic revolutionary leaders like Robespierre and Lenin. Revolution should not be allowed to destroy what was given to us for the purposes of creating a better society. Revolution is only justified when it is necessary to protect those virtuous means which we have inherited.

Revolution and counterrevolution are tools: they are to be used only in the direst of situations, when the values and institutions of society are threatened to the point of destruction. We should be cautious to bring about revolution, be it armed in the manner of the previous age or be it institutional in the manner of the Frankfurt School, but we should not be afraid to engage in it if the liberty and security of society will be lost through inaction.

## CHAPTER X

# Instituting Reform

**P**LACING THE ANARCHIST left's naively optimistic hopes for individual governance based entirely on the power of human reason aside, let us consider the aftermath of a revolution. How should a force which has recently toppled its own government go about setting up a new administration?

This of course presents difficulties, considering that there will be those who seek differing political ideologies to be furthered upon the institution of the new government. However, if, like at the time of the American Revolution, a pre-existing set of principles has been agreed to, a constitutional convention should have enough to work with. A new legislature elected to rebuild government following a revolutionary phase should have this agreement in mind and consider the faults of the previous administration which has been displaced. First and foremost, when rolling back the crimes of the previous administration, a new legislature should look back at the history of the nation it has found itself governing. Starting from a completely blank slate, with a brand-new plan which has not yet been tried and tested by centuries of political discourse, is highly dangerous. New plans must be selected based on the ancestral history of political society in the nation in question.

Let us imagine society as a house: after a revolution, the house has been shelled, and only a skeleton of its former foundations remains as a result of the destructive nature of political struggle. We are faced with two options: either we use the most structurally integral parts of a plan used by those who built houses before us — not perfect houses perhaps, but they were able to stand, and lasted for a long time. The other option is to use a brand-new plan for a house which has never been built before, and whilst it is new, original and looks appealing, it

carries the risk of falling down in the first few days after construction. A 'rational being', as Godwin so often likes to call human beings, would surely choose the option which is guaranteed to build a stable house, even if some nuances are changed to ensure that it will not need to be shelled by the destructive forces of revolution again. Philosophers like Godwin, and other radicals who have followed in his wake such as Marxists and New Leftists, would have us choose the second option to create an abstract 'utopia' which is not only impractical but also lacking in any meaningful virtue or selflessness. It is impossible to have a selfless society where the state is in control of economic and social direction, since central control is by nature selfish. The state will always prioritise its own needs over those of society at large, and all sense of a greater good that virtuous individuals might offer in a cohesive society is lost.

Finally, we shall consider one problem which has troubled revolutionaries from the time of the Roman Empire to the present day — what to do with the tyrant or tyrants once the revolution is one? How should corrupt individuals be punished for their role in perverting government into a vicious organisation of self-interested oppressors?

Tyrannicide has its origins in the ancient world; the phrase of Brutus at the murder of Caesar *sic semper tyrannis*<sup>15</sup> is often quoted by freedom fighters, and features in some of the flags of the original Thirteen Colonies of the United States. Even following the toppling of the National Socialist regime in Germany, its key figures were executed for the role they played in the oppression of Europe and the war crimes they committed. But is tyrannicide justifiable in a virtuous society? Why should a revolutionary government, which would ideally just have fought to topple a government which lacked virtue, lower itself to the level of those virtueless members of the previous establishment by committing the sin of murder when it was wholly unnecessary? Tyrants not killed in the course of a revolutionary war must be brought

to justice before a court of law to answer for their crimes against the people, and if we apply the moral code we established in Book II, then we cannot justify murdering them for the sake of making a revolutionary point. Since we must always follow the path of virtue and maintain the moral high ground, the best place for tyrants is either in a prison cell, or, since due to their crimes against the people's rights, they would have proved themselves unworthy of participating in a society which extols complete liberty and justice, they should be sent into exile and not permitted to return to the society they corrupted. This allows the new government to prove its superior virtue to the previous one, whilst still punishing the perpetrators for their wrongdoing. It may also help to prevent the outrage of those who may be sympathetic to the tyrants, who may treat their death as a sign that the new government is no better, and should be opposed by means of yet more civil anger.

In some constitutions, such as that of Revolutionary France, where the King was fairly detached from his people and most of the wrongdoing was undertaken by his ministers, it becomes clear that sometimes the ceremonial head of state should not be the object of the revolutionaries' anger. King Louis XVI was executed to make a statement — to mark the end of the Bourbon rule of France — but in reality, the man was still fairly popular with his people and would happily have lived as a private citizen under the laws of the republic had he been allowed. It is important, once revolution has just been undertaken, to remember that there may be those seeking to displace the new regime with one sympathetic to their own agenda. Those who executed the French King did this, for they only wished to clear the way for their own tyranny. Where a member of the previous regime cannot be blamed for the shortcomings of his government, he should be allowed to enjoy his liberty as a private citizen under the new government, where perhaps he may offer some old virtues to the new order by means of his experience.

When instituting reform in a nation which has just been through some turmoil, be it violent or institutional, it is important to ensure that the national goals which triggered the previous upheaval are fulfilled. Those who are still alive who are culpable of some wrongdoing must be punished in the due legal process, as their rights in a moral society permit them to be, and those who are not culpable should be allowed a chance to live in the new society. It is never preferable to rush to conclusions or to listen to the demands of an angry mob, no matter how mistreated they may have been. If the only justification for revolution is the reinstatement of a virtuous society, then the vicious acts of the previous government must not be the only things to be removed; the immoral attitudes it held must be removed along with it. Moral goodness must be the watchword of any reform, whether initiated through violence or through peaceful means.

BOOK IV.  
**LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE  
POWER**

## CHAPTER I

# Introduction

**U**P UNTIL NOW, we have spent most of our discussion in this book presenting an alternative moral view to that of leftists and anarchists based on Mr Godwin's own structure. Now that we have a definitive moral code to work with, we know what the purpose of government should be and when it is and is not justified; we can begin to consider the practical details of political institutions rather than mere generalisations. We should remember that government is not an evil in itself, but it certainly has the potential to be when reviewing the following topics.

We shall consider the sort of people who do run and should run government administration, the sort of moral and social culture that those in government operate best under, the interaction between these people and the people of a nation, the forces that adversely affect institutions and control that legislative and executive power can exert over a society, what good it can do and how best it can shape virtue into providing a state of continuous moral improvement for society as a whole. Concerning executive power, we must consider how powers are balanced between a head of state, a head of government, and the ministers who oversee the various roles of the executive. In terms of legislative power, we must explore the value of law and deliberation — how to avoid the interests of partisanship and how to focus legislation purely on moral ends. Justice is merely a means of upholding the law which legislature passes, and since we have already laid out a system of virtue which governs moral justice, we may assume that a virtuous judicial system would always have the good of the community as a whole and the selflessness of action in mind when passing judgement in matters of law.

We have also already established the principle of the inequality of

man, so therefore we may assume that there will always be a system of elites who are more inclined to move their way up a meritocratic system into the echelons of government. Of course, as we have already discussed, it is perfectly possible for elitism to be a force for good, and so we may consider the elites who work their way into the higher levels of statehood to be of either good or bad stock. Either way, elites of some description will be the ones in government, and we shall consider the moral construction of these elites, how they ought to be selected and how they ought to exert political power. Whether we call our system monarchy, aristocracy or republic, there will always be elites; in a virtuous society, our sole task is to find a way in which the elites can act in the most moral way for the benefit of the non-elites as well as their fellows, rather than trying to obliterate elitism altogether.

We shall discover, over the course of this division of our discussion, that monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are not actually at odds but wholly capable of cooperation, and in fact require cooperation from each other in order to create the most virtuous of governments.

## CHAPTER II

# Education of the Elite

**W**E SHALL FIRST consider hereditary government, or at least the concept of having hereditary members of government such as in a monarchy or aristocratic system, where certain individuals can be rewarded with certain privileges which grant them a special place in society or government.

The education of monarchs and sons of laws has been seen as elitist in the worst possible sense because of the attitude prevailing among many members of these classes over the centuries, which has been described as the '[divine] right to rule', a concept which places the 'upper classes' on another plain above the rest of society purely by nature of their birth, and affords them more rights over the rest of society because a certain ancestor was appointed to a certain position by a certain monarch, who derives their legitimacy from God. This sort of attitude, however, is not inherent in human nature, and cannot be inherent in hereditary nobles purely because they are part of some sort of nobility. This sort of attitude is derived from upbringing and education. If the sort of attitude described above is prevalent among certain elite classes, then self-interest, caprice and a general lack of appreciation for the good of the community will be seen in their actions, which is of course to be avoided in a virtuous society.

When the elite are elevated to certain positions for whatever action it is they have undertaken, they would do well to remember that the mere fact that they have been elevated does not make them superior human beings. It may afford them more respect, but it does not make them more valuable members of the community. If the philosopher is just as important as the bricklayer, then a non-elite is just as a valuable as an elite. Whilst it is perfectly possible for anti-elite sentiments to be fostered by provocateurs among mainstream society, it is equally

possible for the elite to develop haughty and anti-non-elite sentiments on account of their privilege. The task that every virtuous monarch and elite faces therefore is the education of their hereditary successors in the same magnanimous and virtuous ways as they, in order that the same spirit which inspired the great deeds which afforded them their position might be carried on. An elite need not be humble, but he should be modest and respectful of those below him, since if those below him did not exist, he would not be in the position which he finds himself in.

There should be an understanding amongst the elite when brought up in the privileged environments in which they live, that they did not come into their position originally by nature of birth, but by nature of reward, and rewards can be just as easily removed by authority as they can be dished out. There should also be an understanding between the elites and their sons and daughters that the offspring of elites do not share the same experience as their elders. Many on the left believe that hereditary privilege ought to be abolished as a result of this, but to obliterate tradition so hastily is not often best for a community. If virtuous men are to be given the gift of privilege, then they must educate their heirs to realise that they have not performed the same deeds as them and must work for the same respect that they have earned. Having a title which indicates the parenthood of a virtuous man does not convey virtue on the bearer of the title. If the father can pass on virtue to the son, he may perform great deeds and earn the same respect as his parents had; if by contrast he is immoral and unworthy of the title, there should always be the risk of such privilege's removal for conference upon a greater person.

The education of an elite in matters of virtue, or the history of his ancestors which afforded him his position, does not afford him anything more than the respect and privileges of that respect that a certain status affords him. Elites should remember that they have no more legal rights than the common citizen. In a just society, those who

have a history of virtue and continue to inherit such moral qualities ought to be rewarded, but reward does not amount to preferential treatment under the law. Nor should they have sole control over making the law, though of course they should have a say in making it, a system which worked well in Britain (as discussed in the previous Book) before the expulsion of the aristocracy from the House of Lords in 1999. Equality before the law is necessary in any just system, since whether it is an elite or a non-elite who commits a crime, the resulting label is still the same for both: they still sully themselves with the sinful title of 'criminal'.

Any sort of elitism which may come to hold power in a political system should adhere to certain precepts which prevent a misuse of the privilege which we may use for virtue. There should be a deep-held consideration that value is inherently attached to the status of an elite, and value is only added to something when it is in demand. There is demand today for virtuous actions, which would surely indicate a paucity of elites who convey virtue through their actions in society. It should be in the interests of the elite to value selflessness and charity, since their position of respect in society provides a centre towards which those outside of the centre can aspire to move towards. That is to say, if the most respectful members of society are virtuous ones, because they are selfless, because they work for the improvement of others out of the compassion of their own hearts, those who are not yet in that circle may aspire to join it and so pursue virtuous actions of their own. Thus is a cycle of virtue perpetuated through the whole of society more easily.

In terms of the power of a monarch, we reach a question of the extent of power. The British system works well, since the monarch forms a rallying point for the traditional and historical awareness of the citizens of Britain yet has limited constitutional powers. The natural impartiality of the monarchs and their waiving the right to participate in mainstream politics ensure that politically interested

establishment are kept out of the highest office of state, and the monarchs may exact their constitutional duties without political bias. So long as this attitude of impartiality is carried down the generations, the monarchs can provide a stable base for handing power down to executive government, whilst serving as an important reminder of natural inequality of man and the necessity of a layered society. It goes without saying that in republics where the head of state is elected, such as the United States, the system remains akin to monarchy, merely with the exception that the monarch is chosen directly by the people and has a limited term of office. This system, whilst it can work in a similar way to hereditary monarchy, is more open to partisanship, since the elected 'monarch' is often associated with an organised political group with certain interests attached to it. As we shall learn later, partisanship is often the swiftest path to political injustice in the exercise of governmental power.

The elites must be imbued with a certain moral attitude and treat the education of their successors seriously. Virtue can be taught, and it can be inherited, and whilst privilege can be used as a reward, it must be exercised carefully, since the men and women who prove themselves to be most worthy are the only ones deserving of such honours, and today, the institutions of aristocracy and similar elite systems are openly mocked and degraded by their abuse at the hands of interested parties.

## CHAPTER III

# Life of the Elite

**P**RECEPTS SOWN in the mind of the young frequently carry forward into later age, but sowing virtuous character into the mind of a young man, whilst it serves as the best groundwork for a beneficial life, does not necessarily make for a practical one. After all, like in the cultures of the ancient world, it is not mere mindset that is rewarded with the status of heroism; it is deeds which convey heroism on the doer. We must therefore examine how those with privilege can best use the gift bestowed upon them for the benefit of others, and how they might come to appreciate society more fully, enabling a more virtuous application of legislative and executive power.

It may seem like a generalisation, but it would be fair to say that elites live fairly sheltered lives. In modern Britain, most elites are not necessarily aristocracy but merely those who have inherited large amounts of money and behave as if they were aristocracy. They often send their children to public school,<sup>16</sup> where they are educated in high culture, taught Latin and ancient Greek, which has fallen out of use in most state-run schools, and will then enter a selective university on account of their extensive education and, upon leaving university, work in some sector in which their family has a great deal of influence, with the family name to back them up and with no particular connexion with or care for any other member of society. Indeed, remaining in such circles renders it often unnecessary for such elites to ever enter the circles which non-elites move in, and we are left with a vicious cycle which cultivates the worst sort of elitism that a civilised society aspiring for more moral ends could ever suffer.

Now, we are not disputing whether or not the elites should have the right to send their sons to elite schools — that is a prerogative that should exist in any free society, no matter how much the left may hate

the existence of schools which are independent of a state-central agenda. However, keeping these young future leaders in such closed circles for almost their entire lives leads them into the false belief that the concerns of the non-elites must be the same as theirs, and perhaps most worryingly in modern times, that a lack of income is not an issue for the vast majority of people. I recall a recent doctoral graduate at university speaking to me about future careers in academia; starting at the lowest rung of the ladder, his salary came at just under £40,000<sup>17</sup> per annum, which most people would jump at the opportunity for. However, he was left with the debt to pay off from his university fees on top of his tax contributions, not to mention the fact that he had been earning no income whatsoever while studying for his doctorate, thus leaving him with the disposable income of the average worker. He was all right with this arrangement — his family had a large inheritance that they could provide him with — but I realised in this moment that the poverty of my family compared to his would always exclude me from an academic career, yet he looked at me with complete surprise when I stated I could not do the same.

In other instances, elites misconstrue the desires of those outside their circle, and engage in reverse-snobbery where they exclude those below them from indulging in the culture of their own circles in order to eliminate the notion of a certain environment being ‘upper class’, but parade their customs openly among the members of their own. For instance, banning certain dress codes perceived to be elitist from certain events in order to encourage those without that dress to come, when in fact it merely discourages those who have risen up the ranks to attain that same status from coming to such events.

These are just a few examples. Elites often simply do not realise the differences between themselves and those outside of their circles, no matter how good-natured and morally upright they might be otherwise. The solution to this problem is to encourage hands-on practical interaction between elites and non-elites, and to ensure that

the attitude of ‘us and them’ is completely removed from public discourse. There should be a recognition of society as a community rather than a medium for individual life, and if the elites truly hold a moral responsibility to those below them (which as we have previously ascertained, they do), then they should follow the example of those estimable predecessors of theirs who set that moral example.

For sake of example, let us consider the actions of Lord Shaftesbury (1801–1885), who despite his education in elite circles (Harrow School, then Christ Church Oxford), used his privileged position in society for a great deal of social good. A lifelong Tory and supporter of structured community and moral responsibility, he supported the reclassification of the mentally ill to ‘patient’ status and helped to introduce a bill which specified certain standards of medical care for the mentally ill; perhaps most famously however, he petitioned the Prime Minister Robert Peel several times in support of a parliamentary bill preventing the exploitation of children who at the time were often forced to work in mines or as chimney sweeps. By 1847 a bill inspired by his ideas was passed, and the proper treatment of children has been considered a fundamental tenet of civilised society ever since.

Men like Shaftesbury were inspired to their virtuous actions to a large extent by their Christian faith. The Lord in question was a prominent figure in Anglican evangelical circles and believed that his actions were merely following teachings of Christ. One cannot underestimate the value of treating religious, or indeed simply moral, teachings seriously. If any group of society genuinely believes that it must follow the selfless and moral teachings of its religion, or its moral code as an imperative duty, then it will be more likely to use its legislative power for the greater good of society when faced with obviously wrongful situations.

Of course, another frequent criticism of elites, particularly when elites are afforded such status purely by nature of their financial wealth, is that they are often dissolute. Indeed, a large amount of

money is often a path to sin, since the temptation to spend money on carnal pleasures is often irresistible, especially to the younger generation, whose minds are still pliable and eager to experience the pleasures of life. Whether or not we spend, rich or poor, money on material or bodily pleasures is purely a matter of morals, though of course one response would be that in a moral society, the dissolute, or indeed anyone who proved themselves unworthy of elite status, would not have it afforded to them, or would have it stripped of them when enough evidence came to light proving them to be setting a poor moral example. The reading of history which dictates that the aristocracy was frequently dissolute, citing examples of individuals such as Byron or the later Bloomsbury Group who were able to engage in immoral acts, is misleading. Yes, these individuals had the money to afford to be radical and immoral, but the truth is that many aristocrats of the last three centuries dedicated themselves to fundamentally moral pursuits. Many treated their position in society with reverence and produced such great political stock as the Duke of Wellington, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl Grey, who did much to advance the representative powers of the Commons, and of course men like Shaftesbury. There was then a better appreciation of community and the responsibility members of both the elite and the non-elite had to their society rather than to interested parties. Of course, today interested parties are quite literally the groups which permeate our political system, and that previous time was marked with much less political partisanship, and whilst loose political coalitions of men existed, organised parties with whips enforcing certain moral and political worldviews on their members did not.

Like any group of society, the elites are open to corruption if they lose sight of their moral responsibility. In recent years, with the aristocracy destroyed, and a political elite frequently referred to as 'the establishment' taking up its place, which is influenced by wealthy business and banking corporations, religion and morality has been replaced by wealth and selfish individualism. This sort of corruption has gradually eroded the ability of those in government to exercise

moral justice in the exercise of legislative and executive power. The elite are frequently caught up in their own interests when they live lives completely removed from those of the ordinary citizens of society. In order to improve the moral quality and understanding of the elites for the plight of those who do not have the same privileges as them, be they monetary or purely titular, it is most beneficial for the elites not merely to be educated in virtue but also to spend time working with and listen to those who are not like them. The best education, after all, is often learnt 'in the field' rather than in the schoolroom. Virtue is an estimable concept, but it is much more than a concept — it can readily translate into action. If the examples of the past are anything to go by, modern conceptions about virtuous actions are almost non-existent, and if a functioning community with a hierarchy which benefits mankind rather than hinders it is to be brought about, the social bubbles in which those inclined to be in government often move within must be popped, or at the very least opened up with a vision to what lies beyond.

## CHAPTER IV

# Benevolent Dictatorships

**W**E HAVE ALREADY concluded that dictatorships are naturally oppressive, and even if dictators are by nature benevolent, they must still act in secrecy and maintain their absolute power by surreptitious means. We dismissed the concept of dictatorship in our discussion of government, but now in the context of legislative and executive power, we return to the topic, especially in the context of the elites we have just discussed.

The absolute rule of one man is oppressive, perhaps, but if, as we have discovered in the chapters above, that elected Presidency, such as the model used in the United States, is merely a renamed and constitutionally varied form of monarchy, then it is perfectly possible for a form of absolutism to be elected to power. Godwin dismisses elective monarchy in his discussion of these ideas on the grounds that, the deceptive function of absolute rule aside, it often reaches a stage where a single family is favoured for election over others, such as in the Holy Roman Empire, which was nominally elective, but in practice consistently elected the Habsburg family to the throne so often that it became *de facto* hereditary. In the United States, George Washington was elected to the office of President twice but refused to take up the office again out of his disapproval of monarchy — the same tendency here is shown. Society craves a single ruler upon whom it can place value to act as its head of state. However, whilst the American President's powers are balanced out by the powers of the Congress and the Judiciary, they have endowed the President, unlike the monarchs of England, with the power to control the military, make warlike acts — all the prerogatives of a tyrant. Did Caesar not have a Senate, a body which could not touch him because he wielded the power of the military? The American Presidency is a form of benevolent

dictatorship, for it allows one man, with the nod of goodwill from his people by means of election, great power over them all. It is in effect an elected monarchy, merely with a limit on its terms. Is it acceptable for the people to elect a monarch, however, no matter how well constituted the agreement between people and government, no matter how benevolent the individual elected?

Of course, election is a lottery. Electioneers can make false promises, they can be influenced by those in government when elected and they lack the inherited virtue which ensures that the duties of state which the head of state is obliged to conduct are undertaken in good faith. Recent political climates have shown that Presidency has produced no more transparency than tyranny — meetings concerning the safety of the nation, meetings of ministers and the private opinions of the President are kept as closely guarded secrets, and only released as highly classified documents to certain individuals or released to the public heavily censored. The idea that a democratically elected President, whom we may as well call a ‘monarch’, has any more legitimacy than a hereditary one is farcical. Neither acts in any particularly better way. There is an objection often raised, that the checks and balances in place in Presidential constitutions make it difficult for Presidents to abuse their power, but indeed, in mixed governmental systems, such as that in the United Kingdom, there are just as many checks and balances. The Queen of Britain has the right to dissolve Parliament, to declare war at will if she wished to, but she will not, for she knows that such action would lead to her swift demise. The British Parliament commands all military action; the recent decisions of Mr Trump in America have proved that Presidents have much more power than a consolidated hereditary monarch in a traditional mixed system.

When republican governments lack virtue, they also begin to tend towards the same hereditary tendencies as the elective monarchies described by Godwin. When the established order of a republic

becomes corrupt, and loses sight of virtue and its obligations towards society, there is always chosen a named candidate who is considered the obvious successor to the previous 'monarch'. In the United States, the election of Trump was a great shock, since it was widely assumed that Hillary Clinton would be the successor to Mr Obama's Presidency — for she was the named successor by the media, by the establishment, by those who wanted to keep the natural order of the new agenda moving.

It is perfectly possible for a virtuous man to be elected to executive power and be served by virtueless ministers. The agendas of individuals, no matter whether appointed by a previous or incumbent administration, still have the potential to be corrupt. The objection to this is that it could be true for any government, but in fact this is not the case. A mixed government, where the executive power of the monarch is limited to certain duties, and the power of ministers is to serve the will of a Parliament which represents both the commons and the nobility, ensures that ministers can be more easily checked for failing to implement the will of the whole, rather than influencing a monarch who dictates the orders to the ministers, who in turn would find it easier to put pressure on one man or woman holding a great deal of executive power. For instance, if a minister wishes to go to war on behalf of a particular nation, he would rather attempt to bring a monarch with the power to bring about that war at the drop of a hat to his point of view, so that he could set about the administration of the war, than convince an entire Parliament of varied men with varied opinions, or try to manipulate that war himself and be forced to answer to an assembly of angry representatives.

It is also natural for a man with a great deal of personal power to take his own personal concerns to heart, and perhaps even to consider them virtuous, or for the benefit of greater society, even when they are not. When so much power is conferred upon one, it appears to the holder like a shame not to use it, and he begins to create reasons in his

own mind why he should use aspects of his power which might be harmful to society for his own ends. To convey power upon one man, whether benevolent or not, produces, as we can therefore see, a selfish form of government, and since all virtue is derived from a form of selflessness, a powerful dictatorship of any sort over the major parts of a society is fundamentally an evil. There will be those who, when they learn about the sort of society we propose in its place, will say that our disdain for dictatorship is at odds with a hierarchical society with a monarch at its head. This could not be further from the truth, since it is perfectly possible to have a sharing of powers whilst recognising the natural order of things which is best to sustain the concept of virtue in society. Mixed government where a noble elite which has proved its virtue is represented separately to the common people in a legislature sustained by a dutiful monarch, governed by a virtuous executive with a vision of a communitarian society is in fact designed precisely to prevent the dictatorship of one man in any part of society.

The truth is that benevolent dictatorships are all around us today, and whilst the nuances of each individual constitution may differ, it makes the end result no different. The mere fact that we say that our monarch is 'democratically elected' does not make him any more legitimate than a man with the same powers who received his position by virtue of inheritance. If government is not properly balanced, individuals not made accountable and the interests of all layers of society not represented, a President may still be a King, a wise man may still be a fool and society may still be deceived.

## CHAPTER V

# Ministries

**A** MINISTER IS, by his very name, a servant to a master.<sup>18</sup> Today ministers might be more readily known by many people as ‘cabinet members’, or in the United Kingdom and United States as ‘Secretaries of State’. It is in fact no coincidence that these latter two countries have decided upon the title of Secretary for their ministers, but rather it is a useful reflection of what the ministers of state ought to be doing throughout a term of office.

We have considered the influence of corrupt ministers upon kings, and we have considered briefly why ministers are less inclined towards corruption in more thoroughly structured mixed governments, so now we shall attempt to define the role of a minister. For what is it that a secretary does outside of a political context? He is an administrator, a keeper of records and a distributor of information pertaining to executive commands received from those they work for. A minister is therefore like a secretary for the government: he is a keeper of information regarding practical policy, and he oversees the administration of policies which require day-to-day checks and reviews in order to keep certain areas of society functioning. The minister is not there to express his own opinion or to change the operation of his role at his own whim, no — he is there as a servant. Since all political power is derived from all people in society, he is a servant of the people. If he is a minister of the Crown, then since the Crown derives its legitimacy from the love of the people, so too is a minister of the Crown a servant of the people. The minister is a tool of government, and he serves those above him. Government, if it is to be successful, must represent the natural inequality in human society, and so too are the administrators and masterminds of government naturally unequal in the hierarchy of executive power. There is nothing to stop a minister

from petitioning for a change to policy, but he may not change the policy he is implementing until he has approval of those who oversee his work.

So the role of the minister is that of a servant. But what are the roles of ministries in general? There seems to be a ministry for almost everything in the modern world, and at times it is disturbing to see echoes of George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* seeping into the fabric of society and government. In Orwell's world, where the infamous Ministries govern almost every aspect of daily life in the global state of Oceania, the mantras of *War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength* govern a deceived populace who cannot even recognise the oxymoronic quality of the slogans which their state repeats to them. It is only terrifying when one realises that this is the purpose of modern ministries: not to serve the people for whom government was first created, but to churn out meaningless statements and mantras to keep those people preoccupied with working out how various policy areas will affect their own personal lives rather than considering what the purpose of government should be, or whether the policy itself is inherently virtuous. Ignorance has become such a strength that much of the political establishment itself has already come to believe it for themselves; policy is no longer decided by a parliament which represents all members of society but rather by individuals in governmental offices considering how best to further their own agendas. Ministers must be governed by those who appreciate society as a whole and have a vision for the betterment of mankind if ministries are to avoid becoming corrupt in the ways depicted in Orwell's novel. A parliament must be the dictator of policy, since if the executive decides on policies by its own whims then it is also more likely to break promises.

If ministers are appointed by a high officer of government, there is the chance that they will be appointed according to the personal interests of that officer. If ministers are directly elected, then those

ministers will reflect the opinions and concerns of the significant number of the electorate, which may not necessarily be the best for society as a whole. In either system, ministers may also be inclined to change policies partway through a term of office in order to respond to the changing caprice of the public, which, once again, may lead to broken promises or a deviation from the path of virtue for the sake of maintaining the popularity of the ministers. Parliament, which represents the hereditary nobles who have maintained their status by means of virtue, the commons, who have sent their representatives to parliament, and the monarch, who presides over the whole institution of government, must be the body which holds these ministries to account, since it represents both the capricious commons and the more steadfast nobles, also informed by the morality of the Church. Virtue, once again, is the governing force of ministry, and since ministers are the tools of government, they are tools which must be used for betterment.

A balance must be struck between freedom and authority: the means for bringing about a completely libertarian society by means of executive power is found in the defence of the individual right to personal freedom and the right to mental freedom. A ministry which dictates the sorts of food that a population should eat, for instance, is inappropriate, since it removes individual freedom from the individual who has the right to choose the sort of food he eats and suffer the consequences of good or ill health as a result as a matter of personal risk. A ministry for the management of food standards is quite another matter, since such a ministry would oversee the rules which ensure that the manufacturers of food do not corrupt their produce with material which might harm the population. That would be a virtuous pursuit of government, since it prevents the sin of harm. Any harm taken upon an individual by that same individual, however, is not the concern of government. Malice and vice should be the enemies of virtue, and it is the purpose of government to make them so. Where there is no malice, but only a matter of reasonable personal conscience,

the ministries of state should not interfere.

Ministries in general should be kept to a minimum, since it should be the primary concern of individual communities governed by good men to ensure that virtue is propagated by strong interpersonal moral values; however, ministries will be necessary for the function of any government. If communities throughout a nation have institutions which ensure that local morality is maintained, then ministries are the fathers of those institutions; they are the representatives of the community of the whole nation and therefore must operate by the same morality. They should set an example by their conduct of sound administration and be answerable to the nation through a parliament. One need only look at the past in the early United States, or Britain in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Whilst we cannot fairly say that these times were perfect, the appreciation of community was much stronger. These states had much fewer ministries and interfered with the affairs of local communities much less than in modern Western societies, since the morality of the time prevented the state from needing to intervene on behalf of local communities. It is a virtuous morality which must be propagated if ministries are to be made functional, and to be reduced. Virtue is the door to a good society; functional, restricted ministries hand in hand with moral communities are the hinges.

## Subjects and Citizens

**S**O LONG AS THERE are governments there will always be those who are subjects and citizens of those governments. These are the people who elect representatives to the commons, perform jobs to earn salaries and keep the economic system moving. They are the ants of a colony who work hard and build something at the end of it; for all their endless toil they have the potential to create something special. A revolutionary would suggest that these ants should kill the queen ant and take decisions for themselves, operating on their own individual free will. Indeed, we must ask — why should the people of a nation be below other citizens in terms of rank and privilege? Why should they be unequal, and what is the purpose of this inequality?

We have already asserted throughout the course of our argument that human beings are naturally unequal by nature of their biology and individuality, and as part of that inequality, society itself must also be structured hierarchically. Throughout history, whenever a new civilisation has arisen, it has always formed a society ordered around an unequal structure. We have said that elites or nobles who are awarded certain titles and positions within society must be given such positions as a result of virtuous actions, the habits of which they can pass on to their successors to create a system of hereditary virtue which sustains virtue within the function of government itself. Does this mean that those people who are mere subjects and do not take part in elite life are not virtuous? Of course not, it is perfectly possible to endeavour to live virtuously and not be a noble. The purpose of nobility is to reward those who perform extraordinary deeds which advance the prestige and virtue of the entire nation, whilst there are other awards both titular and monetary which can be conferred on other citizens who have still expressed a concern for their fellow

citizens but have not shaken the earth with their mighty deeds. This is how we may structure society: the monarch was traditionally the strongest of men, who was appointed as king because he earned the love of his people, or vanquished his challengers, then convinced his people that he should be their ruler (since not even the strongest man can withstand the ire of a thousand weaker men) then those who demonstrated great virtue were ennobled, those beneath them knighted or awarded the merit of certain order, and those yet to prove any prominent virtue left without.

The purpose of such rewards is not to discriminate, it is to encourage an aspiration towards virtue. The ordinary man has always mainly been concerned with his own affairs, foremost his livelihood, his pay, his food and family, but there have also always been those who have striven for that which lies beyond their own concerns. The utter selflessness which drives virtue is that which draws a distinction between the ordinary man and the virtuous man, the man without and the man with privilege in a politically just society. Some may not have time in their lives to properly give care and attention to others, some may simply not be interested, and the beauty of individual liberty is that they have the full right not to do so, but if a nation is to be a beacon of virtue, then it must encourage virtue, and those who willingly choose to care for none but themselves cannot expect to be rewarded in a politically just society.

To recognise the nature of society as being a whole made up of many parts, which in turn are made up of individuals, is to recognise the role of every individual as a hero, member or danger to society. Every member and every hero deserves to participate in the administration of his society to some degree and has a right to exercise a certain degree of governmental influence. For the vast majority of citizens, this right is the right to vote; the right to vote for a representative is one of the most forthright expressions of membership of society and thus should only be reserved for citizens themselves. To vote is to have a say in the

management of a nation, for it is the act of placing trust in a representative to offer opinions on behalf of the electors in a body which oversees the very function of society itself. The nobles who have proved themselves virtuous are so small that they may have their own chamber, such as the former British House of Lords, which numbered some 1,000 members, whilst the Commons represents such a large number of people that they must send representatives to parliament in their place, since an Athenian-style assembly of all the people is impractical. Of course, the fact that an ordinary man chooses not to make an effort to be especially virtuous does not mean he should be excluded from exercising the rights which every citizen, elite or non-elite, is equally entitled to.<sup>19</sup> Rights, such as the right to vote, can only be removed when a citizen has proved himself unworthy of membership of society, such as while serving punishment for a crime. Godwin's notion of equality, that reason dictates that every man has the faculty to play an equal role in governance, does not align with the principle of natural inequality. Not every man has an aptitude for governance: in the management of the state, if he has an aptitude for governance, he might put himself forward for election; if he has an interest in government, he might vote for his preferred candidate; if he does not care he will not vote. That representative, elected by the commons will represent his people in the House of Commons, which in turn legislates with the Lords, who have separate interests, concerns and aptitudes, and so the interests of the subjects are included in the deliberations of governmental power, whilst those subjects without the time or interest to be further involved may waive such responsibilities.

The political interests of the subject are given attention, but in a society structured around virtue, his interests are weighted according to his aptitude for virtuous actions for the benefit of society. It is ridiculous to say that every man knows what is best, but by allowing every man to have a say in electing a representative to one part of government, political discourse may be shaped by debate between the

best and worst ideas, thus allowing citizens to influence the search for justice, which as we know is a branch of truth.

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Finally let us consider what makes a citizen: who deserves citizenship? A citizen is a member of society, and as we have seen, societies are defined by their history and the unique culture which has developed over many thousands of years of that history. Language, attitude, and, to a certain extent, race define societal membership. It has been observed in countries with mass immigration of ‘multicultural’ migrants, such as in Malmö in Sweden, and London and Birmingham in the United Kingdom, that those of the same race tend to gravitate towards one another and form culturally distinct communities. This is due to the natural affinity between races which share a culture, and the natural distrust of these cultures for those which are different.

The very existence of nation states in the first place is enough to prove the ridiculousness of the modern multicultural agenda followed by many Western nations. Cultures do not naturally mix with members of each culture joining hands in happy appreciation of one another — they are naturally disposed to separate and follow distinct paths towards political and social justice, since both differ in worldview and customs and may view the other as immoral, barbaric or inferior in some way. The foolishness of forcibly mixing them has been proven amongst the modern Western left in paradoxes such as their continued support for immigration of Muslim migrants into Western Europe, and their support for LGBT liberation despite the fact that the vast majority of Muslims oppose LGBT rights in general, and in fact seek the persecution of such minorities.<sup>20</sup>

Now, we should not say that race is the be-all and end-all of societal cooperation, nor should all races apart from those native to a country be barred from entering it — that would be uncivil, if not prejudiced. A small number of those with different cultural backgrounds who accept and abide by the laws and customs of their new adopted nation, whilst

remaining interested and in touch with their roots, can do great things to educate the people of a nation in other cultural values, even if these appear a little alien or unusual. In general, participation in a society is defined by attitude, but the history of the ethnicity native to that nation is crucial in forming these attitudes. The adoption of the sartorial, linguistic, moral and cultural attitudes of a particular nation defines the ability of an individual to participate in that society as a respected member of society. For those born in a nation with family stretching back generations, this is not difficult at all.

Second, and arguably just as important, is contribution to society itself. Those born and raised in a nation will usually seek to work and raise a family in the community in which they were born, or at least in the same country. Immigrants arriving from other lands will need to prove that they have not only the cultural means to participate in society but also the right social attitude. They must be able to offer something to society which pre-existing members of society could not, and efficiently provide that which they offer. The complete self-sufficiency of a nation is often not possible, and is a characteristic of autocratic, closed societies (such as North Korea) but a government must remember that its primary duty is towards those who are already citizens of the nation.

Society is built on citizens and subjects, and to become a citizen, one must prove oneself to be worthy of the values which bind that society together. Political justice and virtue in accordance with the morality of selflessness define the attitude of every good-minded citizen who wishes to make an active contribution. Economic migration in general is usually marked by a desire for personal gain, by dissatisfaction with the lot that an immigrant had in his home country, and so he seeks better elsewhere. But to seek something for personal gain is surely selfish, and if selflessness is virtue, then that immigrant would have to prove that he seeks to move elsewhere not merely for himself, but to provide a helpful service for the sake of others as well. Christ did not

send his ministers out from the Holy Land for a better life but to bring their good works to the people of Europe, and they did not expect a welcoming reception. Those leaving their home countries are not born and raised with the same values as those who already have families in their destination country, and they must recognise that different cultures and races are naturally 'racist'. That is to say, there is a natural discrimination between those different peoples with different histories, and the most powerful tool in overcoming that natural suspicion is a demonstration that the attitudes of the new nation have been adopted out of respect for the new nation.

To be a citizen is to participate in society — it is a dutiful status to have, and it is not one to be taken lightly, certainly not for the sake of personal gain.

## CHAPTER VII

# The Monarch

**T**HE ROLE OF THE monarch in society is a prestigious one, and as we have discovered, even in nations where there is a general belief that the monarchy has been abolished, a monarchical system remains in place even if the title and nuances of the position have been changed slightly. We shall now turn our discussion towards what the role and power of a monarch should be, how the powers should be distributed and what respect the monarch should be afforded in the exercise of executive power.

Monarchs were first powerful chieftains who earned the love of their tribe by force, by slight of speech or by glory of deed. Today, monarchs are a dying breed in the traditional sense; the world's last emperor rules Japan, whilst the Queen of the United Kingdom remains one of the most loved monarchs in the world, with subjects hailing from Canada to the South Pacific. In much of the rest of the world, the hereditary monarch has been replaced with an elected alternative, some acting as mere figureheads with the position reserved for retired ex-statesmen, and others with much greater, quasi-regal powers. Nevertheless, it has not been a smooth transition to this situation, and if we are to continue to defend, as we have been doing, the functionality of constitutional monarchy in a mixed governmental system, we must consider the history of monarchy and devise the best system to both limit a monarch's power and define his prerogatives.

Since despotism has been dismissed as an evil, we can safely conclude that absolute monarchy is not a preferable form of government. However, it is from absolutism that the British system of constitutionalism grew, and from this constitutionalism grew the modern system of constitutional monarchy, which is probably much better defined as a 'crowned republic'. Modern constitutional

monarchies retain their monarchy not out of respect for the age-old institution of inherited virtue but out of a desire to ride the popular sentiment which frequently accompanies these monarchies, left from the remnants of respect for tradition which has not yet been destroyed by the critical theory of the New Left. A crowned republic affords the monarch no responsibility, no care or attention for their nation, merely to act upon the whim of a Prime Minister designated by the whim of a misled and disaffected electorate. This is not in the spirit of a mixed government, and it leads to situations such as that seen in Britain today, where the parts of society which have just as much of a right to representation as the commons are expelled from Parliament over abstract notions of 'equality' and 'updating' the constitution for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. True democracy is the rule of the people, and if the monarch and the aristocracy are also people, surely they too are part of the *demos* which deserves to hold political power.

Godwin's main criticism of monarchy, and the criticism even used by republicans today, is that monarchy is easily inclined towards tyranny. This is probably true with regard to most absolute monarchies; however, a monarchy is the best medium for defence against tyranny if it is properly managed against the interests of other parts of society. A monarch, as the head of state, should concern himself with the formal opening and dissolution of state and the appointment of a First Lord or Prime Minister based on the advice of his Council and Parliament, and apart from these political duties, should have a regal presence and show reverence for tradition and religion so as to present an image of steadfastness, ancestral respect and morality which the people of a nation can admire. Fundamentally, the benefits of a monarch are this: he is an inspiration, and an object of love of the people. If the purpose of hierarchy is to inspire upwards aspiration and virtue, then the monarch should have a duty to be near-sacrosanct in his love of the traditions of his nation. A monarch is not merely a *de jure* ruler; a monarch is pin that holds the cart in place against the reins.

With this love for his nation, the monarch will become solely concerned for its advancement. Even if power over all the people is removed by nature of the parliamentary system, and his duties limited to just a few prerogatives, the value of his traditionalist attitude is not to be underestimated in the greater good of a nation. A monarch concerned for his nation will ensure that a good man is appointed as Prime Minister, such as in the case of George III; he, seeing that his nation was threatened by clamour for reform, corrupt colonial corporations and Revolutionary France, appointed the underdog figure of William Pitt the Younger to the Premiership, who, despite being mocked at first, proved to be one of the greatest and most concerned Prime Ministers that Britain has ever had. When a monarch appreciates the longevity of his family's history and the importance his position affords him at the head of society, love for the country, and a desire to ensure that its politics functions in the best way possible is a natural instinct.

In the event of a constitutional monarch overreaching his power, or failing to keep his coronation oaths, which history has proven is an occasional occurrence, the Kingdom of England teaches us the best way to proceed. The betrayal of the English nation by James II, his alignment to Catholicism and disdain of Parliament ended in Parliament's removal of the King and replacement by a Protestant relation. James, perhaps due to his religious affiliations, failed to realise that his power was derived not from God but from the legitimacy conferred upon him by Parliament, and therefore his people, both noble and common. The 'Divine Right of Kings', no matter how much it may appeal to Romantic notions of historical conservatism, must be dismissed by rational men. The benefit of monarchy can be defended purely by its own independent existence, and indeed it must be if traditional government is to champion it to the destructive alternatives which have been forced into place over the past century.

Godwin argues that a monarch with limited powers may as well not exist at all, since he becomes nothing more than a cipher for the actions of those who hold real political power. This is a misunderstanding, however, which is rooted in the disdain for tradition which radical academics have, the failure to recognise any sort of benefit in the inheritance of ancestral blood and habit, and a desire to destroy any ability of the people to rally around a figure of importance in times of hardship. Who was it who visited the people of London suffering in air raid shelters during the Second World War? It was King George and his consort. The monarch is the embodiment of the nation; in his habits, culture, duties and morality, he forms the gemstone set in the ring of the nation – the most valuable asset in times of hardship, a thing of beauty in a world which values paper rather than gold.

Monarchy is a powerful tool in the exercise of government. Without some form of meaningful monarchy, the people have no true leader. To dismiss it is to dismiss government altogether, which as we know is a dangerous fantasy. So long as government is properly structured, and the monarch appreciates and remains within the scope of his duties, a country will be on course for far more political justice than it could without a traditional hearthstone.

## CHAPTER VIII

# Limited Executives

**M**ONARCHS AND MINISTERS are not the sole operators of a governmental executive. American citizens will be familiar with ‘executive orders’ from their Presidents, and pundits from the cabinet offices of most major governments speak to representatives in parliaments and to the media, expressing their intentions for various areas of society, giving opinions which are bound to please some and upset others. The purpose of an executive, as a concept, must be explored. We have already considered that ministries ought to be accountable to a parliament and should restrict themselves to the day-to-day administration of their areas of concern, and kings too should be limited to certain duties in order to ensure a balance between tradition and representation of the people. The truth is that we can find fault in almost every system of government: Godwin criticises monarchy and presidency for both being systems in which power is too concentrated in the hands of a few, yet he founds his own political system on a mass intellectual improvement among the general population where every man and woman is able to express his or her own opinion and exercise individual reason in distinguishing moral right from wrong. If we are to criticise the *potential* faults of state government, surely the potential faults of an individualistic personal government which he proposes are much greater? The communism of Marx offers similar conundrums: a state-controlled socialism where ministries direct the distribution of property and means of production, until such a time when the state is no longer required when a state of communism — complete equality of person and property — is reached. Godwin’s theory of government is (it seems to me) a form of proto-communism. Both theories rely on a naïve hope that humans are both fundamentally able to achieve equality, and that ministries will not use

their power over the people to maintain that power rather than implement an equality of existence.

Our argument then is this: whilst we must embrace inequality in order to properly sate human nature, whilst using this inequality to our advantage, it is also in our interests to limit the power of the executive in order to ensure it does not take control of the means for providing a society with its own existence, such as in a communistic society, where all individuals become dependent on the state in a horrifyingly sickly manner. If liberty is the best environment in which man may search for the truth of moral improvement, then there cannot be moral improvement when individuals constantly look to their executive government for food, for income, for moral answers. Natural society relies on the executive promoting virtue, community and very little else.

It is in the interests of society for the executive to be limited in its duties. A virtuous executive should look to the following administrative capacities: the maintenance of a just legal system to punish criminal wrongdoers for the preservation of personal liberty; ensuring that society does not fail those who are not able to enjoy liberty by their unfortunate unavoidable circumstances; the maintenance of a defence force and the security of national borders; the maintenance of low taxation to ensure that the people are not thieved of their rightfully earned pay; fiscal responsibility; maintenance of a low national debt and running a budget surplus, especially outside of times of depression; presenting a good image for the nation on the international stage; the maintenance of its own moral compass; the reporting to parliament of the actions of the executive.

It has always been a stereotype of the conservative to be in favour of a small state, low taxes and a lack of social and economic interventionism. However, this does not mean that, as modern libertarians desire, the states should refrain from any intervention at all, and the executive should be stripped of as much power as possible,

afforded no respect and considered a necessary evil. The executive has the potential for evil, certainly, but it is a necessary good more than anything else. The limits of the executive lie where liberty is threatened, but for the maintenance of complete liberty, the executive must have virtue in mind, and it must not be afraid to use the power which the people have endowed to it for the sake of the moral good of the national community.

Edmund Burke and Benjamin Disraeli are possibly two of the best examples of European conservatives who recognised the need for a balance between community and the individual, between tradition and classical liberalism. In Burke's attack upon the French Revolution, he did not fail to express his outrage at the treatment of the aristocracy, despite his love of liberty. The very existence of an elite which has a hereditary tradition does not cancel out the potential for others to enjoy liberty in a society, and thus he saw them as quite compatible. Disraeli, the British 19<sup>th</sup>-century Prime Minister,<sup>21</sup> perhaps best condensed Burke's ideas into a policy system. His 'Tory democracy', or traditional one-nation conservatism, was founded in the love of the nation and the society which forms a nation, with its traditions and social customs forming the bedrock of a national identity held together by duty and morality. One of Britain's most famous traditions was that of individual liberty, but Disraeli also saw the suffering of the Victorian poor all around him. In the habit of reformers such as Shaftesbury, Disraeli extended the voting franchise and improved the working conditions of many factories and mines, believing in the responsibility those higher up a social hierarchy had to those below.

The executive therefore needn't be the director of public morality in every area of life, nor does it need to provide for the general public. Human beings should have the intelligence and the willpower to deal with such concerns for themselves. However, what the executive must do is set a virtuous example to those whom it governs to ensure that virtue is not merely a pretty goal to be aspired to, but an active force in

the shaping of policy and public discourse. Executives should stick to the duties we have laid out, as they have done in the past in many countries, to ensure that life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness can be the primary concerns of all its citizens, rather than the question of when the next load of government benefits are to be delivered to their doors. The executive must strike a balance: the bringer of liberty and morality; an example of virtue, but not a dictator of it.

## CHAPTER IX

# Titles

**O**UR REASONS FOR defending the existence of hereditary titles were ones founded in the belief in inherited virtue and the responsibility of a father and mother to hand the noble traditions of their family down to their heirs. Titles in general, we have seen, are beneficial to a society when used as a reward for virtuous deeds, and they cause a righteous layering of society which encourages those below to aspire to attain the same heights as those above them. But how should titles themselves be ranked? Historical monarchies are famous for having many and complex variations, as well as awarding privileges to members of the royal family automatically, without any sort of proof of value whatsoever. If a virtuous society must have titles of privilege, we must discover how their benefits can be maximised.

First we must draw a distinction between peerage and purely honorary titles. A peerage of the realm affords the title holder the privilege of sitting in the upper chamber of parliament, since it denotes a nobility of deed and the highest possible respect beneath the monarch himself. Peerages also give the bearer an estate, and are hereditary, and so carry duties with them — first, to take part in political debate, since there is an obligation to attend parliament; second, to properly manage the estate which their title affords them; third, to pass on the history of their deeds or ancestor's deeds to the next generation so that they might emulate that history. In awarding such peerages, a second hierarchy within peerage is not necessary. In Britain, peers are marked by their status as a Baron, Earl, Duke or Marquess, but in any society, the title of Baron or equivalent is perfectly sufficient for both bestowing the honour of parliamentary privilege and personal respect. The distinction may have been necessary when the titles were first created, when they indicated

differing levels of military importance, but when privilege is concerned, there is no need for this difference. In countries where the distinction between peers is already established, such as in Britain, the existing titles might as well be kept distinct until they might need to be rescinded, since most peers treat each other with equal respect anyway. In the creation of new peerages, however, there is no need to differentiate, since the privileges conferred are equal.

As for honorary titles, these cover the non-parliamentary and non-hereditary offerings, such as knighthoods or national orders. Most countries, even republics, have these, and they may be named after a religious tradition or historical event of particular meaning to that nation. The purpose of these titles is to confer respect to the bearer without offering as much privilege as a peerage. The bearer of such a title may use it in correspondence, or when describing himself in any way, informing those who interact with him that he has performed some deed which constitutes virtue. Each nation will have its own traditions and its own name for such titles, but it is a universal truth that nations do seek to reward certain members of their society with honorary titles — those titles must be respected if they are to have any value whatsoever.

But what should qualify for an honorary title and what a peerage? Once again this is a matter of aptitude and scale of contribution. Those who have shown political and social virtue, who have a history of bringing about positive change in society for the sake of the suffering, or have debated in political circles for a significant portion of their lives in defence of the common good, should receive more consideration for a peerage than others, due to the political and social responsibilities that the titles carry. Those who make contributions to cultural and scientific life also deserve recognition, since whilst their work may not have a direct correlation to political life, they have offered a benefit to society, either by entertainment of the populace, important literary discourse, or by furthering mankind's understanding of the nature of

the world. Honorary titles suit these people best, since it affords them respect without handing obligations to them which differ from their preferred areas of expertise or distract them from their vocation. These sorts of people may be called upon to give expert opinions, or at least have their ideas respected by all in public discourse nonetheless, but they are excluded from the privilege of parliamentary participation, though of course they may still vote for representatives to the lower house.

So much for titles — but a warning; whilst we have disproved the Godwinian dismissal of titles as ridiculous, the power of these appointments is not to be underestimated. The corruption of the peerage in various countries and awarding of honours to those who are friends of the political establishment rather than virtuous examples is to be condemned, for it demeans the very purpose of having such titles in the first place. The appointment of new peers and orders must be made as independent as possible, ideally with a set of guidelines and requirements laying out the necessary criteria for appointment to a particular noble group. If it is easy for the establishment to appoint whomsoever they like, there will swiftly be no point to titles at all. The removal of hereditary peers from the British House of Lords and replacement with ‘life peers’, and the Prime Minister’s leaving-office honours of David Cameron are prime examples of the destruction of titular privilege by misuse. The House of Lords is now no longer an independent body offering sober thought from the minds of men who have a long tradition of political heritage, but a baneful den of vampires, filled to the brim with former members of the lower house, appointed by former Prime Minister to act like a retirement plan. Meanwhile, non-hereditary honours are given out to the Prime Minister’s hairdressers, colleagues and close personal friends. Such is the nature of titles in a society which has lost all sense of direction, and no longer values virtue.

## CHAPTER X

# High Culture and Government

**W**HEN THE WORLD ceases to value virtue, it also ceases to value true beauty. Today we are frequently caught in a battle between high culture, which we might describe as ‘true art’, and popular culture, which, whilst many people may call it art, is in fact the product of the left’s critical theory, which has systematically destroyed many of the driving forces of Western cultural achievement and made artistic beauty nothing more than the dirt which is scraped off the boots of modern ‘artists’. Whilst this book is not devoted to aesthetics, we must consider whether the government, if it is truly to value tradition and morality, has a responsibility to the arts, to ensure that they are not only supported by government but also an intrinsic part of it. High culture, really, is not high culture at all, but true culture which deserves to be appreciated by all. The destruction of education by critical theory has made this harder and harder, and unless an injection of true artistic virtue is rammed into the operations of political society itself, culture will be forever distinct — a battle which ends in the dirt being piled on top of the gold, with future civilisations only having a small chance of one day digging the latter up.

High culture is derived from classicism, which is to say the culture of ancient Greece and Rome. Look at the very buildings which house our parliaments, the great columns and spires, turrets and pedestals! The architects of such great works sought to imbue a spirit of that age, marked by philosophy and critical thought, into the minds of those who make our laws and decide our futures. To lay an eye upon a beautiful building built after the style of our ancestors is to see the great things that human beings have always striven for: beauty and truth. Many civilisations of the ancient world had a remarkable respect for the powers of logic, and indeed, considering how much modern

knowledge is derived from the scientists and thinkers of those ancient worlds, it is easy to understand why those who lived only a few hundred years before us had so much respect for them. To have a classical education brought great respect, to own a neoclassical house or statue was a sign of taste, to love the struggle for perfection, the order of design was not merely taste — it was an appreciation of beauty. To design such art is to project one's own mind into the creation of something new, using the skills of logic and imagination combined to create something which stirs whomever lays eyes upon it, or hears it. It is therefore an act derived from a great inner appreciation of beauty, and a willingness to express one's own feelings for something else for the appreciation of others — it is selfless, it is virtue exemplified.

Much modern art is slapped in the makeup of a successor to high culture, when beneath the veneer lies nothing more than the dirt we spoke of before. It is not beautiful to place one's own bed on display,<sup>22</sup> to scream into a microphone for a few minutes,<sup>23</sup> to paint a canvas in different shades of single colours.<sup>24</sup> Yet modern establishments laud their work as revolutionary — for it fits the revolutionary mantra of the neurotic left. This art 'liberates' itself from the conventions of what makes traditional art in any way artistic, and in so doing makes itself non-art; yet the critics call it art, and so art it is in the eyes of a world which has not been taught what virtue is, what skill is.

In music, the discos swell with noise, with sound put together specifically for coupling with flashing lights and drug use, so that the pounding, melody-less rhythms will in turn pound the listener into a psychotic stupor, eyes wide and mind lost to some other world which only brings short-term madness and long-term misery. Singers swear and attack their former lovers openly in their lyrics, song becomes an exercise in selfish self-indulgence and suffering rather than any meaningful pathos, rather than requiring any vocal skill. Machines tune the voices of attractive women to be acceptable to the ear, so that

young men with unrestrained appetites might become devout followers of their latest crush and call it 'music'. The pounding frustration of Beethoven, who could not even hear, yet offered his musical expression to the world despite all the odds, is slapped in the face and driven into the mud in the name of popularity. Meanwhile, attempts at modern classical music offer nothing but dissonance, and a complete lack of control in the face of modern orchestral sizes, developing the theories of those who paled in comparison to the skill of the masters who preceded them. Cultural corruption on such a vast scale as this must be amended.

Once, the state was the embodiment of culture, when great works of literature were quoted in parliament, in books and stories with moral worth depicted in paintings and in music. Even Godwin, who despised almost every existing institution, quotes Shakespeare and other contemporary novelists, philosophers and dramatists. At the coronation of kings, national holidays and spectacles, composers such as Handel wrote the most regal and striking music, which remains the staple of many modern choruses. Trumpet fanfares and the logical and theoretical structures of events and accompanying music held the audience of such spectacles in rapture. Government bodies wrote reports in perfect grammar and ensured that the language used was standard and correct, whilst members of parliament debated in as perfect diction as they could muster, speaking clearly and openly about their own opinions independent of pressure from their colleagues about what is and is not acceptable to say when part of a particular political group. Many of these statesmen were also authors, who wrote either great literature with social and political meaning behind it, commenting on the nature of life and what the country needed to bring it forward, or they were philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill, both a representative and a champion of liberty, who despite his questionable views on economy and utilitarianism, still did not fail to provide the public with books explaining his personal opinions on various political issues of his day.

Culture and the government were intertwined with each other, and it was seen as a duty of those in government to hold in reverence those things which defined the traditional culture and high achievements of their ancestors. When we explored constitutions in Book III, we used the analogy of the plan of a house to discuss how it is best to draw up a national constitution. If the state is a house, then culture is its beams. The classicists adorned those beams with gold to beautify it and steel to strengthen it, whilst modern culture is more akin to a wood-rot. The beams will be eaten by the decay until there is no culture at all, and then we must dread to think what will happen — at best, we may be left with the shell of a house, at worst we will not have one which can function in any meaningful way at all.

Once again, our discussion ultimately falls down to the question of virtue. If society is to be virtuous then its government cannot simply be virtuous in action, but in attitude and habit. Custom and tradition are one thing, but practical culture with beauty running through its veins is just as important, if not absolutely necessary for the flourishing of traditional society. If the state has an appreciation for these things, it will soon enough become fashionable to emulate these traditions in order to be seen to participate in the higher echelons of society — thus will a more virtuous cultural system begin to take root in the bedrock of popular entertainment and art.

There will be those who will argue that aesthetics is not important in matters of governance, and that it is merely a matter of taste, but as we have said, this difference of opinion relies upon what we consider to be virtuous. Education in the modern world places very little value on virtue in a meaningful and practical way whatsoever, and so it is only natural that the vast majority of people have no interest in high culture. This is worse than a shame, since if it is culture which defines a society, and our societies are losing those cultures, then the agenda put forward by the left's critical theory is coming to fruition: the criticism of everything traditional, everything binding, everything

necessary for an enriching and functional human society is beginning to wear down the nation, and therefore mankind itself. When culture is dead, and traditions are no longer associated with government, there will be no defence against the threats of multiculturalism and the abolition of borders. Humankind will become a cultureless, empty and faceless race of apes, with nothing special about them whatsoever apart from their slavery to an establishment which systematically destroyed the very reason for their existence — moral improvement.

Culture is a vehicle for virtue, and thus it is a political vehicle. Attitudes towards high culture must lose their false associations with snobbery and anachronism, for they are related to these things in no way at all — rather, they are the defining symbols of a nation, the last bastion of golden beauty in the crumbling house of society.

# The Features of Democracy

**W**E SHOULD DEFINE democracy literally by its name: the rule of the people. Godwin considers it to be a system where each citizen is considered ‘a man and nothing more’, that is to say, each man is given the same amount of influence over the affairs of state as the next. However, since mankind is not and can never be equal, when we say ‘the people’ we must include men with more influence, or at least the right to more influence, and those who still have influence but express it in different ways. Viewing democracy as an equality of influence upon the state presents a number of problems which prove equally democracy’s incompatibility with human nature.

The British philosopher Nick Land best identifies the major criticisms of modern democracy in his seminal essay of the neo-reactionary movement:

[Neo-reactionary politics is] predisposed, in any case, to perceive the politically awakened masses as a howling irrational mob, it perceives the dynamics of democratization as fundamentally degenerative: systematically consolidating private vices, resentments, and deficiencies until they reach the level of collective criminality and comprehensive social corruption. The democratic politician and the electorate are bound together by a circuit of reciprocal incitement, in which each side drives the other to ever more shameless extremities of hooting, prancing and cannibalism, until the only alternative to shouting is being eaten.<sup>25</sup>

Land’s worldview is distinctly Hobbesian, viewing the masses of the people as unfit to govern, and he makes a cogent point — many people with the power to vote simply have no idea about politics, nor do they wish to find out about it, so long as their own personal interests are attended to. Perhaps a better and certainly less verbose definition of the true value of modern democracy is best provided by Marvin Simpkin, who captured the essence of mass politics’ flaws in an article for the *Los Angeles Times* written in 1992:

Democracy is not freedom. Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to eat for lunch. Freedom comes from the recognition of certain rights which may not be taken, not even by a 99% vote.

Herein lies the flaw of democracy. Because of the apathy of the majority of voters, or at least the caprice with which their opinions and desires chop and change, the general populace can very quickly become unaware of the fact that their rights are being removed, surreptitiously or otherwise, or indeed they can whimsically decide to vote to remove those rights, and suddenly find themselves in abject slavery. Of course, they would naturally blame their politicians for deceiving them, even though the right to vote and come to their own decision on the matter was their prerogative throughout, and any culpability for the loss of liberty would lie with the electorate alone. It is also possible for perfectly good men to be persecuted and ostracised as a result of ridiculous public sources of dislike, or merely because they express an opinion which differs from the accepted wisdom. We may consider the amusing examples from ancient Athens, where the politician Aristides, who had earned himself the nickname 'the Just' for his actions and speeches, was ostracised by the democratic assembly, and when he anonymously asked a citizen why he was voting for Aristides' banishment, the man replied that he had never met Aristides, nor knew of any wrongdoing he had done, but was annoyed at hearing him consistently referred to as 'the Just', making the citizen feel small in comparison.

This is precisely why we defined the purpose of a national constitution as being for the insurance of certain rights, certain customs and traditions which embody the spirit of the nation and have a sacrosanct quality which governments must swear to protect, no matter how much pressure they might come under to change them. To criticise democracy is not the domain of the intellectually weak, but a necessity of the intellectually strong. But some form of democracy must be present in all political society, since some of the people will always be in government, and some of the *demos* will always hold

*kratos* (power). The Western world has gone so far down the path of political enfranchisement that it has reached a stage where the power given to the people at large can never be taken back. How then can we make the best out of this potentially destructive situation? We should bear in mind the famous quotation from Winston Churchill that 'democracy is the worst form of government, apart from all the others'; we must concede that the change towards total political enfranchisement was inevitable given the values of free expression, free speech and a free press that the West so valued. In a world which protects the freedom to offer an opinion, no matter how controversial so long as it is not obscene or vicious, the question 'if we can all opine on all, why should we all not vote?' naturally follows. We should use the enfranchisement of the entire population as an opportunity for virtue, and since we have asserted that the primary cause of government is virtue, then the opportunity is indeed palpable.

If every citizen has the vote, then the use of that vote for virtuous ends relies on a strong trust in the people of a nation to find the best political ends from their common consciousness, to elect the best representatives and respond to political events with outrage when necessary and praise when deserved. To place value on virtue and judgement in the casting of one's democratic vote comes from having had those principles drilled into the individual from a young age. Education itself has an obligation to prepare the citizen for their role as a member of political society, which we might add, means educating young people in the structure and meaning of the constitution, and offering them insight into why the exercise of their political right is so important, not merely for themselves but for society as a whole. Often education is marked not by constitutional and societal instruction, but a politically motivated one, where teachers push a particular political agenda in their teaching of history and politics, emphasising the moral importance of a left-wing inclination, and preparing children for their future life as the stiflers of alternative discourse, the snuffers-out of political life.

This leads us to our ultimate justification for democracy as it stands: even if a great number of the population have detestable opinions, since individual opinion is the lifeblood of political discourse, democracy should have a tendency to edge itself more towards the truth than other systems, since it allows all — the moderate, the liberal, the conservative and the radical, to express their opinions freely and influence the government, so that it might edge the nation ever further towards moral improvement on a far grander scale than if the electorate was limited or non-existent. It also allows for virtuous men to have their opinions reinforced against the virtueless, and in the event of large swathes of the electorate being misled, allows for there to be a strong base from which the most steadfast of principles can stand against the forces of corruption. There comes with this a grave warning, however, which is that when society becomes intolerant of a certain viewpoint, no matter how detestable it may seem to any number of people, the value of democracy falls away. When the people cry out for the removal of the rights which guarantee their liberty, and lynch, either physically or metaphorically, those who speak out in the defence of those rights and traditions, then we know that democracy has failed. So long as democracy allows every man, no matter what his personal political disposition might be, the right to express his views and vote for the representative whom he feels best mirrors his personal aspirations for society, there will always be a glimmer of hope, no matter how much it might seem as though the rights of the people are at risk of being removed by the people themselves.

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Considering the inequality of man, as we have mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, complete equality of political status is never going to be possible. Even today, whilst we may believe that no man has more political influence than any other due to everyone having the same right to one vote each, this is practically not the case at all. When we come to each election and make a decision as to whom to vote for,

to whom do we listen? Is it to our own conscience? For some of us this is the case, but there are also many who listen to their politicians, despite the complaints made about them, and believe their promises, judging their vote on the basis of short-term personal satisfaction rather than long-term virtue for society. Those already in government already have more political influence for a start. It has also become a political ploy in modern society to have famous non-political individuals, such as famous actors or popular 'artists', endorse political parties and ideas, since the general population might be more inclined to look up to and vote according to the ideas of people who they have been captivated by in modern day-to-day entertainment. The question of political power is as much a subversive and psychological one as it is a rational one. The public mind, in general, would rather vote for their favourite actor than their favourite philosopher. At least the actor is sexually attractive, while the philosopher, degraded as a 'know-it-all', has no objective value whatsoever, on account of the boredom he inspires compared to the heartthrob actor.

This again highlights the inequality of man, and the difference in aptitudes between humans. It is partly this recognition that led to the deputation of democracy that is nearly universal in democratic states today. Since it would be impractical to assemble the millions of people which populate nations today, we elect representatives on our behalf. This is mostly a question of practicality, but we must also ask ourselves the question: would every citizen of society really want to, or have the education and understanding to debate the intricacies of economy, social policy and infrastructure, amongst other complex political discussions? The answer of course is no, and it is undeniable that the election of representatives is at least in part a projection of political power onto those with greater wisdom than the electors. This does not mean that the elector cannot consider the same political questions as the candidate for election — he must, if he is to exercise his true judgement in the election of a representative — but the intricate details of political legislation will never be the concern of every ordinary man.

If awarding peerages for politically and socially virtuous actions affords the bearer of the title a right to a parliamentary seat, then it is only right that he be denied a vote for the election of representatives to a lower house. If the purpose of election is to delegate power to another for the purposes of practical parliamentary discussion, a man or woman guaranteed a seat in parliament has no need of a vote. Democracy is still served, and so long as the number of peerages awarded remains low enough to be practical, it will remain as an effective situation. This has been the case in the British House of Lords for almost its entire life as an institution.

Democracy is about the people, from all layers of society, being afforded the right of representation. It relies on virtue being the goal of society, and certain freedoms being valued above all whim and popular opinion. The freedom of speech in particular forms the cornerstone of democracy, since without it, the soul of political discourse itself is torn out of the nation, and democracy, along with many of the libertarian freedoms which the best societies give their citizens, will swiftly fall into the dust. Democracy, like the abstract terms so readily used such as 'equality' and 'freedom', is much more complex than its status as a mere word. True democracy, where power is balanced between all the people of society, relies on the people placing their trust in a set of common values, and recognising that they have obligations beyond the self, which involves the community of citizens on both national and local levels.

## CHAPTER XII

# War

**W**AR IS, IN GENERAL, an evil to be avoided at all costs. In a modern world especially, where the nuclear threat is ever-present, war does not simply carry the danger of great and unnecessary sacrifice any longer, but the danger of complete and utter global destruction on a scale that threatens to extinguish the human race entirely. War is a political consideration not just because of its history, but because the prerogative to make war often lies with the legislative and executive branches of government.

Modern leaders have proven that they are prone to rashness. The slightest sign of potential ‘war crime’ in a foreign country leads to the most destructive and unhelpful interventions, with the recent wars in Iraq and Syria being prime examples of how military meddling in foreign affairs for the sake of petty ideology can only lead to instability and yet more conflict. The heroic values previously attached to war from the ancient world to the early modern period died with the end of the First World War. The true nature of modern warfare is demonstrated in these early 20<sup>th</sup> century conflicts: no longer is the question of honour a matter for soldiers’ consideration, but slaughter. Masses of military casualties and the involvement of civilians in violent persecutions, genocides and war crimes are the defining features of modern warfare. The virtues of valour, love of one’s country, and individual heroism extolled in works such as Julius Evola’s *Metaphysics of War* are dead, or at least incredibly difficult to emulate in today’s world. It is hard to recreate the conduct of warriors with sword in hand, matching the measure of each other’s strength on the battlefield when war has become so dishonourable and a pure matter of sheer firepower — the ancients hated those who struck from afar, yet now war is almost never fought hand to hand, and the lonely

farmhouse caught in the middle of a global conflict stands no chance in the face of a hail of Katyusha rockets. Citizen and therefore economy alike are in a literal firing line, and Hell itself descends upon the world as fire and pain rains from the skies. War is not a glorious exercise, it is a universal shame, which does not lift up the virtuous but stamps them down in the mud.

Aggression, however, is a character trait of every human, and whilst many of us may be able to control our aggression, there will always be those who cannot. Not even Christ could contain his anger in the Temple of Jerusalem as he flipped the tables of the moneylenders and scattered their coins across the marbled floors. War is ubiquitous throughout human history, and wars of some kind, whether fought directly, by proxy, or as a new-fangled cyber-war, will be present in humankind's future. From a purely philosophical point of view, however, we must consider the morality of war. A discerning reader need not think too hard about what perspective we will be approaching this subject from considering the introduction to this chapter presented above, but even still, we must find justifications for our disdain of conflict. A note to be remembered is this: we cannot say outright that heroism and bravery can never be achieved by modern soldiery, merely that the means for obtaining it has become negligible. Soldiers will always have to be brave if they are to face the onslaught of fire that modern battlefields present them, but to be a true hero is to be powerful yet merciful, to be brave yet wise, to be loyal yet honourable. Modern warfare cannot offer us a return to the epic feats of Homer's *Iliad* any time soon, but loyalty to one's nation remains one of the cornerstones of modern militaries. We would do well to remember that this loyalty should not merely be a characteristic of the soldier, but of the citizen as well.

We may approach the problem of war in the same way as we have approached the problem of crime. It is a sin to harm another, to deny them of their liberty by attacking their person or their property, and a

nation, since it is comprised of many individuals, is much the same. For one nation to lust after the wealth, territory or influence of another is the same sin as if a man lusts after the wife of another man, and seeks to win her over by persuasion or by force. To be hungry for war is an act of collective selfishness, though often stirred up in the minds of the people by the violent rhetoric of a few leaders, for to seek war is to seek harm, to seek beyond the means and requirements for happiness that a nation already has at its disposal. Provocation to war is also the same as provocation to violence between individuals — it is certainly more virtuous to keep the moral high ground and refuse to be provoked, and instead to work for virtue internationally. In a truly just world, disputes would be settled by agreements, but this is not always possible. When nations have their own interests at heart, the interests of others become overlooked, and soon enough, the less virtuous of the nations of the world may pursue the option of force to set examples, or to crush their enemies completely.

Let us assume that a dispute over territory has occurred between two nations, let us say an island has been the territory of nation *A* for the past few hundred years, but nation *B* once owned that island a few hundred years before that. For reasons of sentimentality, and to distract the population from problems at home, nation *B* invades the island. Just as when a man is assaulted he may use force to defend himself until such time as his assailant may be brought to justice, so too is the war of defence acceptable. It is clear that, if hundreds of years have passed, and the islanders are now ethnically members of nation *A*, any claim nation *B* might have is weak. Nation *A* has an obligation to defend the citizens who are now threatened by the invading forces of *B*, whilst *B* alone has history as a justification for an act of aggression. History can teach us about how we ought to behave, it can teach us how our ancestors lived and how we might best strive for virtue as they did, but it does not justify selfishness; in fact as we have discovered it does the exact opposite. Therefore, we may comfortably say that the only justifiable form of war is a war of self-

defence used for the protection of citizens, and national integrity against the aggressive selfishness of other nations.

Today, the meaning of a war of self-defence seems to have extended to include aggression in order to justify non-defensive wars. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was called defensive, since it was a pre-emptive attack upon the al-Qaeda terrorist group to supposedly prevent further terrorist attacks on Western Europe and the United States. Indeed, as a result of this defensive-offensive strike by the United States, terrorist attacks have not stopped in the Western world, hundreds of people have been displaced, and new and more extreme groups have arisen, whilst the fleeing populations of the Middle East make for Europe itself in the largest refugee crisis ever seen since the Migration Period of the 300s AD.

Offensive wars cannot, by any mode of nature, be defensive. War, as we have seen, particularly modern wars, are destructive not just materially, but mentally and sociologically. Entire ethnic groups are displaced, nations destroyed and civilians tortured for the sake of the greed of superpowers. When the entire world loses sight of virtue, offence becomes defence, destruction becomes valour, and the whole world is turned upside-down, linguistically and physically. The words 'war', 'bombs' and 'national defence' should send just as cold a shiver down the spine of every law-abiding citizen as the word 'terrorism' already does. Often, the source of civil woes at home can be found to have their roots in the consequences of wars fought abroad. Soon enough Western nations will find themselves with no alternative but to further their own destruction: after all, it was they who displaced these thousands of people from their homes with their selfish wars, was it not? Is it not right for the destroyer of a home to provide a new one for the home owner? The war-hungry neoconservatives of Western foreign policy schools have sown the seeds of the destruction of their nations by enforcing policies which they claimed would be our salvation.

Let the nations defend themselves if they must, but let the

aggressors of this world be punished, that war might be so irregular it does not threaten the happiness and liberty of the people of the world. 'Let it be so' — we might pray to God.

## CHAPTER XIII

# Democracies and War

**I**N THE UNITED STATES and the United Kingdom, it is the legislatures, Congress and Parliament respectively, which reserve the right to declare formal wars; the executives of both countries, however, retain the authority to authorise minor military operations and air strikes on targets which do not legally constitute a declaration of war, but for certain amount to such an action. The obvious moral question that political philosophers face is ‘How can this be right?’ Legislatures are naturally inclined to produce more reasoned and sensible solutions to dilemmas because they discuss issues from multiple standpoints and personal opinions; this of course does not mean that legislatures always find the right answer, but their tendency towards the truth is more profound than a small executive. By this logic it might seem as though a virtuous constitutional solution would be to limit the decision for all military action to the legislative branch of government, but we might be able to take things even further, considering the conclusions we have reached regarding the purpose and nature of a mixed constitutional government.

If we consider the system of government which we have defended in the previous chapters and book divisions to be democracy proper, then we must ask the question: is it ever lawful for a democracy to declare wars? Different forms of government, as we have previously discovered, are characterised by different attitudes towards morality and political control. The tyrant and even the benevolent absolute ruler must be inherently selfish, since they limit power to themselves, and even if they have the approval of their people, they must maintain their power by surreptitious means and secret pacts, restrict the rights of the people in order to ensure that their power is not infringed upon by democratic protestors, or to protect themselves from the paranoia of

being removed from office. These forms of government are inherently selfish, and inherently damaging to the pursuit of a politically just society. A balanced democracy is the best form of government, since it tends towards truth, and upholds social structures whilst allowing for the free dissemination and discussion of all opinions within a framework which promotes virtue among every echelon of society. Based on this analysis, we immediately face a problem when confronted with war or warlike actions: if war is selfish as we have asserted above, then war must be incompatible with the very principle of democracy itself. It can never be right for a democracy to authorise aggression against another party unless it is in response to an aggression made against the integrity of the society which government is supposed to serve.

The constitution of a virtuous society should not permit its legislature or executive to authorise offensive military action against another nation, neither through declaration of war nor undeclared military action, which on an international level, amounts more to a war crime than a pre-emptive strike. It will be obvious when national territory is attacked – only then should a legislature be permitted to authorise military action. Offences against other nations can only ever be characterised as the actions of tyrants and have no place in democratic states.

It goes without saying that if offence is the action of selfish tyrants, and should not exist in the minds of democratic leaders, then we ought to think carefully about what sort of position that theory places many modern ‘democracies’ in. When we live in societies which claim to be democratic, yet openly indulge in warlike acts for the benefit of corporations rather than the general good, for the sake of interest groups and the ‘security’ of allied nations rather than the defence of their own home territory, we should be forced to question whether or not we live in democracies. It may seem harsh to place our leaders in the dock, but truly this is what we ought to be doing every single day.

The more we question, the more likely we are to find the truth, and we may assert quite confidently given the rationale behind our theories that many Western countries today which call themselves ‘democracies’ fail to show many valid characteristics of just democracies. It may seem controversial, perhaps even a stretch of logic to claim that we no longer live in democracies, but we do not. There will be some who are shocked, perhaps even offended by this viewpoint, but our arguments are clearly laid out – let the individual be the judge of these conclusions.

Finally, let us consider internal war within democracies. By this we do not mean civil war or revolution necessarily, although as we have made clear in the preceding division of this work, they may become necessary elements of political life in the course of a nation’s history; rather, we mean the struggle between classes and opinions. Class war, and the question of its very existence, has been a contentious issue since Marx’s day, and remains topical among the New Left, despite its change of tactics since the days of revolutionary communism. Class war, however, has been a feature of political history since long before Marx: in Niccolò Machiavelli’s work *Discourses on Livy*, the Italian master guides us through his theory of classical republicanism, and reaches cogent conclusions. He identifies the class orders of ancient Rome, which for the most part prevented the capricious mob from corrupting the freedom that Rome earned across various parts of its history. Perhaps most controversially, however, he contends that struggle, sometimes violent, between the classes was what kept the Roman state in check and drove it on to greater successes. The power shifts between dictators riding the back of populist movements and traditionalist republicans seeking to preserve the old orders were the source of much internal war and strife for Rome across its republican history, but, Machiavelli argues, ultimately reminded many Romans of the need for honesty and virtue in the conduct of government.

Perhaps the most important theory that we may draw from

Machiavelli concerns both internal and external war: that not money, but the spirit of men, is the true driving force of war. Human spirit breathes into every war — the loyalty of the defender, the glory of the conqueror, the conviction of the dogmatist. Machiavelli identified the early beginnings of what we have already concluded is the spirit of post-Enlightenment political society: opinion. The move towards civilisation was designed to prevent violence when differences in opinions were encountered, and the Roman republic was one attempt at diffusing social hatred and class suspicion into a peaceful constitution which promoted political discourse between those classes. The exploitation and corruption of the Roman republic prevented this vision from being properly realised, and as any student of ancient history knows full well, the republic collapsed into the absolutist empire which remains famous in world history.

Opinion drives political discourse, but the tensions between varying opinions can easily amount to war if differing opinions are not afforded respect. Hegel claimed that there is a grain of truth in every ‘foreign phenomenon’, by which he refers to unsettling or controversial ideas. It is not merely selfish and virtueless therefore for a democracy to seek belligerence with other nations, but equally sinful to hate the opinions of any of its citizens: if it is the freedom of opinion which defines a just democratic society, then modern ‘democracies’ which refuse to tolerate certain opinions deny themselves the right to use the label of democracy.

If one wishes a state to live long, it is necessary to often look back towards its beginnings...it is clear as day that such states do not survive if they are not renewed [from the example of their origins]<sup>26</sup>

## CHAPTER XIV

# Militaries

**I**F WAR IS A POLITICAL TOOL, then the militaries which undertake war are as much a tool as war itself. Militaries have the potential to exert a great deal of political power, and throughout history leaders have used their military prowess or simply their popularity among the rank and file to cement their own power, to topple governments and defeat their opponents. If the military takes a dislike to its government which runs deep, the risk to the survival of that government is beyond high.

So we may assume that the primary purpose of the military, given our understanding of war, is the defence of the homeland. The question posed is: does this task of 'defence' extend to protection of political rights? On the one hand, military leaders with a strong ethical code, virtue in mind, and a vision for the nation could use military power to bring about a great deal of good — the loss of the military by an incumbent government is the loss of that government's means of defending itself and enforcing its laws. So if there is a bad government, a selfish government, an enemy to all virtue, why should the military not overthrow it?

Military governments are naturally inclined to enforce their rule by force, since a military by nature is a weapon of force. Once the government is overthrown, a military power must, even if democracy is its long-term goal, enforce short-term martial law. The problem that this poses is that the total control offered by martial law often seduces even some of the most principled men. Dictatorships, which often begin benevolent, such as the rule of Julius Caesar in Rome, swiftly become tyrannical, because the military leader believes that he alone, or his associates, can govern society for the best without the help of others, strengthened by the power which his military support affords

him. What we may say then is this: no, it is not right for the military to overthrow the government alone, certainly not as a private initiative, since the control of the military, even if it is only interim, tends towards tyranny, and therefore away from political justice. In the case of a bad government holding sway over society, of course it would be right for the military to refuse to follow its orders, but to take matters into its own hands without there first being a popular movement for justice would ensure that an army could take total control. Ultimately, since the military is a tool of government, and governments serve their nation, the military too is a servant. Any military which is requested to harm its own citizens without those citizens being first proscribed for genuinely criminal, immoral and other actions which threaten lives, cannot claim to be the servant of a just society. Equally, the military should be kept as far away from political life as possible.

On the other hand, it will be necessary, if the government is the controller of the military, for members of government to be involved with the military. It has been the undoing of many leaders throughout history to assume that, because they have the command of the people, they are also great military commanders. The Roman Emperor Nero and German leader Hitler are two good historical examples. Both believed that they had the key to victory in the wars they respectively fought, despite the former being a poetry-obsessed psychopath (but ruthless tyrant), and the latter a former soldier and skilled orator, but certainly no general. Both men fell, since neither knew how to manage military operations. Military generals are not merely the advisors to governments, but they are experts in terms of strategy, with far greater experience than any politician. What a society needs therefore in the management of its military is a balance of roles between state and military, with the roles of each suiting the expertise of each party.

It is rightfully the role of the legislature, as we have asserted before, to consider when military action should be undertaken, when the homeland of a nation is threatened. The deliberations concerning this

matter is reserved to the legislature alone, since the representatives of the ordinary people and the aristocracy, having knowledge of the people and lands of the nation as they do, will have best in mind the effects of invasion upon the citizens of their country. If defence by military action is considered the only available option, then the question of strategy, deployment of armies and appropriate response is purely a matter for the generals and strategists of the military. The executive may continue to report to the legislature all undertakings of the military in case of the need to suspend operations, but all operations themselves are not the concern of a political body. The primary aim of military leaders however, should always be the minimisation of unnecessary sacrifice and the protection of the citizens whom they serve. In this discussion, we are not considering strategy, and whilst it may be tempting to challenge modern military tactics, true to what we have said before about the separation of political and military decisions, we shall not endeavour to dictate appropriate responses to hypothetical military situations.

In times of peace, it should be the role of the government to dictate a budget for the military, since the finances of the nation are the concern of government, and the legislature should decide upon an appropriate figure for the defence of the nation. The military must then work with the resources it is allocated, and the matter of constructive fortifications, recruiting new soldiers as well as updating equipment and maintaining existing forces should be the concern of the military alone when using the funds provided by the government. A general will best know the sort of equipment his soldiers need, though he may well not take into account the costs, since his primary concern is his men rather than the rest of society. Therefore, budgets should be set separately from the military, but spent at the military's request.

As for the conduct of militaries, there is much to consider. Since the World Wars, many nations of the world have agreed on certain standards which are supposedly kept to in the conduct of war, and of

course the Geneva Conventions remain the most famous agreements concerning the 'humane conduct of war', which is of course the oxymoron of oxymora, but thus it stands. A lot has changed since the days of heroism and hand-to-hand combat, and whilst it is undeniable that war has become much less glorious, modern soldiers cannot avoid the fact that they are the successors to that history. The concern of the soldier is to fight other soldiers and to honour himself in the defence of his homeland and his beliefs. Since it is the spirit of man which is the driver of war and not his pay, the true reason for service should be in the mind of every soldier. The soldier is ultimately a citizen with particular training, and his service to society is a necessary role in the defence of any kind of justice; the soldier fights for the good of his country, and for the defence of truth, for in that defence is virtue, the only virtue that can come from war. The involvement of citizens, even foreign citizens, in the conduct of war is not the concern of the soldier, since he is fighting only those who threaten his homeland. The stress of battle, the fear and destruction that it brings will naturally alter the mindset of the soldier, and often the rules prescribed for war are not as clear-cut as the leaders in ivory towers would have us non-soldiers think; however, attitudes towards war must be firmly set in the mind of the soldier. Enforcing the rules of war in a court martial is one thing, it is quite another to give a soldier perspective. The protection of citizens and the prevention of war crimes comes not just from the deterrent of the law, but from the mindset of those conducting war. If soldiers are educated in a just vision of their service, they will be more inclined to be honourable in their conduct and brave in the defence of their families.

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A final note on what is perhaps the greatest threat to the modern world: the nuclear weapon. Militaries ultimately may arm themselves with whatever defensive weapons they can afford, yet it goes without saying that the nuclear bomb is not primarily a defensive weapon. The

sheer destruction that it works on areas exposed to it explains our point clearly, and its historical use primarily against citizens rather than military targets highlights its evil in every form. Of course, the mantra that accompanies the threat of nuclear war is 'everybody loses', but in the event of this kind of war being triggered for whatever small or apparently harmless reason, such warnings carry no weight whatsoever. The human race would have been far nobler if it had never created this weapon which only demeans its existence. Yet we stand with this force, and we must recognise its existence. So long as nations remain suspicious of the fact that their rivals may own such weapons, international nuclear disarmament may never be possible.

Whilst it may be deemed necessary by the governments of the world to have a nuclear arsenal so long as the threat of nuclear attack is present, however small, a source of anger for many people comes from the fact that the economic savings from the abolition of these arsenals could allow for huge amounts of social investment and improvement. We should appreciate both sides of the argument, considering the circumstances in which these weapons exist throughout the world, but the question we must keep asking our governments is this: if the only result of nuclear attack is apocalyptic destruction on both sides, and the world's alliance network ensures that an attack on even a non-nuclear country would result in this outcome, why should countries, especially smaller ones such as Britain, retain a nuclear arsenal? Why not rid the world of some more of these Satanic instruments and use the money for virtuous ends? Many people would thank you, and the country may still defend itself conventionally whilst hiding in the shadow of a larger, wealthier, nuclear power. We must have hope that if enough countries succumb to this logic, there may yet be an end to the nuclear age, as the mighty powers see the errors of their ways and the militaries of the world put honour above power, virtue above destruction. We must hope.

# The Composition of Government

**N**OW WE MUST TURN our attention to the organisation of government in terms of the separation of its powers and the balance of powers within political institutions themselves. The question of whether or not the state should afford status to a particular religion, whether or not the legislature and judiciary should be completely separate, and whether the executive head of state should be an individual or collective position has troubled statesmen since the first democracies were created in the ancient world. The traditional three branches of government, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, have grown to be considered typical of all democratic states purely by virtue of the fact that it stands to reason that these three powers must be exerted in any stable state. As to which deserves the most power, which is most important and what the precise roles of each should be is a matter of opinion, and here we shall explore these questions in detail.

In true democracies, where government is conducted with some form of input be it direct or indirect with every eligible citizen, the spirit of political discourse must be opinion — we have asserted this many times. With valid opinion must come a degree of rationality, and it is around reason which the decisions of government must pivot. Reason is the judgement of the human mind — it is not merely a moral judgement, but a divine one, since reason is a unique gift and must be revered. This does not mean that government should be held in reverence, but rather that government should hold reason in reverence; therefore, all three major branches of government must be constructed in such a way that reason has the maximum potential to flourish. It will have been made clear in reading the previous chapters that we consider legislature to be the superior branch of government

on account of the wide representation and capacity for debate that parliamentary chambers allow citizens to take advantage of. When considering the other two branches of government, we must therefore consider how we might best stimulate the same debate and rational considerations between more than one individual whilst also considering the issue of practicality and the delays that democratic discussion often causes during the course of decision-making.

When a monarch is at the head of state, which we have concluded is a cultural universal in some form or other, he must always have a board of advisors. The British monarchs have had their Privy Councils, the American Presidents their cabinets. In cases where the monarch's powers are limited, it is these councils which deliberate, and find the answers to executive problems. Of course, it goes without saying that an executive council ought to be far smaller than a legislative one, since it is not representative of the entire population and derives its authority from appointment rather than election. In the case of presidencies where the incumbent president has the power of veto or may override the decision of his council, rational men should object. The opinion of one man compared to the deliberations of several others does not tend towards the truth in the same way, since information may not be as easily dissected, and flaws may be overlooked rather than exposed. In this manner, presidents should act more like the chairmen of executive councils than an overall chief. Perhaps a president's vote ought to be weighted as a sign of his authority of the others (which is naturally right when the highest position of society is obtained through virtuous means), but it does not prevent the opinions of others from being stifled completely. Some countries, such as Switzerland, have tried an openly balanced model where the executive is comprised of several individuals rather than one advised by a council. This has been proven to work and fits well into the traditions of confederal republics such as Switzerland, but we must do well to remember the different political traditions of each individual nation. What suits Switzerland may not suit every nation, after all, and

the natural hierarchy of a society comprised of unequal individuals must be kept firmly in mind. If we are to elevate more than one man or woman to the highest office of state, then every one of these people should be of equal good character and full to the brim with virtue. The ministers who comprise the executive council, whilst they will have their own opinions, must also be open to the advice of their subordinates. Whilst it is the duty of a council to reach a final decision by diligent deliberation, it is also the duty of an empowered minister to attend such councils fully informed of the real state of affairs.

Now, the executive is primarily an administrative branch of government, and it must be answerable to another branch. The purpose of composing government in a fashion which makes it accountable is to ensure that corruption is kept to a minimum, and different individuals control different elements of statecraft. The legislature is arguably the heart of government, and certainly the most important branch, for here is where important national decisions concerning the law itself are deliberated. The legislature does not merely represent particular interest groups, but the spirit of a whole political society. The poorest elector sends his preferred neighbour and the richest aristocrat attends the same institution for the consideration of the same issues — it is a meeting place where both high and low are brought to the same plain. The executive, whether drawn from the legislature such as in the British system, or completely separate from it such as in the American or Dutch systems, should always report to the legislature, and be subject to its most intense scrutiny. What is certainly true is that it should always be the legislature which reserves the power of legislation. The function of the executive is the enforcement of the law, and not the creation of it. The infamous ‘executive orders’ in the United States often amount to legal decree, when in fact they should have no purpose other than to guide the enforcement of pre-existing laws. The separation between decree and legislation should be a clearly distinct one; the emperors of ancient Rome enforced their will by decree, as did many of the absolute rulers

of history, for it is a single opinion treated as if it has the power of law. Decrees may easily be used to suspend rights, to withdraw *habeas corpus*, to suspend the right to trial or to remove juries from the judiciary. Certain rights as these, if they are sacrosanct, and may not be removed by any popular vote, should also be immune from the interference of executive interpretation. The legislature has introduced these rights into the laws of Western nations for a reason, and that *reason* as we have asserted above must be respected. We have enjoyed such rights for so long because our ancestors felt they best allowed the state to flourish, and whilst times may have changed since the days when the right to jury trial and *habeas corpus* were introduced, the importance of retaining such rights has not. Law embodies the spirit of a nation, and the creation of those laws is not a task to be taken lightly. Therefore, when legislation is concerned, the legislature must have complete independence from the decrees of external bodies, there must be complete freedom for the opinions of representatives to be dissected for the purposes of truth.

Yet with the creation of law comes the need to interpret it; thus does the judicial branch of government exist. The judiciary itself should also be hierarchically structured based on judges' years of service and experience in various areas of criminal, family and commercial laws. Once again, the purpose and power of justice should be separate from that of legislation and administration. The Supreme Court of the United States recently changed the definition of marriage in America — under a system which separates political power, this was in effect (if not in terms of technicality) a form of legislation and therefore wrong. Under the US political system, politicians can be impeached by Congress and tried by the Senate — this is a system derived from the ancient Roman practice of the Senate regulating its own members — but this is also clearly wrong. If a public servant has openly abused his position then he should stand trial in a court of law against a jury, not against his fellow politicians who may pursue their own sympathetic or antagonistic agendas against a disgraced public servant. The judiciary

alone should have the power to conduct trials, and it should be closed to public pressure. The recent practice of placing cameras in courtrooms turns the interpretation of law into a reality television show, and makes a mockery of real legal justice, with judges playing to the gallery of public opinion rather than making informed legal and moral decisions according to the true nature of legislation.

No matter how much, however, we manage ensure that each branch of government does not infringe upon the others' powers, we must not forget tradition. We should not allow tradition to be destroyed in the name of the separation of powers. For instance, in Britain, for a long time, high ranking judges were also members of the House of Lords; the Prime Minister Tony Blair removed these 'Law Lords' from Parliament and placed them in a separate 'Supreme Court', which Britain had no tradition of, away from the legislature. It was a myth, however that these Law Lords had influence over the legislature; all legal appeals that went to the Law Lords were considered in a separate council to the House of Lords and were decided upon by the (legally non-partisan) judges in non-parliamentary sessions. They merely retained the right (in the manner of aristocracy) to sit and vote in the House of Lords as a privilege due to their position as respected judges. It was important to have wise legal minds offering parliamentary advice on legislation, but the Left, as per usual, destroyed this for its own ends, using the excuse of separation of powers to do so. Thus, true political justice dies.

A true democracy must have these three branches of government, which ensures that certain fundamental rights cannot be removed by one in place of the other, and each has its own separate roles, whilst each uses the powers it has to ensure that the other branches are keeping to their duty of maintaining a virtuous society for the people. The composition of government in these three parts may well be considered common knowledge, but if the tripartite system is ever to be taken seriously, any infringement by one upon the other, no matter

how much it can be justified by legal technicality, must be addressed and amended as appropriate for future generations' sake.

## Parliaments

**W**E HAVE LAUDED legislature so greatly over the course of our discussion and considered that it should be the most important hub of all government, so it only sits right that we should now turn our attention to the discussion of legislatures themselves, which we shall refer to as ‘parliaments’ but are known by many other names throughout the world, with ‘Congress’ and ‘National Assembly’ perhaps being the most commonly encountered alternatives. When considering the most politically just form of parliament, there are many things to consider: should parliament have one or two chambers? How should power between chambers be balanced? What powers should parliament have as a whole? Perhaps most importantly, who should have the right to vote for representatives, and be a representative in parliament? Since the power to make law, and therefore the power to alter the very spirit of the nation lies with its legislature, the honour of being a legislator is not to be taken lightly. Membership of parliament carries with it respect, but also a heavy burden of duty, and its use today as a mere career path for certain members of society who enter in the interests of certain friends or sponsored parties debases the purpose of parliament. What’s more, the partisanship of modern parliamentary bodies often makes meaningful and varied discourse on political issues near-impossible, and this too is something that must be challenged and reduced if a politically just society is ever to be obtained.

Godwin’s argument against parliaments in general is that they are restrictive to human reason. He accuses them of producing a certain ‘unanimity’ which restricts opinion and causes division within mankind. Of course, since this is derived from Godwin’s theory that all political institutions are an evil, and the individual decisions of man

can never be in the interests of community so long as social constraints are in place, we would only expect him to be critical of this age-old institution. Godwin, however, is once again misguided in his criticism. In the anarchist state which he proposes, communities would make their own independent decisions by the deliberation of each man and woman of the community, in a similar vein to Marx's communism. But anarchy relies on the complete destruction of the nation, and since the nation state is the most logical conclusion of the cultural community, the nation state cannot be governed by local communities alone. If a state is to be unified and if it is to have a unifying political spirit which is embodied in a constitution — an agreement between citizen and government — then the maintenance of that constitution must be conducted by the representatives of those who have agreed to that constitution.

The democracy of ancient Athens was the most direct form of democracy, and its legislative system which permitted every citizen to attend meetings of the assembly worked fairly well for a city of some 30,000 eligible citizens. But even a population of those thousands can be difficult to represent in one space alone. Even in ancient Athens the assembly space could only fit about 6000 people onto its outcrop.<sup>27</sup> In nations which are now populated by millions, it is completely impossible for direct democracy to be implemented on national levels, and with populations of individual towns and cities now reaching the millions as well, direct local government is also exclusive. This is the purpose of representative democracy — to amend the problem of overcrowding. It seems practical enough, but representative democracy can only work when representatives are elected on the basis of the intelligence of the electors. If an elector votes for a candidate because he represents a particular party which that elector's family has always voted for, or because he appears attractive, or any other subconscious psychological criterion, then the purpose of representation, for the dissemination of private opinions for the national benefit, is lost.

There is one apparently radical solution to the problem of false representation that plagues many modern ‘democracies’, and that is the end of partisanship. On one hand, it may seem contradictory that those who believe in liberty should seek to eliminate political associations such as political parties, but we may contend that political parties actually damage the very concept of parliament, and as such damage the concept of liberty altogether. If the purpose of legislation is the preservation of ancestral tradition and order, only to be changed when moral virtue absolutely demands it, then the opinions of representatives must not be shackled by the whips of party agents and forced into the legislation of agendas which do not reflect the interests of society as a whole. To go to a representative of constituents and to say ‘vote on this issue in this way, else we will not endorse you at the next election’ not only forces the representative into a corner, whereby he cannot express his own conscientious opinion on a particular issue, and also denies him the chance of representing his constituents again, no matter how good a representative he might be, since the electors are influenced by time and inertia to vote for a party label rather than an individual name. It is through partisanship that legislatures are controlled by interest groups, and that fundamental rights can be removed by metaphorically beating parliamentarians into line. It was this desire to enforce partisanship that killed the British House of Lords – many of whose members before the 1999 Reform Act did not belong to any party, and consistently rejected the incumbent ‘New Left’ Labour Party government’s bills. The incumbent Prime Minister Tony Blair therefore removed the right of hereditary peers to sit in the Lords and replaced them with ‘life peers’, many of whom were former leading members of his party and other sympathetic establishment organisations, thus allowing him to push his agenda through parliament unchecked.

Here then arises the argument in favour of a bicameral parliamentary system. Even with the removal of political parties, the popularly elected chamber of parliament will always naturally be more

reckless than an appointed one. After all, as we have previously seen in our study of democracy, the whim of the people is subject to volatile caprice and can change with the winds from a love of liberty to a hatred of it overnight. The power to legislate itself is a dangerous power, since often when the law changes it does not take too long for the public to change its opinion in line with the law. For sake of example, take the legality of homosexuality, which before 1967 was a criminal offence; for a long time after the passage of the Sexual Offences Act which decriminalised such acts public opinion retained an unfavourable attitude towards homosexuals, but as a result of that decriminalisation, attitudes towards homosexuality and LGBT rights have gradually liberalised. Today (according to YouGov polls) 90% of British citizens believe that homosexuals should not be discriminated against for their sexuality, whilst 61% believe they should have the right to marry. In 1965, a government poll found that 95% of the British public considered homosexuality to be an illness. Laws, no matter how badly they are received at the time, change minds as certain attitudes and customs are enforced and become normalised. Law is therefore a powerful social tool, but also a dangerous risk to a virtuous society. The whims of the people therefore must be checked by the sort of people we considered worthy of elevation to the peerage in Chapter IX of this division, and the upper chamber must be just that — it must be superior to the lower house in terms of its powers. There will be those who will accuse us of allowing a form of tyranny to be perpetuated by permitting the upper house of parliament this sort of power over the lower house, but truly this is not the case. It cannot be tyranny when the people in a chamber of parliament are citizens of the nation, with an interest in that nation and have been afforded their honours for service to that nation.

We have stated before that there must be sacrosanct rights which may not even be removed by a 99% vote — the purpose of the upper chamber is to oversee that these rights are protected within the agenda of a government which is naturally dominated by the lower house,

being the democratically elected chamber of parliament. This is why traditionally the upper house has been appointed, and in a just society would have to remain so, since it retains interests separate from the more capricious house of the people and embodies a 'small-c conservative' attitude to legislation. In the United States, where aristocracy did not exist, until the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 the members of the Senate were not elected, but appointed by the legislatures of the constituent states, which makes much more sense in a federal system, where each state government has a right to send its elder statesmen to represent it at a federal level (since such men and women are effectively a republican form of aristocracy), whilst the people of the whole nation elect their representatives separately and popularly. The popular election of senators allowed the Senate to be controlled completely by the bipartisan system which remains in complete command of the United States' Government today. It goes without saying also, that member of the upper house, if they are to have a duty of care over the constitution and the regulation of the will of the commons, then they must be of an elder age. The United States prescribes that senators should be 30 years old; ideally, an elder statesman in an upper chamber should be about 40 years old, which places him in a much wiser position than the members of the commons who may be elected from the age of majority, which should be appropriately set varyingly between 18 and 21 years old depending on jurisdiction, but certainly after the stage of puberty is at least for the most part complete. It is people of this age who are able to vote, and therefore should be able to stand.

The only disqualifications for voting or standing in a parliamentary election should be if the potential elector has no fixed address, is not a *citizen* of the country for which he is electing representatives, or if he is or has been a member of a political party. If political parties are to be meaningfully abolished, the penalty for forming and belonging to one must be severe — it must carry a jail sentence or hefty fine, along with being debarred from standing for or electing to public offices in order

to properly deter the formation of such associations and allow for the free dissemination of individual opinions. Those who agree on certain issues need not regulate each other's opinions on other issues, and loose coalitions of friends who agree on certain aspects of policy are perfectly acceptable. Once a party is established which forces its members to accept a single 'manifesto' with which not all party members may agree, yet are forced to conform to, democracy itself is mocked by the very concept.

An upper chamber is absolutely necessary for the protection of politically just constitutions, and parliaments must be wholly non-partisan if they are to serve the people in the capacity of a national debating chamber. Affectatious theatrics and party scheming have no place in democracy, and the sooner we may be rid of such political horrors, the better.

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Now let us turn our attention to the powers of parliaments. The obvious purpose of parliament is legislation, but what else, if anything should it be permitted to conduct in political society? We have already dismissed the idea of parliament judging its own members — the role of prosecution of any member of society, politician or not, should fall to the judiciary. Parliament should be open for the voting public to watch, either by means of a gallery or televised coverage, since unlike a courtroom, parliament does not deal with sensitive criminal cases but the affairs of state with which every elector has the right to be concerned. Some congresses and parliaments reserve the right to sit in secret, such as the British House of Commons did in December 2001 when debating the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill. The right of houses of parliament to sit in private, suspending broadcast and expelling the public from the gallery should not exist in a true democracy. No matter how 'sensitive' information is deemed to be, if it is sensitive enough to be the concern of a representative, it should also be the concern of the elector; since he or she has had a say in electing

that representative, thus it concerns the nation and not only parliament. The European Union has been exposed several times in using the excuse of 'security' to deny the European public access to certain documents and discussions in its Parliament. In the discussions regarding the TTIP in 2015, MEPs were forced to sign a gagging clause which prevented them from disclosing the details of the treaty to their electors.<sup>28</sup> We need not elaborate too much on this, but it goes without saying that when virtue is being openly destroyed, good men must be prevented from speaking out against it. Such actions are not seen in societies which value liberty and morality, but only in tyrannies where coercion and punishment are used to pursue the agendas of specific groups rather than the whole community. The words of Benjamin Franklin resound down the ages:

Those who would give up essential Liberty to purchase a little temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.<sup>29</sup>

We have said before that Parliament should keep regular scrutiny of the executive, but it should have far more sweeping powers of scrutiny. Ministries, public enquiries and debates concerning the nuanced issues of local communities may all be considered by parliament, and with it being the political meeting place both physically and spiritually of the whole nation, it deserves the power to consider issues from across the whole of that nation. Now of course this may not amount to criminal prosecution, but it may well be possible for a parliamentary body to uncover evidence which may require handing over to legal authorities. The purpose of parliament should not simply be debate and legislation, but also the protection of citizens themselves, especially in matters of political corruption. As a body which represents the entire nation, corruption in parliament surely leads to the corruption of the whole of society, as toxic laws and dangerous ideas become perpetuated in a system which exists solely for the keeping up of appearances rather than genuine political discourse. Let it be said then that a parliament is the most important institution in the whole of political society, and that legislative power, whilst it should carry the most respect, should

also be reserved for the most virtuous. If the voting public can be genuinely educated in the importance of virtuous representatives and the need for separate chambers with balanced powers, then the hope for political justice and fixed libertarian rights may not be in vain.

APPENDIX TO BOOK IV.  
**FURTHER REMARKS ON  
POLITICAL SOCIETY**

## Freedom of Religion

**B**EFORE WE CONCLUDE this division, there are a few final matters to consider concerning the exercise of political power and society as a whole. The first topic for consideration is the question of tolerance — the freedom of religion, which in Western Europe at least has become one of the most challenging issues of the age. The mass migration of an alien culture by the displacement of thousands of citizens of Islamic countries poses a real threat to the values of traditionally libertarian civilisations in Europe. The freedom of religion is on the one hand a staple civil liberty, but on the other hand has the potential to create a great deal of societal division. We may criticise religions as freely as we like (or should be able to at least), and whilst we must accept the criticism that the nature of religious adherents depends a great deal on individual interpretation of the tenets of a particular religion, the cultural and societal traditions which have grown up around particular religions must be taken into account. In nations where law is based on strict religious teaching, and which when faced with the powers of reason do not come up to the sum of virtue, it is only natural that the law, which is the spirit of the nation and defines the eventual behaviour of its citizens, will reinforce certain behaviours which may be incompatible with or damaging to other nations which place reason and truth as their ultimate goals, rather than destructive and warped interpretations of morality.

A state which values freedom of opinion must also value freedom of religion, this much is given. If it is the variety of opinions which allows a democracy to consider both truth and falsehood, both the most outrageous and the most conventional in order to find the most virtuous path for its own self-improvement, then religions, which are ultimately theological expressions of individual opinion, must be

permitted the freedom to express their doctrines in the same way that political opinions are. However, we cannot avoid the fact that adherence to certain religions carries with it certain consequences. Throughout most of the medieval period Jews were banned from many European countries due to their association with exploitative money-lending and usurious financial practices, something which traditionally arose from Christianity's ban on the faithful's lending at usury, whilst Judaism has no such restriction. Islam was for a long time the sole and most dangerous enemy to Christendom, with Arab invasions of the Byzantine Empire and Moorish incursions into Spain being checked by various Christian Holy Wars. By the time of the Enlightenment, free thinkers such as Voltaire openly attacked Christianity itself, naming the religion which had dominated Europe since the age of Constantine the most dangerous threat to intellectual progression. What this teaches us of course is that whenever a particular dogma is favoured over another, we can never truly say that this dogma is 'perfect' compared to the alternatives. When it comes to religion, nation states are faced with a dilemma: to be religious, or to be secular, and if to be religious then to what extent?

It makes sense, from a comprehensive reading of European history, to conclude that Europe itself owes its values of liberty and democracy to the spirit of Christianity which served as the uniting force of European nations for much of the past millennium. We should not say, of course that Christianity has not also been used as a justification for wars both within and without Christendom; that would be false, but it stands to reason that every nation regardless of religion, race or culture has fought wars with its neighbours or with itself throughout the course of its history. The mere fact that Christianity existed in one group of nations, Islam in another and Animism in some others bears no relation to the historical human tendency to fight one another. Christianity, however, differs from many other religions in its exultation of free will, and use of God as a leveller among men. The nature of that God who is seen as the ultimate judge, who does not

discriminate in that judgement based on wealth, race or any other socio-economic factor, is the same nature which permits every free-born citizen the right to equality before the law, the right to a fair trial and the right to never be a slave to another man. In the dissemination of free will, we are all given liberty; we all have the freedom to do whatsoever we please, though we are reminded that in choosing the path of harmful sin we must expect to be punished. The Church has had its shameful episodes, and its treatment of scientists and philosophers who questioned its extra-Biblical teachings are testament to this. But for all this, the Church has survived, and Catholicism in particular remains the world's largest religious denomination with over one billion practising adherents. The Church's ability to retain a grasp on the legitimacy of its fundamental teachings despite the many changes in social and political thought over its history is a testament to its survival, and despite any suspicion of Enlightenment-era change that it may have had, the values that embody the spirit of Western democracy today are defended by the Christian Church in almost every country where it is present.

What makes Christianity perhaps the most special religion in the course of shaping Western culture is the monopoly it holds on Jesus of Nazareth. No other religion can lay claim to such a man. Whether we consider Jesus to be divine or not, whether his miracles were manifested in physical medicine, illusion, divine intervention or were merely literary contrivances does not detract from the strength of his moral teachings. Since there is a consensus that a historical Jesus existed, faith in his moral teaching can do nothing save reinforce our reasoned argument that moral self-improvement and the virtuous path in life can only be obtained by a vision of the world that is greater than the self, a vision which extends beyond the self-gratification which individualism openly encourages, and projects worldly value upon the individual's duty towards his fellow man. It is this compassionate and altruistic attitude, which in Western nations has been rationalised independently of the Church in the categorical imperative of Kant and

intuitionism of Hume. Therefore, we may conclude that a predominantly Christian outlook upon the world has been the philosophical father of Western progress and intellectual advancement, whether the Church itself has been the nurturer of that outlook or not.

What this theory means is that we may approach the existence of alternative religions in society with a different perspective. When we examine alternative religious traditions, we can see where the deviation between rational religion and dogmatic religion come to blows. The Christian Church has never endorsed sins such as adultery, but as much as it may discourage it, Jesus demonstrated the Christian attitude towards such acts when he confronted the adulteress in John Chapter 8:

He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. ... When Jesus had lifted up himself, and saw none but the woman, he said unto her, Woman, where are those thine accusers? hath no man condemned thee? She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her, Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more.<sup>30</sup>

A Christian society instructs wrongdoers to sin no more, sometimes through the form of a judicial punishment as penance, but it is not intolerant of sin to the point of cruelty, for the ultimate judge of life and death can only be Nature, or God himself. In Islamic countries, where an orthodox form of Islamic law, known as Sharia, interpreted from the works of various clerics holds sway, sin is not tolerated, and the cruellest punishments are exacted. In Pakistan, elder councils order retaliatory rape as a form of justice, and women raped by men may be executed by stoning for 'fornication' despite being forced into sexual acts by other men.<sup>31</sup> To merely open the Qur'an is to see instructions from the prophet Mohammed exhorting his followers to the murder of non-Muslims.<sup>32</sup> There is a context to these passages, of course, one which arguably no longer applies, yet unlike the Christian Bible, the Quran does not have a saviour in the form of a New Testament to fulfil its prophecies and call an end to the violence encouraged in the Old Testament and replace it with a merciful and

rational sense of justice. The instructions to the faithful to be violent, it can be argued, still stand. Meanwhile, the recent atrocities in Paris, Nice, Munich and London have proven that many Muslim immigrants to Europe, whether or not they have any direct association with terrorist organisation in the Middle East, are quite willing and ready to take up arms against the countries which they claim to have made a new home in for the sake of these anti-rationalist, anti-peace values.

It is out of place to say that Western nations have a right to dictate to Islamic countries how they should legislate for their own citizens: that is not our concern, but in our own nations where the customs of these alien peoples have become criminalised, are identified as harmful and restrictive, and have no place in our own culture, it is also out of place to say that we are obliged to welcome such ideas. Whilst it is important to remember that Islam, like any religion, can be interpreted positively, and that the liberal mantra of 'not all Muslims' which so often follows any terrorist incident is blatantly obvious, the fact remains that the customs of Arabia and the Hindu Kush are not the customs of Aquitaine and Suffolk. Freedom of religion may be necessary in a completely libertarian society, but only for the citizens of that society. It is the obligation of government, as we have asserted before, to defend the borders of the nation. As part of that defence, the vetting of individuals who adhere to criminal opinions and destructive customs is also necessary. It may be perfectly possible for a Muslim to come to a Christian nation and put aside the incompatible tenets of his native culture, to adopt his new nation's custom, laws, and to interpret these new customs through the medium of his own God; cultural groups, however, as the spirit of human self-preservation dictates, are naturally resistant to change. In general, a particular culture is determined as much by its religion as by its race and history. To deny Western nations the heritage of their historical religion, to deflect criticism of alternative religions away from public discourse by terming such criticism 'racist' or an opposition to 'freedom of religion' is a falsehood in itself. In the protection of a free society, we must also be

free to defend that which has nurtured our freedom. Once again, we may turn to Benjamin Franklin for one of the most concise summaries of the legacy of Christianity in the formation of Western moral and political traditions:

I think the System of Morals and [Jesus of Nazareth's] Religion, as He left them to us, the best the world ever saw or is likely to see; but I apprehend it has received various corrupt changes, and I have ... some Doubts as to His divinity; tho' it is a question I do not dogmatize upon.<sup>33</sup>

# Loyalties

**W**HEN WE SPEAK OF loyalty we speak of attachment to concepts and bodies, both institutional and physical. Loyalty is necessary in any society, on familial, local and national levels, if a truly organic society which recognises the importance of morality is to flourish in a safe environment. Loyalty entails a commitment, an undying commitment which provides strength and stability, and its recognition as such by any society allows for the strengthening of the human and national bond. Attempts to weaken loyalties in recent years have also weakened the social cohesion of nations themselves, and if allowed to continue will surely lead to one of the most faceless societies that it is possible to imagine.

On a familial level, the obvious state-sanctioned loyalty is marriage. Marriage legally recognises couples and places obligations on each partner towards the other, though it has been on the decline in recent years. In America today, for instance, it is estimated<sup>34</sup> that 55% of adult Americans are married, whereas 70 years ago approximately 96% of Americans were bound together in matrimony. This drastic decline in marriage is mostly out of a change in social attitude: all those 70 years ago it was expected that couples who loved one another would marry in order to start a family. According to certain liberal media outlets, the decline in marriage is down to several factors:<sup>35</sup>

1. The radical act of refusing to marry. Since marriage was previously expected of couples, to refuse to marry is seen as a liberating personal choice.
2. To marry is to be seen to give up one's independence — it forces the individual to settle down and designates any further relationships as adulterous and therefore immoral. Marriage is seen as

identitarian and prescriptive.

3. Marriage is seen to enforce unequal gender roles.
4. Since many women now have careers, fewer are willing to give up those careers in order to become a housewife.
5. Sexual intercourse and reproduction outside of marriage is no longer taboo, thanks to the sexual revolution.
6. To be married is to surrender freedom.

The truth is that many of these factors are actually falsehoods spread by the New Left, through media such as the sexual revolution of the '60s and '70s, which were in fact the results of critical theory, deliberately designed to destroy marriage and the family unit itself. Godwin too criticises marriage in as early as 1793, accusing it of debasing womanhood to mere property, a criticism emulated by the left today, though renamed and rebranded as critique of 'stereotypical gender roles'. Marriage however, is not a contract of servitude, and no matter what obligations of 'obedience' were placed on the female partner in these relationships in the past, the fundamental spirit of what marriage *is* or *should be* has not changed since its first institution. Marriage, it goes without saying, is fundamentally to do with love, but it is much more than expression of romantic love. As we saw above, one of the major modern qualms about marriage is the fear of surrendering oneself to one other person, of denying oneself sexual gratification from any other human being. Since intercourse itself has become a perfectly acceptable aspect of premarital relationships, it has added an extra dynamic to relationships which would not have been the same had the individuals involved been celibate. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but in a world which increasingly places self-satisfaction as the only viable human goal, the fear of loss of romantic love has become a key opponent to the sanctity of marriage.

Marriage today has effectively become a shadow of what it once represented: it is now seen as an agreement between individuals to

have sex with one another a little more exclusively than they would otherwise, and to receive a healthy tax break — all of which, when viewed objectively, reveals that it is no wonder 20% of modern marriages end after only five years, given such a shadow and naïve reading of what marriage truly is. The German poet Goethe, after publishing his infamous novel about the suicide of an infatuated man, *The Sorrows of Young Werther*, later derided his own work, describing it as ‘everything that is sick’. Goethe himself saw that an obsession with romantic love, and the hope that it would continue forever is unreasonable and impossible. If married couples expected the first flames of their relationship to burn for eternity, they would be swiftly disappointed and driven to misery and despair. In his correspondences with his friends in the Weimar school of literature, Goethe termed the latter stages of marriage ‘Klassik’ — ‘Classicism’; he meant the rational and realistic long-term planning that every serious marriage must face.

The 17<sup>th</sup> century Anglican vows of marriage sum up the true nature of the institution rather well: ‘for richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health ... to love and to cherish ‘til death do us part’. Unless each person in a couple sees their partner as the physical manifestation of their soul — unless without their partner they feel incomplete as a human being, the true gravity of the vows of marriage has not been understood. But marriage goes beyond the spiritual relationship, it extends into the community itself.

It goes without saying that a person born in a certain area feels a natural attachment to that place as their ‘home’ especially if their family has a hereditary history connected to that home. Any community, however, regardless of location, as we have previously explored in the second book of this work, is a fundamentally necessary nuance of civilised society. In societies which adhered to traditional conceptions of morality, the state often did not require as authoritarian a presence within communities, due to the self-policing that

interpersonal bonds such as marriage provided for the community. One incident frequently cited by members of the feminist school of history which supposedly portrays marriage as a tool of patriarchal oppression is the case of a young wife in medieval England, recorded as Margaret Neffeld in the statute books of 1395, who took her husband to court for separation after he broke her arm during an argument. Margaret's husband argued that his actions were reasonable and honest, and a fellow man of village supported Mr Neffeld's claims, accusing Margaret of certain 'errors'. The judge dismissed Margaret's case.<sup>36</sup>

Now, it is certainly not justifiable that the husband should be permitted to break his wife's arm for any sort of transgression, but to say that the case was dismissed purely as means of oppression is not wholly true either. The exact nature of Margaret's 'errors' is unknown but some have connected them to accusations of flirting with other men in the local community of York, something which would indeed be taken seriously. If such accusations were true, then Margaret would be seen by other members of the community as a nuisance to the lives of other families, and a potential threat to the integrity of the community as a whole. Margaret's husband, should he become known as a cuckold, risked losing his own respect, his business, and friends. Thus, the community would view it as an obligation of the husband to keep his wife in line with the expectation of the community, which itself was rooted in biological stereotyping (which arose by the pure fact that biological traits were observed) and moral teaching.

Margaret's husband dealt with his wife too harshly to warrant justification, but he had a justification nonetheless that a justice of the peace from the time would have considered wholly reasonable. Far from many myths propagated today, despite the fact that arranged marriages were common, loving and stable marriages were also common in medieval England, and the communitarian, locally centred as opposed to state-centred enforcement of justice through

interpersonal bonds grew out of those lovingly construed obligations. Marriage was, and ought to remain, a contract as much with the community at large as with the individual. It can only ever be a virtuous institution, if it is interpreted as the bedrock of selflessness, protection, love and death-bound familial obligation. Individuals within couples who genuinely love each other and take the commitment seriously will surely find that their marriage does not merely do good for themselves, but ultimately for their nation. To choose to marry is no easy decision for any couple, but it is an absolutely necessary one in the pursuit of true political and social justice.<sup>37</sup>

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The bond of marriage, however noble, is not the be-all and end-all of national loyalty. We turn to the question of oaths, both formal and informal, and patriotism. Patriotism is often considered distinct from nationalism, since nationalism extols the national superiority of the state over the individual communities of the nation, whilst patriotism encourages loyalty to the national community and cultural values of that community rather than the political government of a nation. We have discovered this for ourselves, since whilst it is our belief that a government must endeavour to reflect the national spirit of a country's culture, it is the communities and loyalties between individuals within those communities which are most essential for the cohesion and improvement of society. The state, rather than being separate from local communities and national spirit, is naturally bound up within these things, and whenever it tries to deviate from them, the destruction of national rights and freedoms can only follow. It is this risk that makes constitutional government so necessary, and the sacrosanctity of a constitution which ensures that it can only ever be added to and never have articles removed from it must stand if Burke's 'little platoons' of civil society are ever to have a chance at success.

We therefore face a problem when those who are elected to

governmental positions forget their connection to their original communities. Under the British and American systems of plurality voting (where the candidate with the most votes wins), despite the criticism that it is not proportional, is founded in the concept of communitarian representation. Members of Parliament represent communities and the interests of communities rather than the proportional political opinions of the nation, which, being so divided, only serve to slow the already tardy democratic process yet further. The removal of political partisanship would aid the cause of communitarian government yet further by increasing the importance of community loyalties over party loyalties. Assuming that representatives, however, whether local or national, are representatives of communities, then they must owe a certain loyalty to that community. One way to ensure that representatives have an interest in their community is by only allowing residents of so many years in a particular community to be permitted to stand for election in that community. Another potential option is that of the oath.

Oaths in the political sphere have attract some controversy, from republicans in Britain because of the oath of loyalty to the monarch, and in other nations, particularly the United States, but others as well, due to references to 'God' which continue to anger secularists. Without becoming bogged down in a theological quagmire, it stands to reason that even an atheist or agnostic man must believe in the nation which he hopes to serve in a political fashion. The spirit and values of that nation, whether you call it 'The Spirit of the Nation' or whether you call it 'God' as a result of Divine Providence having passed that spirit from Heaven to Man, is irrelevant. Political oaths are often called unnecessary by the left, but they are not merely a spiritual expression of loyalty – they are a public declaration of membership to a value-system, a national attitude and belief in the people that a politician represents. If the monarch embodies the spirit of the nation, it suffices to swear loyalty to the monarch; ultimately that monarch is only there due to the love of his people, thus the politician still serves his

community. Political oaths require a 'yes' or 'no' answer, and since yes must mean yes and no can only mean no, there are no grey areas when legally interpreting the obligations of an oath of office, or military oath.

Oaths are important in the case of treason, since the betrayal of the people of a nation is arguably the vilest crime of all, since the community, national and local, which a politician swore to protect was placed in existential danger by that supposed servant. We should not deceive ourselves into thinking that our own conscience is the seat of our obligation to society. To swear a public 'yes/no' oath is a clear expression of intent and forms a binding connexion to society at large. It is necessary for the protection of the national and local community that politically motivated men and women should take an oath — that way, the line between loyalty and treason is clearly marked, and those of virtuous disposition dare not cross it.

## CHAPTER XIX

# Libels

**L**IBEL IS PERHAPS the most ambiguous crime in the whole of legal history. 'Defamatory publication' is open to a great deal of interpretation, but in an age in which speech is increasingly restricted in the name of preventing certain '-isms' and '-phobias', we must be careful to preserve the sacred right of free citizens to freedom of expression and freedom of speech.

Godwin considers it impossible to find any fair grounds for the prosecution of individuals for this sort of speech or publication, since often the grounds for defining 'defamation' are rooted in the anger of an individual at perceived offence or opposition to a particular agenda that this individual may espouse, leading him to seek to use such ambiguous legal proceedings as a weapon against his political enemies. In almost all cases where speech or publication has not been used to incite violence against a particular group, this is broadly true. It is of course a natural human instinct to take offence at disagreement, or at whatever someone else puts forward which does not appear to be right within a different interpretation of human reason. What's more, humans often fear what they dislike or do not understand, and so are inclined to lock it away far from the consensus of society so as to ensure that they are not offended further by the strange opinions or habits of dissenters.

Whilst libel against the individual is not necessarily as common in court as it used to be, in Europe in particular a new kind of libel has taken hold in the form of criminality: 'hate speech'. The left is very much behind the criminalisation of hate speech, but in a society which values the free dissemination of opinion, can we ever truly restrict speech on grounds of hate? We must recognise the criticisms offered against hate speech; in some cases hate speech is indeed derived from

prejudice rather than informed opinion, but even if this were what hate speech laws were used to prosecute, surely the most effectively way to combat irrational prejudice is through education rather than criminalisation. After all, speech does not have the capacity to cause any physical harm whatsoever unless it is actually urging others to harmful behaviour. To express a hypothetical opinion, say 'I think Muslims are awful people who should not be European citizens' is quite different from saying 'Muslims ought to be eradicated'. The former is simply an opinion, the latter is genocidal in nature. We do not know the context of the first statement: perhaps the holder of the opinion has reason for believing that Muslims are awful; he might have rational arguments to offer as to why Muslims should not be European citizens completely separate from whether or not they have a right to exist.

If we take the example of UK law against hate speech, and examine the detail of the relevant law:

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if, with the intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress he (a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, disorderly behaviour, or (b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing harassment, alarm or distress.<sup>38</sup>

Law prohibiting harassment against individuals already existed separate from the law concerning matters of race, and right to be free from assault on or threat to the person exists for every citizen. However, when the law dallies with terms like 'distress' and 'insulting words', it immediately opens the door to prosecution for the sake of individual opinion. Opinions are always going to provoke distress in some, since it is natural and human to be offended by those things which criticise one's preconceptions, way of life or religious beliefs. Ambiguity, as usual, is the perpetrator of a restriction of freedom which occurs over a period of time, exploited by certain interest groups to remove the ability of the free-thinking population to express their own independent will. With the death of this sort of freedom of speech comes also the death of democracy and the libertarian society. What is

perhaps most worrying is that, in UK law at least, dissemination of all 'hate speech' against religion, race, sexual orientation or citizenship extends to almost all media: published material, plays, recordings, broadcasts and possession of any kind of 'inflammatory material'. Liberty is surely dying, and a politically just society cannot afford to lose it.

Ultimately, such symptoms are the product of political mismanagement rather than malice, but eventually, when the time comes that a malicious government does wish to remove the right of its citizens to express their individual opinions, libel and hate speech legislation will most certainly be used to suppress any attempt at challenging the status quo.

## National Education

**G**ODWIN STATES that a national curriculum is often used by government to imbue the wealthiest with a belief in authoritarianism and control which allows them to more easily manipulate the population, whilst manipulating the younger generations. This may have been true in Godwin's day, but since the recognition of education as a human right, there will be no removal of national education anytime soon. Ultimately what education should include comes down to a matter of individual opinion, and we have already considered education as means for moral improvement in Chapter IV of Book II. We have emphasised the importance of balance between empiricism and art, and we have previously lauded the value of the classical education and high culture derived from the intellectual Indo-European traditions of Rome, Greece and Persia.

When considering a virtuous education, the curriculum for which is often set by the state, we must consider two things: first, of what should be taught, and second, of how the system of schooling ought to be structured. When approaching the first question, many societies throughout history have looked further back to the origins of the human quest for knowledge, to philosophical and theological organisations, for inspiration. One need look no further than the very names of many schools on the European continent, with the French *lyceum* and German *gymnasium* lifted directly out of ancient Greek tradition. Education, when properly considered in the context of preparing children for a future within a local and national community, is as much about teaching the importance of educational and sociological inheritance as it is about cramming knowledge into young minds. By preparing the young in education, and giving the historical and empirical sweep of human progress, regress and ultimate

improvement, we will make them more readily able to tackle the questions of the future which present mankind with the potential for further and faster self-improvement. In history, this quest has frequently been connected with a deity of some kind, and it is for this divine representation of moral knowledge that Socrates was poisoned, Jesus Christ was executed and Zarathustra challenged the paganism of central Asia. The teaching profession in many Western nations today has lost sight of this divine goal. To ask any person on a British street today about the political associations of teaching immediately brings up a left-wing bias. A heavily unionised profession which has been increasingly corrupted by critical theory is sure to yield its problems, and indeed, often half-truths are taught in history lessons.

I may speak from personal experience when I say that I never had a teacher or higher education supervisor who was not of either a left-wing or centrist disposition. I have had teachers accuse European nations of guilt for their participation in the slave trade, without also adding that every human civilisation has at some point in its history been guilty of slavery, with Europe being the first continent to seriously begin its abolition; I have had teachers denounce the Crusades as a religious aggression which debunks the necessity for religious society, without adding that in previous centuries the Arab Islamic Empire had conquered huge swathes of previously Christian lands for the same reasons; I have had instructors who denounce right-wing statesmen from history as bigoted and racist, when their crime was only to have predicted some fifty to one hundred years ago what is actively and undeniably being fulfilled today. Even Godwin states that education 'is the mirror and tool of government itself', and if this is so, then what we see is a sorry reflection of the agenda of modern government. Government has replaced God, and the young people in education look to government for their earthly salvation rather than to selfless moral improvement, the divine spirit of God and Reason.

Whether or not we teach our children classical history or merely

ways of interpreting certain key historical events, whether we teach them creationism, evolutionism or both, what is most important is the skill of critical thinking. The evaluation of facts and the conclusion of independent personal opinion is at a paucity in many educational systems, and it will continue to be, so long as educational instructors inject the education system with their own private opinions, rather than allowing their wards to come to their own conclusions. Rather than teaching children the nature of their constitution, why we have certain inalienable rights, and why the spirit of the nation must be maintained within that constitution, all the youth of today can think about are flaws, emotional infringements and 'feelings'. Abstract conceptions of equality and fairness are considered the only moral ends, not because they make rational sense, but because they 'feel' good, or 'seem' right. Things are not as they seem. If education itself loses sight of reason, the governments of the future, which will be comprised of today's young generations, can only be irrational.

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Mankind, as we know, is an unequal race. Therefore, we would be dishonest with ourselves to say that all children have the same aptitude for education, the same mental means for critical thinking, the same possibilities and the same successful futures. This is what the left would have us believe, and this view has its intellectual origins in the Godwinian hope for a future marked by 'great intellectual improvement' among the general populace, where each and every man is freely able to express his own rational opinion and settle moral issues independently of authority. But there will never come a time, certainly not in the coming millennia, when all human children will have the same capacity for intellectual improvement. When an educational system is constructed, it must honestly take this irrefutable fact into account.

There will be students who have the aptitude for future academic careers, those who seek financial careers, literary careers and practical

careers in architecture and engineering — the possibilities are endless. But we will always also see those who do not even have the aptitude for high education after their pre-university schooling. Britain used to cater for these eventualities under the tripartite schooling system which existed from 1945–1974. This system divided post-primary students by an aptitude test into three groups: those who went to one of the country's ancient 'grammar schools', which received their name for placing special importance on the teaching of classical languages, but also those gifted in mathematics and science, whilst the rest went to either 'secondary technical schools', which placed special importance on science, or 'secondary modern schools', which effectively acted as the tier below the grammar school. Those with enough money were able to afford to send their children into private education, whilst those from poorer backgrounds who might well have been intelligent enough to deserve private-level education were excluded from this by monetary limitations; thus, by showing a degree of aptitude in an exam taken at age eleven, the wheat, we might say, was separated from the chaff, and those who could prove their level of intelligence were allowed to enter a grammar school.

By the late 1960s, with the publication of Michael Young's satire *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, in which the meritocracy of education was openly criticised, the Labour Party in Britain abolished the system and closed many grammar schools. Whilst today some grammar schools have survived on a provisional basis, many remain closed, and some have entered the private sector, whilst the replacement of such 'elitist' schools with state comprehensives remains the long-term goal of the left, hand-in-hand with the strange and dishonest ideology that every child deserves and responds to the exact same standard of education. Contrary to hopes, the comprehensive education system has not raised all schools to the same high level of education, but has driven the best teachers into the private sector and left comprehensive schools with equal standards, but equally low ones.

In a virtuous society, the ultimate value of education is preparation for both political duty and communitarian duty. Working in a stable job earning money for a stable family may be part of that duty to community, but fundamentally, the interests of students will be different, and trying to create a comprehensive system with a one-size-fits-all educational model cannot work, since it is incompatible with the natural inequality which is present in the human race. The attempts to argue that each child has the same capacity for learning and will not be held back by being forced (yet another restriction of freedom) to choose an egalitarian schooling system rather than the private choice, or taking the test for selective state schooling, will force the egalitarian mindset into children themselves, and surely cause a plethora of irrationality to take hold of those who will be the future shapers of society. Once again, we see that even in matters of national education there cannot be an equality of education and a freedom of choice. Liberty and equality are incompatible, since in forcing equality on the population, choice of schools must be restricted. It will not surprise our reader to learn that we believe in a completely libertarian society the state should always allow its people freedom of choice rather than enforcing abstract equality.

## The Fraud of Economics

**T**HE FINAL DISCUSSION of this division will be centred on economic theory. In truth, economic science deserves a full enquiry in its own right, so our discussion will be somewhat limited to the broad goals of economy, how economy has failed society in the modern world, and how we might go about changing attitudes towards economy in order to bring about a more practical, but also just, system of political economy. No doubt at some later point I may endeavour to take my reader into a new full work with ethical economics in mind.

Modern economy is founded on deception, for fundamentally the economic and monetary system of the modern world has turned towards transactions that use money which simply does not exist. This 'non-money' is manifest in several different ways: first, the deception of the populace by false promises of money which the state does not have, or cannot afford to spend; second, the adoption of a monetary system which creates currency as debt, and derives the value of currency from an 'I-owe-you' system rather than actual monetary value; third, the use of paper and copper alloy as money rather than gold and silver, which is valuable due to its preciousness on the face of Earth. The fact that the economic system operates based on these deceptions also sheds great light on modern 'capitalism', or rather disproves its existence, and reveals a great deal of uncomfortable truths about the manipulation of economy for the means of control rather than public benefit. If the commonwealth of citizens is the purpose of society in the first place, then economy is perhaps the most crucial tool in securing that commonwealth.

First we must consider the greatest Ponzi scheme ever to defraud the people of this world, particularly in Europe, where the welfare state has been most engorged. Many of the assurances which the

governments of Europe have offered their people are in fact fraudulent. In the United Kingdom for example, citizens who are forced to pay part of their salary into state pension contributions are forced to do so on a regular basis, on the promise that once they reach retirement age they will be able to claim a pension. However, all long-term promises, as we have discovered in Book III Chapter III, are unsustainable. The UK government has now found that it is unable to pay back everyone who has paid into the pension scheme, since instead of each individual paying into his own personal pension fund, the money is treated like a tax, and the government has spent that money on other things over the pension scheme's lifetime. Therefore, we have reached a situation where there are more people set to claim pensions in years to come than there is money to pay for them. Hence the government has been forced to resort to tactics such as raising the pension age, and that which was once 60 is now set to be 68 by the 2030s. It is this same inability to provide the money after over 50 years of borrowing that is forcing governments across Europe to implement austerity measures. Such measures are of course unpopular, and we cannot deny that they are affecting many people adversely, but they are entirely the consequence of the false promises made by the left-wing governments of previous years. The 2008 financial crisis proved that the entire economic system was flawed, and yet now almost ten years on very little has changed.

This leads us to our next matter for consideration: the currency of debt. Besides the fact that central banks consider it sound economic policy to print money which they do not have (Quantitative Easing), governments choosing to spend more than they receive (deficit spending) is ultimately the disease which infects the monetary system. When the treasuries of the governments of the world issue bonds, and banks buy bonds at auction, they do not take into account that bonds (which are nothing more than 'I-owe-yous') remove money from the future system for the purposes of spending in the present moment by means of creating debt. Central banks then pay for bonds from banks

by creating money through Quantitative Easing, but since central banks do not have any money of their own, they create money out of thin air to pay for bonds. The government and the central bank of a nation therefore do nothing but swap long-term debts, and thus every dollar or pound or euro created must by nature have a dollar or pound or euro of debt attached to it. Since most nations left the gold standard after the First and Second World Wars, money has always derived its value from debt rather than from the value of metal, and it goes without saying that if the money that people spend on a day-to-day basis is founded only on debt, then they are nothing but debt slaves themselves.

It has been said that ‘Gold is the money of kings; silver is the money of gentlemen; barter is the money of peasants; but debt is the money of slaves.’<sup>39</sup> There is a reason why the ancient civilisations of Athens and Rome used gold and silver to craft their currencies — that money had real value, which was stable and always in demand. Floating debt-based currency has no such stability. Even the Greeks and Romans debased their currency, however, by clipping their coins, which we see in the silver *siliqua* of the Hoxne Horde of coins discovered in England. What is perhaps most remarkable about currency debasement is that it only occurred in the dying days of the Roman and Athenian empires. When governments become mired in debt and financial difficulty, they seek to attain more wealth by any means necessary, which includes increased taxation (something which only involves stealing the wealth of private citizens, which whilst it may be necessary for the maintenance of a state, has never been seen before on the same scale as in modern times<sup>40</sup> ) but also monetary debasement. Today’s monetary debasement is undertaken by printing more money, or creating it electronically, and therefore decreasing its value, just like the desperate Romans hopelessly melting down clippings of coins already in circulation in vain attempts to increase the money supply.

The truth is that the monetary system is a fraud, and the more

people continue to accept it, the more of their own wealth will be removed. It is probably safe to say that much modern wealth inequality is derived from this fraudulent system, and if the people of Western nations were to reject their currency *en masse*, perhaps the greatest increase in economic liberty the world would ever have seen might come about.

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We will not say much more on economics, besides this: the so-called 'capability approach' to economics is becoming increasingly popular in modern times thanks to thinkers such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. This is a philosophy concerned with focussing opportunities within society towards what individuals are 'capable of'. It doesn't sound so bad until we compare it to the Marxist mantra of 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his need'. With commentaries on capablism from Nussbaum adding feminist readings to the mixer of leftist thought, and involving the upheaval of gender relations within the married family, it becomes clear that economic capablism involves the creation of false suitable roles for differing skill sets. The logical economics of Adam Smith and his successors has been succeeded by yet more politics of liberation. Economics is no longer about what may rationally work, but what might best allow the individual identity to engage in any form of labour, no matter whether or not it is suited to this form or not. Under modern systems of 'anti-discrimination', the man best suited to a particular job will be paid the same as a woman, who perhaps cannot do as good a job for natural biological reasons, purely because that woman is a woman, and therefore oppressed by a non-existent 'pay gap'. We should not argue that women should not be paid the same as men, but we should argue that women and men should be paid according to their abilities. Labour is a commodity, and if men are able to earn more because they are more assertive, naturally stronger or better at their job than a woman, then it is the imperative of the woman to either improve her

skills or find a job which better suits those skills in order to earn the same or more than a man. The possibility for gender equal pay is there, it is merely a question of logic: are those who are paid less, regardless of gender, willing to work more or with a different skill set, for more pay?

However, these things being said, in a world where capitalism has in fact fallen out of favour and been replaced by cronyism, it has become increasingly hard for workers of either sex to find alternative employment which suits their skills. In Dr Kerry Bolton's provocative publication *Revolution from Above*, he presents us with the alternative theory that capitalist and Marxist economics have been conflated, and neither mainstream left- nor right-wing political parties have any interest in pursuing true economic benefit. Neoliberalism is not economic liberalism, it is not economically ethical. Of course, firms must be profitable in order to survive, lest they not be able to pay for labour or their very continuance; however, with the complete polarisation of wealth such that the wealth of the richest 1% is equivalent to the wealth of the remaining 99% put together, certain problems with the economic system are highlighted.

However, so long as the 99% are obsessed with their own self-gratification, constructive attempts to reduce wealth inequality to more natural levels will never take proper root. Ethical policies by businessmen have been undertaken in the past and present. In Germany for instance, the Marxist narrative which seizes many countries where the worker and the business executive are at odds with one another has been eradicated by allowing workers to have representatives on the board of executives of companies which they work for. In the United Kingdom, the Cadbury family of chocolate-makers and Wedgwood potters were famous for paying for their own workers' housing as well as providing them with paid jobs. Spedan Lewis, the owner of the John Lewis PLC retail giant took the adventurous step in 1929 of distributing all profits to his employees

and converting his business into a partnership, where every worker was a partner in the business, and therefore had an interest in ensuring the business remained profitable, whilst retaining the hierarchical structure which allowed it to function effectively.

Ethical capitalist economics is, by all means, possible; it is merely a means of encouraging sound business practices by outlawing harmful ones, ensuring that cartels are properly prosecuted and monopoly law is extended to include oligopoly as well. It was Smith's belief in *The Wealth of Nations* that businessmen who treated their workers well and pursued ethical systems ought to be rewarded with honours and titles, in a similar way to how we decided the virtuous in society ought to be rewarded. If economic virtue is embodied by ethical practice within a capitalist system (however reluctant we might be to accept capitalism) then we may extend our honours system to ethical capitalists accordingly. It may be the only hope that the free market economy has for its survival in the face of utilitarian excess on the one hand and socialist obfuscations on the other.

BOOK V.  
**CRIME AND PUNISHMENT**

# Introduction

**W**E HAVE DEFINED crime towards the start of this work, at least in the context of society, so by returning to it, we shall be treating this next division more as a vindication of the purpose of strong legal systems, and examining in more detail the nature of how and why we must punish criminals and to what extent they ought to be rehabilitated.

Godwin's criticism of punishment for crime comes from his detestation of the government of his day. The 'suppression of force by force' argument, however, is very similar to the agenda of the modern left. One need only look at Nordic model countries such as Norway in which a life sentence is set at a maximum of 21 years, though most prisoners only serve around 14, and, according to law, are permitted unsupervised parole on weekends after serving one third of their sentence. The reason why the left is obsessed with more lenient sentencing, and in some cases even with allowing prisoners certain rights such as the vote, is derived from the moral outrage that certain individuals feel at the idea of removing someone from society rather than helping him to undergo rehabilitation. Whilst we have previously expressed sympathy with the concept of rehabilitation, and there have been several cases of even murderers undergoing a change of heart, there must be a balance between punishment and rehabilitation. Whilst the education of criminals to help them assimilate into law-abiding society is necessary, it must be proven to them that their actions, which are harmful to society as a whole, are not acceptable, and they will be denied certain freedoms and rights as consequence for demonstrating that they are not able to play a functional role in society.

Crime is fundamentally connected with vice, and the designation of

certain actions as sinful is not about enforcing a subjective moral code but preserving the integrity of a local and national community in such a way that the nation may maintain the best standards for its citizens' safety, liberty and capacity for self-improvement. Using force to repel force is sometimes necessary, since standing idly by whilst having one's individual will assaulted is obviously not an option for any rational being. Justice, unlike what many critics of strong legal systems based on punishment say, is not about retribution but the maintenance of safety, and in the interests of that safety, a certain cynicism about the nature of man must be incorporated into justice. By exploring that cynicism, the categorisation of crime, the policing of crime and the conduct of trials, we may better come to understand the purpose of a judiciary in a politically just society.

The question of how law ought to be interpreted, and how criminality should be discerned from mere errors of judgement is certainly a problematic one. Law certainly cannot account for every single nuance of circumstance that may arise in the conduct of individuals within a society. What law can do, however, is provide safe foundation on which civilised society may flourish; that foundation may be abused, for certain, but without its existence there would be nothing but tyranny.

## Coercion and Ethics

**L**AW DEMANDS OBEDIENCE, and in so doing threatens force against those who disobey in order to ensure that the law itself is not rendered useless. The Godwinian objection to criminal justice comes down to the principle of coercion, and indeed there is a moral argument to be made that coercion only serves to lower the enforcer to the level of the criminal who first used force. However, coercion is seen across all of history and all human society as a method of law enforcement; indeed, it is a wholly necessary part of law enforcement, not because the executive which enforces law is itself criminal, but because true crime is for the most part an irrational action, derived from irrational states of mind. When faced with irrationality, it is safe to assume that the perpetrator will not respond rationally to the prospect of punishment for his crime, therefore a rational man must restrain him in order to bring him to justice.

Crime as we know, according to the harm principle, is an action which infringes upon the person, property or safety of another individual within society. When the natural human spirit is one of cooperation and improvement, individuals who seek to harm other individuals, whether it be out of need or love of destruction, prove themselves to be lacking in that spirit. Now, it would not be fair to say that criminals are unable to find that spirit within themselves, or that they are entirely defective as human beings, but for various reasons, be they mental or circumstantial, criminals are placed in the minority. Throughout history, whilst it is hard to estimate crime figures before official records began, there have always been criminals, but civilisations have always stood firm precisely because criminals remained in the minority, and rule of the criminal classes was not able to completely deconstruct the legal system of civilisation. Many ancient

civilisations were more turbulent than today, but the fact remains that their political and judicial systems managed to keep order, insofar at least that civilisations such as Rome were able to build and maintain such great empires. Minorities will always exist, but due to their nature as minority, we may assume that they are not reflective of the true nature of the human spirit, and the human spirit is not criminal.

Ultimately, the left expounds a belief that criminals cannot help themselves. Godwin cites the example of a murderer and claims that the dagger he commits murder with is not better or worse than the murderer himself, since it is in the nature of the murderer to murder; the dagger, since it has no nature, does not get a say in how it is used, but neither does the criminal, since he is naturally murderous. However, it is contrivances of morality such as this which have led to the removal of the right of the citizen to defend himself against such 'natural murderers'. The argument that a criminal cannot help himself has ultimately led to the removal of the means to commit crime, whilst allowing the criminal to go unpunished. It is for this reason that it is incredibly difficult to own a gun in the United Kingdom, and use of firearms is restricted for those who do own them, whilst in the United States it is the agenda of many liberals to restrict or remove the right to bear arms. In other words, the left would rather punish the dagger than the murderer. Rather than 'coercing' the criminal into not committing crime, his means for committing crime should be removed — i.e. to take the murderer's dagger away, to abolish private property so that the thief no longer has the capacity to steal etc.

This moral system, however, is flawed. We have already considered that the most violent of crimes are often driven by mental aberration, and in the case of cold-blooded murder, this is most often true, with psychological assessments of killers being frequently undertaken as part of modern criminal trials. The rational citizen should have a right to defend himself from the criminal. The Polish member of the European Parliament, Janusz Korwin-Mikke once commented in an

interview on Polish television that if society accepts that every man walks down the street with a tool of rape in his trousers (that is to say, his penis), then how different is that to every citizen walking down the street with a gun or knife in his pocket? Not every man is a rapist; not every man is a murderer. Many modern conceptions of crime are after all derived from the Christian moral code, but the Christian moral code does not hold tenets unique to Christianity. In almost every religion God is upheld to be the 'father', creator of the Universe and Man, and therefore a God of logic as much as love. Whilst some may argue that a logical God would not have created human beings capable of criminality, let us pause for a minute and consider this in a different way.

When we are born we have a father and mother. Our parents raise us to be functional citizens, members of a community. From an early age we are punished for misdemeanours and rewarded for good behaviour, we learn that a naughty child will be sent to his room, but a good one will be bought the toy he wants. By the time we reach adulthood, we have a full awareness of right and wrong, and will have been exposed not just to this primitive form of morality, but the legal and religious codes of the world which also exist. We are faced with a choice: do we live a good life, for others, and abide by the law, be good, dutiful and respect our fellow man; or do we choose a path of crime, or if not criminality then of immorality, of unstable behaviour and degeneracy? Our father who raised us to take the former path would surely be greatly upset if we chose the latter option; he would certainly still love us, since we are his child, but he would be forced to come to terms with the fact that we must face the consequences of our sinful actions as adults who take responsibility for individual choices. God is much like this – he shows us the path of virtue and sin, and whilst he may be upset to see his creations choose sin, the sinner must take responsibility for those actions and either repent or be punished. The legal system is founded in this concept, even if it has strayed from it a little since its inception. We all have the choice of abiding by the law,

or breaking the law, but we must realise that if we break the law then we cannot be expected to be treated leniently. Criminals can help themselves, since the whole of human existence is about overcoming obstacles. For some this is harder than for others, but whether or not we choose to believe in a God, the fact remains that religion best embodied this spirit: that humankind is flawed, and life is a struggle to achieve a form of heroism, of perfection which is not fully achievable but ultimately worth the struggle. In the words of Camus 'the struggle itself ... is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.'<sup>41</sup> This struggle for self-improvement is one which we must all confront in the progress of human civilisation, and the fact that a criminal might have a tendency towards crime does not excuse him from that crime.

Coercion is therefore necessary as means of defence, but it is also necessary to consider conflicts of the law itself when coercion is used to resolve individual conceptions of unethical action when in fact there may be a broader objective goal of the law in general. Take for instance the case of Euthyphro in Plato's dialogue of the same name. Euthyphro prosecutes his own father for manslaughter for leaving one of his workers bound in a ditch; the worker died, but the worker himself had previously killed a slave from Naxos from the family estate (hence his being restrained by the father). On the one hand, Euthyphro's father is guilty of manslaughter, which is a punishable crime; on the other hand, the man who died was a murderer, and the father was in the process of bringing him to justice before he died, and a case of neglect caused the worker to die. Whether or not Euthyphro's father is actually guilty of neglect is a matter of debate, but let us assume for a moment that he did neglect the guilty worker, who died as a result of undue attention by the father in bringing the worker to the relevant authorities. Why would the father care so little about the murderer that he would leave him in the knowledge that he might not survive until he returned?

If we consider criminality to be irrational, then we must consider obedience to natural law to be rational. When natural law, the natural human spirit of support, is violated and harm is performed on another, it forms part of the instinct of self-preservation for other human beings to judge the harmer on a personal level. It becomes clear to others that the perpetrator of harm has no right to do harm and is a danger to others; he has no constructive role to play in the community. Therefore, even if authorities exist for the proper trial and prosecution of criminals, the value of that human being who is accused is automatically lowered. Euthyphro's father did the right thing in bringing the murderer to the authorities, and he clearly did not intend to kill the murderer himself – such is the value of human life. However, due to the natural lowering of the value of the criminal in the mind of the father, even subconsciously it is likely that the fathered cared less about the consequences of leaving the murderer in the ditch whilst he left to seek help.

On one hand, this does not excuse the fact that the father's actions led to the death of the man; on the other hand, the man who died was a threat to the community, and the father's actions were only undertaken in an attempt to find those whose duty it is to protect the community. Therefore, on a net level, all actions undertaken were considered to be for the benefit and protection of the community, and Euthyphro, in bringing his father to court so confidently, is harming the forces which only sought protect that community, by coercing his own father into his own ethical code without due attention to the full circumstances.

Similar conflicts between individual moral codes and the law have been seen in modern times as well. In July 2016 several employees of the Byron chain of hamburger companies were arrested by British officials for working in the country illegally. This sparked a row about Byron Hamburgers not properly protecting the rights of its immigrant employees, and protestors attacked several branches of the restaurant. In the minds of the protestors, it was right for them to 'punish' Byron

Hamburgers for reporting the immigrants, who in the protestors' minds were only working for a better life and lacked proper documentation due to the tardiness and difficulty in obtaining proper documentation from the Home Office. However, the law exists for a reason, and it exists for the purposes of protecting the wider national community. If immigrant workers do not have proper legal permission to live and work in a nation, there is no way of knowing their background, intentions or loyalties. They could be a risk, or they could simply be there for selfish ends with no interests in the values and advancement of their new nation whatsoever. This is the spirit of enforcing this kind of law and forcing individuals such as these immigrants to go through proper process. The intervention of social justice protestors is not helpful, since in exacting their own form of justice they only damage the rationale of law, and ultimately therefore their own communities.

Even if law is not perfect, and it might at times coerce individuals into morally detestable actions, the fact remains that laws may be changed or repealed. Whilst certain constitutional (and by extension spiritual) values must stand, legal process requires fine-tuning. This is why we inherit the laws and practices of our ancestors, since a great deal of this fine-tuning has been done over centuries already. The process will continue so long as human self-improvement continues, but this in itself relies upon the importance of community and natural law being respected as much as individual subjective interpretation of what appears immediately 'moral' or 'just'.

## CHAPTER III

# Policing

**W**HEN IT COMES TO the policing of crime, we must consider what the value of a specific police force is, how much policing can be done by the populace at large, and what powers a police force ought to have to keep peace. In a modern world with countries of such vast populations an organised law enforcement institution is required in order to protect citizens who otherwise might be neglected by inaccessibility or the bias of a local community; however, as we shall discover, the role of the community in local policing could be much more effective than has been supposed in modern times.

In almost every country with an organised police force, such forces are constituted as public bodies, paid for by public taxation, and maintained by the funds of the state. In this regard, the police force is often presented as existing by the consent of the people in service of the people. In one sense this is correct, since the purpose of policing is law enforcement, and protection of citizens from those individuals who would seek to harm not only other individuals, but the community as a whole. Of course, the police force is often subjected to allegations of corruption and discrimination, and history has many examples of cover-ups, brutality and corruption to prove that such allegations may have basis in truth. This is undeniable, but as we discussed in Book I, just because an institution has the capacity to be corrupted does not mean that it has no inherent value. In achieving a well-ordered society and a well-ordered police force, it is necessary to be discerning in the selection of police officers. It goes without saying that those of good moral character ought to be selected, but it would serve society well to have men also well-schooled in the logic of law. It is one thing to recruit strong and burly men who can arrest and exert legitimised force on individuals, but it is quite another for them to understand the

reasons why they must exert that force at the same time. Policemen and women should by nature understand the purpose of law, not to mention which laws they have a duty to enforce and what level of force is appropriate in response to each crime. Educating the police in this way also allows the constabulary to have the critical knowledge of discerning right from wrong. Should, therefore, the state order their police officers to engage in deliberately oppressive behaviour, not for the protection of their citizens but for their harm or oppression, officers of good moral character may object or refuse to carry out their orders, and thus serve their duty as protectors of the citizens of the nation. It goes without saying that the duty of the police is to enforce the law alone, and not to enforce social custom. If it is not written in law, or no harm is being done, then it is outside the power of the police to intervene.

The police, on account of the fact that they are the physical representatives of the legal arm of the state in public life, will often attract the hatred of certain groups, be they criminal or merely frustrated citizens, and thus are often subject to violent assaults during the progress of riots and other mass civil disorders. It is hard to anticipate every situation in which the police may require deployment to control crowds and disperse perpetrators of civil disobedience, but it is quite safe to assume that so long as a crowd of civilians is threatening the police then those officers are in physical danger themselves. For the same reason as we concluded that citizens should have the right to bear arms, so of course should police officers; however, when police officers are defending against rioters, the use of force must be carefully calculated. Of course, the preservation of life must be the primary concern of every officer, and so if the disorder is armed with the potential to cause physical harm or death on a large scale, the deployment of retaliatory squads ought to be considered. Most often, however, this is not the case and even if certain rioters are armed and dangerous, police equipped with bulletproof armour, various defences against the elements of violent protest, and tools to

bring about peaceful dispersion are justified in conducting their duty without the need to resort to potentially deadly force. Ultimately the avoidance of killing should be paramount for police forces, but in the heat of armed struggle, when an individual is intending to kill another, we must place ourselves in the shoes of the officer assaulted. In that split-second moment when the threat of death looms over an officer, he must choose: 'Do I die, or retaliate?' Whilst it would be ideal for a non-fatal shot to be fired in order to facilitate arrest, the stress of armed struggle often renders this difficult. It should be noted however that there is a difference between armed struggle and shooting men suspected of being armed. If a suspect has surrendered, there is no justification. The best means of ensuring that the police are accountable is by attaching small point-of-view cameras to officers' equipment. This system has been adopted by some British officers recently and would do wonders to aid courts in discerning murder from necessary use of force in cases of suspected police brutality.

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When we examine the origins of policing we find that it arose often out of private attempts by local landowners in earlier periods to protect the communities which they held within their fiefdoms from disturbance. The system of constables and sheriffs in the English Middle Ages were governed by communitarian 'tithings', administrative divisions funded by private citizens with an interest in their moral obligation towards the commonwealth of their fellow kinsmen. Juries who investigated criminality in a local area, led by a constable, were often merely local individuals who believed that the safety of the local community was threatened by criminality, and the punishment of criminal individuals was settled on a private level. Eventually the practice came about of delivering criminals to a sheriff who would exact justice, rather than exacting it privately. Villagers and townsmen would often be suspicious of outsiders and travellers, with local privately employed watchmen being informed by the citizens of a community about any

strange goings-on in that community. Whilst the suspicion of outsiders is a normal part of human nature designed to aid in the protection of human community, in a world where property markets are much more fluid and people of varying ethnicities move from place to place, it has become very much harder to ensure the safety of communities by watching suspicious outsiders. However, the community still has a role to play in policing. Some initiatives in England known as 'Neighbourhood Watch' initiatives where local inhabitants work together to report suspicious activity still exist, though these have largely proved ineffective and serve as more of a deterrent than a practical law-enforcement option. Nevertheless, there is much that could be learnt from the history of our ancestors.

Today, an overarching set of laws and regulations governing the definition of criminality is certainly necessary. Private individuals cannot be allowed to come to their own conclusions about appropriate punishment, since this would quickly degenerate into blood vendetta, resentment within communities and a general anarchic system of legality. However, if communities can be restored to treating their integrity as fundamental to the function of a free society, and individuals take an interest in the safety of their neighbours, private initiative to root out crime could be effective. The police should exist, but ultimately only as a place to deliver criminals caught in a community. Given the technological age in which we live, it is no longer hard for individuals to gather private evidence, though a police force may wish to assist with this. The police therefore can undertake proceedings for public prosecution and be deployed on the streets only when large-scale disorders such as riots, which cannot be handled by individuals within communities, need to be dealt with.

The community can be used, if individuals have a sense of responsibility to their own community, as a tool to maintain order and prosperity within human social groups. The state, and the law enforcement arm of the state, should function as a last resort, and as a

means for the detention and prosecution of criminals who are a threat to society. There needn't be such large-scale state intervention in societies where virtue is placed at the heart of human community. So long, however, as individualism rules over communitarianism, then it will always be seen as the role of the state to impose moral control over the people of the nation. The answer to moral policing is not to abolish the police, or to diversify it, or to reduce its powers, but to change its role. Individual communities must see their own value and place in society, and in so doing, policing can be made much more effective. So long as legal proceedings are in place to ensure that communities do deliver criminals to proper authorities and vigilante justice is not prevalent, the onus of protection will ultimately lie in the free will, and desire for safety and commonwealth, of the people themselves.

## The Categorisation of Crime

WHEN CONSIDERING HOW society should punish criminals who have been apprehended and convicted, crime itself must be categorised. One thing that cannot be avoided when ranking crime based on the harm principle is the question of what harm entails in itself. We have considered physical harm, harm and threat of harm to the national community to carry a necessity to be restricted, but ultimately the question of harm comes down the question of cultural identity. Different nations across the world will have different conceptions of what constitutes harm. The Western world, for instance, has no problem with women showing their faces, but in several Eastern Islamic countries, women are either forced by law or encouraged by social custom to wear a full-face veil, since wearing anything other than this ‘modest’ clothing is seen as a potential harm to the community by encouraging male members of the community to lust after the wives of others. It goes without saying, in keeping with the rest of this book, our consideration of crime will be within the context of Western cultural identities and the traditions of Indo-European history.

When categorising the severity of crime, it is necessary to discern the degree of harm caused by a criminal act, whether it is harmful to a set of individuals, to a whole community, whether that community is local or national, or whether the crime is by inherently a violation of nature itself, in which case the punishment ought to be most severe. We must remember that punishment and rehabilitation of criminals is possible only because of the fundamental nature of the majority of human beings. When we consider the etymological origins of the word crime itself, we discover that the Greek word *krima* and Latin *crimen*, to which the English *crime* is cognate, have varying meanings. The Greek

crime often referred to an intellectual error, a passing judgement which violated the integrity of the community, whilst the Latin crime originally translated as ‘cry for help’ – a moral sin that causes distress in others.<sup>42</sup> In the maintenance of a community, crime is a sin which harms that community.

Let us begin our considerations with victimless crime. It is often hard to judge punishment for victimless crimes, and traditionally victimless crimes have only been criminalised due to morally absolute definitions of criminality often derived from religious teaching. For instance, the criminalisation of homosexual acts common across Europe until the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and still practiced in many Islamic countries, was derived from traditional communities’ conception of damage to the self and sexual reproduction, rather than for producing physical victims of sexual crime. Immoral acts which society possibly could do without but in a broader context do not cause harm should not be encouraged or normalised, but perhaps ought not to be illegal. In John Stuart Mill’s seminal work *On Liberty*, he considers prostitution to fall within this vein. A free society should not outlaw prostitution, but there is a case to be made for its restriction. When we confront other cases of sexual immorality such as adultery, the distinction between criminal and socially unacceptable action becomes even harder to distinguish, given that adultery does have its victim – the cheated partner – but the West does not punish adultery with death as the East does. The main argument against punishing adulterers with jail is that it becomes hard to exact punishment on a guilty party – the cheated partner is hurt and the contract of marriage betrayed, but who is to be punished? Both adulterers? If only one is married, then only the married adulterer? Who seduced whom, who is guilty of what act? As such, concerning matters like adultery, the practice can be discouraged to preserve the sanctity and importance of the married unit by treating it as an immediate annulment of marriage, since the adulterers have proven themselves unable of maintaining their marital oaths. If a couple affected by adultery wishes to give their

relationship 'a second chance', marriage vows should have to be performed again to reinforce the value of the bond of marriage between individuals. Crimes like adultery have victims, and should be treated as crime, but are not serious enough to warrant harsher punishment than the removal of certain privileges afforded by marriage. Harmful drug possession may fall within this category as well, since drug use can urge individuals towards crime, and it causes long-term damage to the mind of the individual, though it is hard to predict the effects of illegal narcotics. Often the best response to addicts is that of a mental rehabilitation centre rather than a criminal one, though society has an interest in allowing its citizens the full freedom of mind, and therefore ought to restrict drugs which have been proven to cause large amounts of mental damage even with moderate to small usage (unlike, say, alcohol).

The next crime for consideration is the forgery of coins or creation of false money. The creation of false money is not the most serious of crimes, but in the interests of maintaining an economic system in which the people of the nation have trust, alternative forms of currency must be outlawed. Alternatively, greedy individuals may have the capacity to deceive others by creating great amounts of wealth for themselves in printing or minting false money and therefore depriving others of the right to wealth which they legitimately inherited or earned. The confiscation and destruction of such wealth by the state is absolutely necessary, and perpetrators ought to serve time with a brief suspension of rights as punishment, during which time they ought to be educated in the reasoning behind currency and money, that wealth must be earned by honest means before it can be passed on. In a time when the underpinnings for a cashless society are already being put in place, future governments must consider what can be done in the world of technology to keep track of hackers and internet-based criminals who may create false wealth for themselves by abusing online banking and financial systems.

Crimes against the person derived from wrathful greed or merely wrath, such as robbery, assault and offences against public order, are the next which we shall rank in terms of severity. These crimes are derived from a concern only for the self and harm the integrity of others, both in terms of physicality and property. This is also the first tier of crimes at which we must consider the question of re-offence. It seems quite clear that certain criminals, despite the best efforts of society to re-educate and reintegrate them, are naturally disposed to commit further crime. How many times ought we to allow a criminal to be rehabilitated after he has re-offended, before we give up on him? If a criminal re-offends after extensive rehabilitation, we must assume one of the two following situations are true: either his mental attitude has not changed and rehabilitation has failed, causing the individual to be naturally inclined towards criminal acts; or the individual's personal economic circumstances are such that crime such as theft was his only means of surviving. The latter is a governmental failure, the former a failure of nature. In the case of the former, we must assume that the criminal is beyond rehabilitation, and his punishment should be more severe than the first offence, with rights removed from him indefinitely as a non-functional member of society. In terms of punishing situational offenders under this system, we may see it as an unfortunate consequence, but a wholly necessary one: examples must be made of criminals under the law, and whilst such situational punishments may urge the government to change their policy to aid their citizens more effectively, it is not right to excuse individuals of criminal behaviour merely due to the fact, say, that they had no money to pay for food.

Fraudulent behaviour must be considered the next most severe, since it is founded on betraying the trust of individuals, which is not merely selfish and harmful, but a threat to the integrity of a whole community, be it local, national or merely financial. Individuals may be affected by fraud, but its implications are societal. Fraud is a form of theft, but far more complex, based around corrupting and exploiting

the human capacity for association and support of each other within a community. Defrauding individual out of money by any means is a menace to communitarian values, and by that logic ought to be punished harshly with longer sentences and fines.

Above fraud, we may place murder and crimes of unnatural violence such as rape. Both are violations of the body, but in an even more unnatural sense than an attack upon the corporeal human existence. Removing life is the ultimate sin, and in some cases renders the life of the criminal forfeit; if he is threatening to murder others, a shot to kill may be necessary to save lives. Otherwise life detention should be considered after proper legal conduct has been undertaken. The same applies to rape (under which we include similar immoral acts against minors), since whilst it is not necessarily fatal, the sanctity of sexual union reserved for love has been exploited for the selfish desires of the individual, and indeed some rapes lead to the procreation of children, which can only ever be evil in the context of such criminality, since it forces life into the world outside the context of love, and perhaps outside the capacity of a mother to raise the child. This makes it a crime against life as well, for even if a child is not conceived, the risk is ever-present, and the right to free choice of sexual activity remains paramount.

The most heinous crime, however, we shall set to be treason. Treason is the most heinous fraud and deception, since it is not only a betrayal of the nation to which citizens are obliged to be loyal, but it also has the potential to cause a great deal of loss of life by the betrayal of information or furnishing of means of destruction (which includes service as an enemy soldier) to enemies who may hope for an opportunity to destroy the people of the nation. Treason is therefore a threat to the entire national community. Treason is perhaps the only crime for which we might be sympathetic towards the death penalty; however, even the ancient Romans, whose legal system exacted much harsher punishments than we are proposing on criminals, did not

always execute traitors. The option of exile is often overlooked or not practiced in modern times, though transportation for guarded accommodation in an outpost of the state, or pure refusal of entry into any territory held by the nation is a viable option for traitors. Exile does not involve having to execute the guilty and thereby remove sacred life from them but is a formal expression that the guilty is no longer a member of, and no longer welcome in, the society which he once belonged to. Having proven himself a dangerous enemy to his own people, the traitor is to be cast out.

Some may object to such punishment on the grounds of human rights, but as we have previously discovered, each nation has the right to set its own punishment. Banishment like this allows a guilty party the full right to further life, simply not in the confines of the national community that was betrayed. It is therefore an effective method of protecting a community from its enemies, in the same way that an enemy to a local community, such as an assailant, is exiled to a prison where he may not harm that community. The only difference is that it is not safe or trustworthy to try and rehabilitate a traitor.

Such is the hierarchy of crime and punishment.

## CHAPTER V

# The Path to Anarchy

**T**HERE ARE MANY THINGS in the world which the human race takes a natural dislike to. It is only right that certain things disgust us, lest we lead ourselves hopelessly into disease, unnecessary warfare and general destruction. The definition of criminality is one of the things which has arisen out of the human tendency to be disgusted. One need only look at the punishments offered to criminals and sinners in the past to see these levels of human disgust. What many of us now fear as 'barbaric' was once seen as justice: the burning of heretics alive, the hanging of traitors and removing them just on the brink of death, before removing their entrails and dismembering their body in front of a public audience. The very idea of witnessing such spectacles, once used to demonstrate the importance of justice and obedience before the community, disgusts many of us today. By no means should these sorts of punishments be brought back, but criminal justice, this history can teach us, relies as much on social attitude as it does on the enforcement of the law itself. We have mentioned before that if a community-based vision of law enforcement is to be realised within societies, then the commonwealth, the universal good of the community, must be recognised within the minds of individuals.

In the modern age, we have seen communities, particularly European communities of indigenous heritage, become disgusted at one another. When we discussed the practicality of constitutions and political justice within a broader national political system, we concluded that the 'spirit of the nation', embodied in certain values and inalienable rights, must be represented by the government of the nation, whilst being not only respected by the population, but being founded in deep-seated national belief. With the onslaught of

multiculturalism and attempts to create a nation of 'humanity' as a whole rather than nations of distinct culture, conflicts have arisen, and the vision of constitutional government founded on common values is dying. The loss of our values and the readiness of Western European citizens to turn on each other and become disgusted by each other's perceived 'intolerance' or 'self-hatred', respectively, have a powerful impact on law enforcement. If we become unaccustomed to be disgusted at criminal activity, then humankind will become disgusted by the punishment of criminal activity.

First, it was deemed disgusting to punish with fire, and so nations ceased to burn at the stake. Then it was deemed disgusting to behead criminals, so we hung them. Then it was disgusting to do so publicly, so executions took place in specially designated areas. Then it was disgusting to hang people, so we decided to only lock them up in jail. Now it is becoming disgusting to lock people up, so we are reducing the sentences of criminals. It is also becoming disgusting to deny criminals their rights as punishment for their crimes, so some nations are considering handing them the vote, and many continental European countries already allow criminals participation in the franchise. We see a trend here, where humanity increasingly seems to feel the need to find something to be outraged at, something to dislike about the treatment of other human beings. Rather than being disgusted by the criminal activity that damages our communities and nations, we are becoming disgusted by our own treatment of those who do not deserve as much respect as we seem to afford them.

If we look at African nations, harsh punishment for crime remains very high. In the Orient too: India, China and Japan all retain the death penalty and harsh sentences for criminal behaviour. If we value the sanctity of life, then the death penalty ought to be avoided (the author himself cannot bring himself to condone it) but its absence marks a distinct line between the Western World and the other nations of Earth. The peoples of Europe have had life a lot easier than say,

Africans have in the past 60 years or so. Economically the peoples of Europe have flourished and have suffered from relatively little corruption in comparison to other continents. It is perhaps not surprising then that Europeans and Americans are more willing to turn on one another, since life has become so easy that there is no need for them to unite. If they were to realise, however, that this division within their own culture was paving the path to the downfall of Western civilisation, then perhaps they would see a reason to unite behind their historical values once again.

Eyes are often rolled when conservatives complain about the downfall of Western civilisation and the threat of anarchy that seems set to replace it. Some even embrace the prospect of an anarchic future. What do we mean when we talk about a loss of identity and the loss of the rule of law that follows? When identity is lost, common conceptions of morality are lost with it. Given the differences between cultures, what is considered right and wrong between each culture also differs. We have already spent parts of this work criticising certain cultural practices surrounding Islam, but for many people who live in Islamic countries these laws and customs make perfect sense. By mixing these peoples together with non-Islamic ones, struggles are sure to emerge. It has proved hard enough trying to mix the European peoples together in a federalised state represented by the European Union, with a European Parliament completely failing to achieve the goals of accountability and representation which it claims to. It has been proposed by some, and it is a movement gathering support gradually, to create a United Nations Parliament, and this has been supported by various trans-national associations and Supreme Court judges over the years.<sup>43</sup>

The coalescence of different human cultures in a single utopian government is simply incompatible with the human tendency to enforce individual cultural worldviews within their own demarcated territory. When we imagine a future where world government is a very

real possibility, with free movement across the world between cultures and nations, anarchy is the only conceivable result. This is not the anarchy that Godwin and Marx promised would allow humankind to flourish. Unlike what the radical thinkers of the past and present believe, the natural state of man is not and has never been equality. Humankind living together with cultural or national boundaries will not be the harmonious rational community of co-existence that is promised. Humankind is suspicious of itself, and for good reason — for the survival of its civilisations. Western civilisation has offered the world a great deal in terms of science, philosophy and civil rights; to argue otherwise is to misrepresent the facts. I know of no books to have come out of sub-Saharan Africa before colonisation. Europe is already starting to see the results of cultural miscegenation in the name of diversity: In Germany, police forces are deployed to support women only after they have been raped, not to stop rapes themselves, and cases of large amounts of abuses from supposed ‘refugees’ are not reported on the national media for being too ‘localised’ — such as the case of Maria Ladenburger, the 19-year-old daughter of an EU official and refugee activist who was raped and murdered by the very people she was trying to help. In Italy, property is being confiscated by the state without the owners’ consent, in order to be used as accommodation for migrants — such as the case of Luigi Fogli from Veneto, Northern Italy, whose hotel was confiscated by the local government against his will after he refused to host migrants voluntarily. Every pillar of our society — the right to protection under the law, liberty and property — is being torn down in the name of ‘tolerance’ and ‘acceptance’.

As these rights and laws are eliminated to accommodate a destructive agenda, so too do the societies which are supposed to be protected by the forces of criminal justice break down. Anarchy does not rely upon intellectual improvement and the harmonious individual will to cooperate. Cooperation relies on cultural coherence, shared values and history. Anarchy relies solely on the destruction of rights,

the destruction of the rule of law and ultimately the destruction of civilisation itself. Whether or not they believed they were doing so, this is what Godwin, Marx and their interpreters on the far left who have infiltrated so many parts of modern life, have advocated, and are continuing to implement in our societies today. If we want to think seriously about the maintenance of criminal justice in our societies, we must stop being disgusted by our own people and begin rebuilding the rights which our ancestors procured for us. If this does not take place, then modern Western civilisation, like the other civilisations which came before it, will crumble into the dust to be studied by future students of history, rather than being the shaper of that future itself.

The path to anarchy is laid before us, but there is still the option to choose a different path.

## CHAPTER VI

# Evidence

**I**N THE CONCLUDING chapters of this division we shall briefly consider the practice of law itself, criminal trials and the actions of the judicial post-trial. The practice of law itself is an empirical one, for it shares many of its practical tenets with science. Conviction relies upon scientific evidence conducted by experts, supported by witnesses who provide reports of the crime committed. In Godwin's text, he dismisses the idea of using evidence to justify coercion of individuals into obedience of the state's laws, but in a modern context, Godwin's criticism of evidence can point us towards a much more pressing problem of the modern age.

It is precisely because witnesses are not always the most reliable source of evidence that physical and empirical evidence has been increasingly adopted today. However, for the political left, in order that they might continue their criticism of evidence and legal logic, a new form of discourse has arisen: that of emotions. Facts and reason serve no purpose, neither in political discourse nor in legal discourse, in the face of the left's obsession with 'feelings'. It is the disdain for instinctive feelings that has allowed the law and rational human preconceptions of justice to stand for so long in the past — mob rule has always been considered unsavoury, because the anger of a few hundred people who feel wronged does not necessarily mean that what they feel wronged about is inherently wrong. The left uses these tactics increasingly in order to attack their political opponents. A judge in Providence, Rhode Island achieved internet fame for dismissing a parking fine after a woman wept before him that she was having 'a really tough time'.<sup>44</sup> Meanwhile on University campuses, conservative speakers are refused a platform by students for creating 'harmful environments' and making students feel 'unsafe'.<sup>45</sup>

Crocodile tears can never be believed, and the facts must be accessed before any judge, be it an independent citizen exercising political judgement or perhaps more importantly a judge of the law who makes a decision on any case. As irrationality and appeals to emotion begin to overtake reason, criminal justice, and therefore the integrity of the national community, is starting to come under threat. Previously, such tactics were only reserved for the political sphere, but as they enter the judicial one, the importance of empirical practice and the quest for the truth by legal evidence is more important than ever.

Emotions exist for a reason, to indicate to others our feelings and to allow for sympathy and comfort, but they can also be exploited for malicious ends, and in the prosecution of crime where individuals may have an interest in exploiting the emotions of the judge or jury, this must not be forgotten. Emotion has no place in the courtroom — only reason.

## CHAPTER VII

# The Institutions of Law

**L**AW MAY BE EMPIRICAL, but in the conduct of trials there are more issues to consider than the question of evidence. The size and makeup of juries, the selection of judges and the structure of courts to facilitate appeal are just as crucial to a just system as the attitude of the judiciary towards criminals themselves. Legal proceedings, after all, are an institutionalised practice derived from centuries of development and trial. In considering the proper conduct and structure of legal institutions, we must therefore take an informed view of both Man and the rationale behind the first legal institutions of history.

When law becomes institutionalised, volumes of statutes and edicts become piled up over time. To walk into a law library at a British University alone is to see volumes of hundreds of pages, each dating back as far as the 18<sup>th</sup> century, containing the legal cases from each year. The purpose of such institutionalisation and the diligent maintenance of records is not for the sake of piling up a historical legal system which is impossible to manage, but rather for the sake of interpretation. Students of law are often forced to review the history of law as much as the state of present legislation. The school of jurisprudence itself, which centres on ethical interpretation of the law, is divided over the origination and authority of law, but based on our categorisation of society as communitarian, and criminality as an expression of violence against the community, the German Historical School of law has the most to teach us about the institution of law itself. The German School tends to place the most weight on society, and the German jurist Friedrich Savigny, in his refutation of the utilitarian jurists like Bentham, *The Vocation of Our Age*, argued that it was impossible for a nation to have any law imposed upon it without

that law first being informed by the history and development of a particular civilisation. Roman law, for instance, which punished certain acts deemed immoral with ‘civil death’<sup>46</sup> (that is to say, the denial of the right to own property or participate in democratic bodies) was fundamentally influenced by the fear of tyranny, the idea of corrupt men holding supreme power. Even under the emperors, many of whom could be described as tyrants, this attitude did not abate, at least officially. Each civilisation has its own aims and designs in the implementation of law.

In the English tradition, which extols the right to be tried by one’s peers, i.e. juries, the judgement of private citizens is considered to be the most objective in considering the matter of guilt versus innocence. However, when we consider what the term ‘peers’ we must ask ourselves what a peer is. A peer is ostensibly an equal, but we have already concluded that society is not equal. In the British House of Lords, members are known as peers, since all lords are ‘peers of the realm’, that is to say, each lord has similar authority and are part of the nobility together, but that does not mean that they are equal to a citizen who is not a lord. In the Magna Carta of British history, which was formulated by Barons in an attempt to restrict the powers of their corrupt King John, the first cited right to trial by jury is recorded in the English Common Law tradition. But these Barons never would have wished to be tried by citizens who were not themselves Barons of the Kingdom of England. When they wrote of ‘peers’, they wrote of their fellow class. There is good reason why a man should be tried by a jury of his peers rather than a hodgepodge of any and all citizens of the nation. If we take the juries of ancient Athens as an example, which numbered some 500 men chosen by lot, such bodies were easily open to persuasion, and could easily condemn men who they disliked on social, intellectual or economic grounds. The case of Socrates is a great one; he was condemned to death on very little reason other than that the jurors disliked him.

If we use the case of a member of the aristocracy being put on trial as an example, then we can see the value of genuine peer trial. If other members of the aristocracy were to try their fellow Baron, chosen as custom dictates by lot, then the chance of a jury of aristocrats who all knew and were sympathetic to their fellow Baron would be low. Also, since aristocracy would, in our previously conceived state, be an institution of great virtue, it would surely disgust any right-thinking man raised to the aristocracy to hear of evidence condemning a fellow Baron to the level of criminal. Since aristocrats have a moral duty to their country and to themselves, it would be in their best interests to ascertain whether or not their fellow is guilty, and to condemn him and remove him from their ranks if indeed he was. At the same time, they are free from the influence of jealousy of position by nature of the fact that they are Barons themselves. If men are to be tried by their peers, then they must be tried by their true peers — for not all men are equal, and it is therefore unjust to try a man with men and women who are not his peers.

Regarding the potential corruption of judges and lawyers, the matter of advocacy cannot ever be conceived perfectly. It is only right that citizens should have access to legal advocates, and many nations have legal aid programmes to assist in this, though their reduction and abolition by some states in recent years can only go to prove the decline in the value of the science of law that modern societies are facing. The purpose of the advocate is to persuade, by oratory and evidence, of the guilt or innocence of his client. Legal proceedings are therefore, in effect, the best of both science and the subjective nature of political opinion. It balances the value of discourse on opinion on one hand with the irrefutable empirical science of evidence on the other hand, and with such closely and imperatively informed species of debate being used in the courtroom, it has the greatest capacity for truth of all the human exercises in discourse. Lawyers have no need to be corrupt, since it is in their interest to win cases, be it for a private individual or for the public; for lawyers operate in the manner of a

private business and require a certain reputation in order to continue a successful career in advocacy. Corruption cannot be achieved by currency, since the lawyer knows that he will receive payment no matter who he works for, but there is potential for blackmail. It is to avoid the blackmail of lawyers into presenting poor prosecution or defence cases that certain legal gags on revealing information about ongoing cases exist, but with the introduction of cameras into courtrooms the potential for blackmail is again rearing its head. Those witnessing court proceedings must abide by the court's rules regarding the information made available to the public, for unlike a parliament, a courtroom is much more sensitive and empirical. The opinions of those not associated with a legal case matter little, and the pressure of the public outside a case is best done without. The courtroom is not a television show, and the judge is there to provide his experienced judgement independently of pressure.

The selection and empowerment of judges ought to be in keeping with the other principles of society that we have laid out; that is to say, they should be hierarchical. Judges are often former lawyers, but they should be selected from lawyers who have proven themselves to have tried a variety of cases and have consistently and successfully found the truth in all manner of such cases. If virtue is the cause for hierarchy, then virtue and truth should be the requirements for legal hierarchy as well, especially with regards to the successful protection of the national community. These judges in turn, who would start out as district judges, through experience and proof of ability for consistent sentencing, may rise to higher positions in the Appeal Court and Supreme Court, or whatever national equivalent might exist in each nation, based on its legal traditions.

Ultimately, the appointment of judges should function in a similar way to the appointment of aristocracy, especially if the highest-ranking judges are to be given a seat in the upper chamber of parliament for the purposes of adding expert legal opinion to public discourse. Virtue,

experience and contribution to the national community and safety of the people are paramount in the conduct of law, as in other areas of society. Institutions, such as the aristocracy, judiciary and their associates, can act for the most part as self-regulating bodies so long as those who are raised into their upper echelons have an interest in maintaining standards, and following a set of professional regulations which define the integrity and reliability of each institution. When corrupt individuals do work their way into the system, proper means ought to be in place to remove them, if, in keeping with the legal profession's empiricism, they can be proven to be a burden or threat to the community. Intra-legal policing is not just something to be conducted in wider society, but within institutions, especially the legal institutions of government, given their importance in protecting the rights and freedoms of the people which they exist to serve.

## CHAPTER VIII

# Pardons

**W**E SHALL FINALLY briefly consider whether pardons, reprieves and commutations have any role to play in the conduct of law.

It seems reasonable that the potential for clemency should not exist, and to bestow the power of pardon or remission onto any member of any political institution is both unnecessary and potentially tyrannical. Granting the power of pardon undermines the judiciary, since it assumes that the judiciary may not always do a good enough job, and another individual (often not associated with the judicial branch of government) has greater knowledge of judicial understanding. It also goes without saying that pardons and remissions may be used by the individual with that power to show favour to certain individuals or groups. It is open to corrupt influence and false representation by individuals or the populace at large.

The sentencing of criminals is placed in the hands of the judicial branch of government in order to prevent the other branches of government from showing favour. To allow a President or King the overarching power of pardon is to defeat that point. If an individual is not happy with the sentence of a judge, an appeals process within the judicial system exists for that reason. However, appeals exist for the purpose of ensuring that the human capacity for error is removed as far as possible, not to empower the criminal. Evidence not taken into account or a lapse of reason from a district or High Court judge may be considered by appeal to supreme judges, who amend sentences accordingly in line with their own experience. In cases where new evidence comes to light demonstrating a convicted man's innocence, then the judicial system usually allows the victim of miscarriage of justice to be freed. There is no reason why any institution or individual other than those within the judicial system should have any control of

sentencing or remissions whatsoever. It is a ridiculous notion.

With regard to posthumous pardons for those condemned for crimes which a later society considers no longer worthy of punishment, these are equally ridiculous. Whether or not societal attitudes have changed, we must appreciate the historical context in which certain actions were deemed vicious and criminal. So for instance, whilst it may seem popular to grant Oscar Wilde a pardon for his crimes of indecency in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, such acts were considered abhorrent and immoral to the vast majority of the population at the time, and the context of the time deemed people like Wilde to be a threat to the community. Just because he would not be viewed so today by many people does not mean that his imprisonment should also be considered wrong in the context in which he was condemned. Therefore, posthumous pardons are mostly tokenistic and favourable to interest groups. They have no practical or moral purpose whatsoever.

Considering pardons when faced with the overthrow of a tyrannical regime, pardon is not the correct term here either. When political prisoners of an oppressive regime are freed, and that regime is replaced with a new form of government, the acts, laws and edicts of that tyrannical regime are rendered null and void. The system of government in transition from tyranny to benevolent government is not consistent, and since there is no consistency between the two governments, the two governments are therefore not the same. The benevolent government cannot take responsibility for the actions of the tyrannical one, since it does not persecute political opinions. Therefore, political prisoners and other such persecuted individuals should regain their freedom, but this is not pardon – it is merely the logical restoration of rights which were removed by the destructive forces of evil.

We can therefore safely conclude that in a state which balances the power of government and people, and ensures that certain rights are maintained, pardons are neither necessary nor are they practical, and

serve only to undermine the rights and protections which a completely libertarian society deserves and needs for its survival.

BOOK VI.  
**PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY**

## CHAPTER I

# Introduction

**I**N THIS FINAL, and perhaps most adventurous division of our enquiry, we shall consider the question of property, specifically the difference between equal property or lack of property, and private property. The defence of private property is a path well-trodden by conservatives and classical liberals alike, so what we shall not be endeavouring to do is parrot those same facts and logical deductions which have already been made time and time again by those before us. Chances are that those reading this are already well acquainted with the arguments in favour of private property, and do not need re-educating in those arguments. In this new technological age, the nature of income and property are set to change, and the ability of the people of the world to prevent this is not likely to be as great as some conservatives would hope. In confronting technology and what it means for our rights and property, we must put aside the kneejerk Luddite reactions which disdain technological advancement, and instead ask: Can technology really do good? If yes, how so? If not, how can evil be prevented?

It is absolutely imperative that any future relationship between technology and property is not used by future governments to enforce false notions of equality. A technological future must retain the fundamental tenets of free societies, as part of which we mean the existence of wealth inequality. Before we can consider the impact of technology on property, however, it is worth making a few fundamental principles about property in a free society very clear, and putting the more traditional radical leftist, or Marxist conceptions of property into perspective in order to allow for a better understanding of how technology could be used to bring about a socialist dystopia.

In delineating a 'genuine system of property', radical thinkers like

Godwin envisaged a future in which human generosity and kindness was viewed as a natural extension of moral law. That is to say, whether or not I give a loaf of bread in my possession to a poor man who needs it more than me is not a question of personal choice, but a moral imperative which every citizen within his means ought to do without question. The creation of such a society in both Godwin's utopian future, and Marx's communist future relied upon a great deal of change in education and social attitude. Indeed, the concept of economic collectivism is seen as early as Plato, who famously advocated the common ownership not only of property but also of wives and children in his *Republic*.

The intellectual and moral 'improvements' believed to lead to the equality of property thought to be just by Plato, the natural result of intellectual evolution by Godwin, and the moral purpose of government by Marx, are not merely unnatural but impossible to achieve within the realistic possibilities of human improvement. Whilst we have asserted previously in our discussion that perpetual self-improvement is a reality within and remains the goal of human life, it is arguably not an improvement to bring about equality. For the purposes of our discussion henceforth, we shall therefore assume that the age-old mantra of equality being 'attractive on paper but impractical in practice' is in fact false. What should be said about equality and ideologies that advocate it is that it is 'unattractive on paper and impractical in practice'. As long ago as the publication of Thomas Moore's *Utopia*, systems of common ownership have been satirised. The mere fact that many are beginning to become more attracted to the idea of equal property is no reason to believe that this time around it 'might just work...'

# Property and Income

**A**T LEAST IN TERMS OF LEGAL STATUS, property exists as a thing-in-itself and requires no subjective value, since one object legally owned by one man does not need the experience of another man to prove that he owns it; the mere fact that a transaction or construction has occurred is enough. When political philosophers discuss property, often they do so through the means of *capital*, which is a subset of, but distinct in some ways from property as a whole. In our discussion we shall assume that capital, or the means of production and transaction, is represented within the general scope of 'property' as a comprehensive concept. Property itself relies on exactly that, however: transaction, before it can properly become the property of an individual. For the buyer, property is that which legally becomes 'his own' once he has purchased it up until the point that he sells it on to another individual; for the craftsman, the creation of a piece of work is his until he sells it, but a transaction must have had to be made in order for the craftsman to obtain the materials with which he constructed his work. Property therefore, in a general sense, relies upon transaction, and transaction relies upon the existence of money. When considering the nature and use of property, we must therefore also include money, and the money that almost every member of society receives: income.

Today, the classical qualification of property is hard to apply to the nature of modern states, especially in Europe. Many governments with social programmes own a great deal of property and lend it out to their citizens (and in an increasingly large number of cases, non-citizens) out of the notion that every human being has the right to housing. Who can we truly say owns houses like these? Legally speaking, it is the government, but if one asked the inhabitant of a council home in

Britain whose house one would surely hear the answer 'mine'. The reality of course is that free societies should allow their citizens the right to own a house, but this does not make those citizens automatically entitled to the ownership of a house. The system in place in many Western countries today deludes the home 'owner' into believing that the house lent to him by the government is his own, whilst in reality the government would have the right to turn them out in an instant, and whilst this would surely cause great uproar, such discontent only derives from the now deeply-ingrained belief that it is a 'human right' to have somewhere one is guaranteed to live. It is not a human right, though perhaps it can be justified as a moral right.

Now of course governments have a certain moral duty towards their citizens. For many governments however, this moral duty has blown out of proportion into some of the most crippling welfare state programmes ever seen. Moral duty has extended to paying those out of work, many of whom do not actively seek the employment they lack. Meanwhile, properties are found to house asylum seekers from foreign countries whilst the indigenous citizens of the nation are left homeless on the streets. In England, the number of homeless are thought to be somewhere in the region of a quarter of a million of which 64% are estimated to be white and of British descent.<sup>47</sup> In the case of say, the beggar we considered in Book II, it is the purpose firstly of charity to support him, and secondly in the case of dire needs, the state may justify a temporary lodging for him for a short amount of time, from a small amount of property that the state may purchase in accordance with other market regulations, during which time the beggar may endeavour to find the means of working for the money which will permit him to find his own property. A moral safety-net on a small scale is permissible, but not as a system which accommodates every single citizen, should the whole nation require the assistance of the state.

With the advance of technology, however, we may soon see a

situation where there is no choice for the state but to provide for almost every one of its people. Recent decades have seen a great deal of automation, with many assembly lines and warehouses being managed by robotic automata. Driverless cars and trains are now in the running for future implementation, and eventually we may see a future where all remaining manual labour will pass to the concern of automata as well. If this is the case, then vast swathes of the population of future nations will have no opportunity to work according to their skill set at all. The governments of the world will have no choice but to offer their citizens an income for no labour, lest they face mass starvation and the complete breakdown of the economic system of transactions. This solution has already been proposed in the form of a Universal Basic Income (UBI), which was rejected (23.1% for/76.9% against) by the Swiss in a 2016 referendum on the issue. Despite the initial disdain of some, it is a very real possibility, with socialist parties in Europe preparing to give it proper consideration. The only people with a potential for work in an automated future will surely be the builders of robots, the engineers who maintain them, and those who wish to pursue artistic careers which rely on the free human consciousness rather than a programmed one.

We are faced with two potential solutions to the problem of automation and UBI. Either the automation of labour and replacement of human workers with automata is to be opposed on account of the future that it offers; or an automated future is to be seen as inevitable and practical solutions to the potential problems with UBI must be found.

It seems to be naturally morally detestable to contend that any individual should be handed money for not doing anything constructive. UBI itself is a proposal steeped in uncertainty: Is it literally to be a basic income where individuals are permitted to earn more on top? Are individuals receiving other forms of income to be barred from receiving UBI? Is UBI to be set at a flat rate, or levelled?

One thing is for certain, that the vast majority of recipients of a future UBI scheme will most certainly receive the same flat rate, with only those with skills which can survive the technological age having the capacity to earn more. We may well see the rise of a new form of elite, a technological elite.

Meanwhile, the political advocates of UBI claim that the downfall of traditional labour-based economics will allow the people of the world, who of course would now have copious amounts of free time, to spend their money on education or on philosophical or other pursuits which would lead to great self-improvement. It would further allow disciplines previously off-limits to the underclasses to be enjoyed by all. This, however, relies upon a number of unrealistic assumptions: To look at our world today is to see human life defined by self-gratification. The ordinary man has always been primarily concerned with his own ends, but in the past this meant finding the next coin with which to pay for his family's food, to provide for a wife and children, to live and get by, not to find his next fix of drugs, or to await the next night visiting a club, becoming intoxicated and bedding the next unfortunate victim of his debased sexual appetite. In a world so morally corrupt, is it reasonable to assume that the people endowed with money for nothing will spend it on things which will improve them? Will they not spend it on alcoholic drinks? On drugs which many countries now seem to be inclined to legalise? On whores and gambling?

This system degenerates rapidly into the physical manifestation of Oceania in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In the name of equality and the universal right to life, wealth and property, a new class system arises based not on virtue but control. An underclass of proletarians placated by their new free income will develop faceless and emotionless lives, only awaiting their next fix of the elixir of self-gratification. Meanwhile the party in control of the nations will cream the benefits of this new society, most likely formed of those interest

groups which construct the new automata, which in turn mostly likely will not be limited to the world of work, but law enforcement as well, as a breed (if this is the right term) of faster and stronger robotic androids bend the population to the will of their new tyrants. Godwin may have dreamed of a future where equal property and the lack of organised institutions allowed for the intellectual improvement of all men, but the reality is much darker. A modern Gothic dystopia, with metal Frankenstein's monsters roaming the Earth and checking every house is a very real vision of a future defined by equal income and equal property.

What is the solution? Let us assume that the automation of the economy is inevitable, and no matter how much resistance is offered, UBI is implemented and much of the population lacks traditional employment. If an intellectual future is to be realised then social attitudes towards education must change towards one of value rather than disdain. If virtue is to remain the principal goal of every society, then finding methods of using the technological age for the purposes of that virtue is a categorical imperative. Man remains unequal at his base level, no matter what might be espoused by government concerning equality. What can be done? The most important thing to encourage in the technological future will most certainly be attitude, specifically, the attitude of aspiration. Even if the technological world develops into a world government with a single human empire as its goal, then that goal of higher achievement, for virtue and moral greatness extolled in the epics of antiquity and the poetic *Eddas* of the Nordic Dark Age must be rediscovered by the people of Earth. The Nirvana of the Buddha, the Lord of Logic that is respected by Zoroastrians, and all the higher powers of Indo-European spirituality must be extolled, and technology seen as the natural result of centuries of human improvement.

Perhaps, in this society of alternative values and a worldview based on spiritual heritage, even if a significant number of people remain

only interested in their own affairs, a larger number still will aspire to be the spacemen of the future. As it seems clear that a technological age will seek to explore space and colonise whole new planets and galaxies, some may dream and finally realise this goal. Other men of good moral character may seek to design and regulate the use of robots of humanitarian and life-affirming roles. The principles of aristocracy, kingship, limited democracy and the privilege of virtue need not die merely because technology changes, but they may need to be adapted to accommodate new conceptions of what is 'virtuous conduct' in an age of technology. The future is not inescapably bleak, but we stand at a crossroads of human history, and the choice between allowing technology to consume our souls or raise them up to higher planes of existence is already one which many of us are beginning to decide upon.

'Equality' and 'fairness' will be the watchwords of the future. When these words are used it will be the rallying cry of those who wish to destroy human aspiration and the spirit of progress which has driven us on to so many great things already. A practical economic and spiritual future is founded in the debate about property and income which conservatives, liberals and socialists alike will be facing in the coming decades.

## CHAPTER III

# Luxury and Poverty

**W**E WILL NOW CONSIDER a few practical elements of the theory of wealth equality. When society permits the accumulation of private fortune and property, or more specifically when inequality is permitted, a distinction will always arise between those with a great deal more wealth than others, and those with next to nothing. The question of luxury versus poverty, whether they are opposed, whether one relies upon the other and whether those in poverty have a right to luxury has always been controversial.

The image of those with luxury stamping in the faces of those in poverty often conjured up by Marxists and economic egalitarians is a disgusting one, and it is of course immoral for any man to deliberately oppress another for his own ends. The moral question, however, resides in whether or not the man living in luxury oppresses the man in poverty by the very reason that he lives in luxury. In one sense, liberty affords men the right to own more property than others, and philosophers such as Godwin who disdain luxury but claim to love liberty seem to be somewhat in conflict with themselves, seeing as we cannot both have our cake and eat it. Once again, the question of what is 'moral' for men to do once they have that property is another question, it is a matter of attitude. It is natural for men to be unequal, but it is against the spirit of self-improvement for men with more property to be boastful, to gloat and to use their wealth to prevent others from aspiring to the same position as them.

The true moral problem of our age — the problem of what those in the lap of luxury could be doing for others — is being lost in the face of non-issues such as the gender pay gap. Many feminists complain of the recent study which found that for every \$1 a man makes, a woman only makes 78 cents. It may seem callous to say that the answer is to work

for an extra 22 cents, but fundamentally this idea is founded in logic. Women have the full right to earn the same as men; whether or not they earn the exact same amount as men is fairly irrelevant, since much of this is a question of circumstance. On average, women tend to earn 22 cents less than men, but this means absolutely nothing about whether or not women *could* earn an even more similar amount to men if their circumstances were different. These circumstances have nothing to do with patriarchy, and everything to do with biological and aspirational differences between men and women. Ultimately, the point we are making is this: that it is a non-issue, it is not a situation involving any poverty at all, but rather only the envy of a specific group of people.

There is an important distinction to be made between the envy of those who do not have the same wealth as those in luxury and those who are living in genuine poverty and are struggling to survive. In the case of these latter individuals, the concern of good-hearted men should be thrust upon them, and a virtuous society would have the means and individuals within it to help those in poverty through the most difficult of times. The opinions and bitter whinings of the envious, however, ought to be spurned. The question 'Do they have the means to live?' is a good first litmus test. Luxury is a right, but poverty is often an unfortunate turn of circumstance. Those between luxury and poverty are making their way towards luxury, but have no right to automatically advance, by the aid of the state or any other institution public or private, to luxury any faster purely because they are unhappy with the fact that another man has already attained greater wealth and property than they have.

## CHAPTER IV

# Sloth

**W**E HAVE DISCUSSED aspiration as the driver of progress in society at great length, and the existence of inequality has been judged to be part of the means of encourage aspiration among the general population of a society. However, when considering a future where property, or at least the means of obtaining property, is equalised, we must also consider whether blights such as sloth could easily take hold of the population and grind further attempts at human self-improvement to a halt.

In Chapter II we considered a future where the population spent its UBI on self-gratifying things, with no vision for their future or their children, living from one moment to the next and wallowing in the most detestable forms of debauchery. Let us imagine, however, that the future is not as debauched as this potentiality makes out. Let us imagine that individuals do indeed spend their money and use their property purely for the purposes of maintaining their families, sending children to school, paying for food et cetera. Even if this were the case, the parents of families would still have no job to go to during the day and would retain the free time they would have had regardless of what they spent their money on. Either the people would spend their money on practical things, perhaps constructing things, attending a University or lecture of some sort, educating themselves or pursuing artistic careers; or they might simply sit at home and indulge their sloth.

In the French economist Frédéric Bastiat's essay *Justice and Fraternity*, he argued that government ought to be limited to its 'essential functions':

[its essential functions are] to guarantee the security of people and property, to prevent and repress violence and disorder, to ensure for all the free exercise of their faculties and the proper reward for their efforts.

Government, however, cannot ensure for all the proper reward for their efforts when there is no effort involved. Even if a workless future was used as an opportunity for more time with the family, it would still be a workless future, with citizens offering no practical benefit to society. Labour as an action is a form of wealth creation, since the labourer not merely procures wealth for himself in terms of wages, but for the economy as a whole by his labour, creating some intellectual, financial or physical material. No matter how much we might be inclined to dream of a more intellectual future, the reality (due to the natural inequality of mankind) is that there will still be relatively few, even when people have more free time, who have an interest in intellectual pursuits. Fewer still will have artistic talents, and the option of an artistic career will be closed to many. Individuals in this future society will therefore either indulge in debauchery or in sloth.

A lack of aspiration among the people of society will leave nothing but these two options. In tackling this issue of sloth, we must therefore look towards historically informed solutions. We have discussed how community can be used for the maintenance of morality and duty and can even aid in the policing of society based on the traditions of our European ancestors. Community could well save the people of future societies from sloth. If free time is to be given the people of a workless future, then work ought to be created for them by their communities. The industries of the nation will likely be taken over by automation, but there will still be work to be done in the communities of the nation. Those finding themselves without the need to commute to work any longer will be forced to get to know people in their local area on an even more intimate level. The building of trust and interpersonal relationships among these new communities will facilitate communitarian forms of work — with members of the community supporting each other in times of crisis, such as natural disaster, or when the machines that will inevitably govern future life break down. Sloth must be replaced with new attitudes towards the community, and if the state must pay individuals for nothing, then aspiration must

be combined with the societal bond of community.

It is not wholly right to say that every person is at risk of becoming debauched and slothful in the future, but it is equally not right to say that moral improvement will come about naturally purely because individuals are suddenly endowed with free time. Different attitudes must be encouraged, and nations should think about encouraging these attitudes now if the future is to remain communitarian rather than individualistic. The future poses a number of troubling problems of its own, and on the day that the automatons break down, any right-thinking society would surely prefer to have its people associate together to keep the world turning, rather than seeing that world grind to a halt in blind panic and personal anxiety.

## Permanency and Vice

**I**N A FUTURE OF EQUAL WEALTH rather than natural inequality, the permanency of such a system must be called into question. An objection that Godwin considers to his own system of equal property is that concerning the nature of man. If a system of equality was to be introduced, then everything that the richer members of society had purchased over time would be seized and redistributed. However, in day-to-day life, it is surely inevitable that as people came by different things and claimed them as their own, other people envious of them would demand to have the same, since they would be aware that the right to equality entitled them to it. Soon enough, society degenerates into bitter barbarism and anarchy of the worst kind as friends and neighbours turn on each other in order to claim what they feel ought to be ‘theirs as well’. As we can see, such a situation leads to both the end of equality and the propagation of vicious behaviour. Perhaps one member of a community will purchase a robot with his state income — soon enough, the whole street will demand a robot. Perhaps one man will upgrade his robot, soon enough the whole street will demand an upgrade. An arms race between individuals ensues, and the potential for war between members of the community itself becomes very real — and we know full well what the value of war is. These dangers are not to be dismissed.

Any system of equality devised in future would not come from the common agreement of the community, which would in its right mind wish to preserve the commodity-status of its labour, but from the imposition of government. This runs in accordance with the Marxist dialectic, but not with Godwin. Nevertheless, since the abolition of the state is never possible, and anarchy only results in the re-establishment of even more tyrannical government, we must assume

that equality is imposed and not implemented by full consent. The idea of shaking off what might be useful to the self and considering that whatever excess we own ought to be gifted to our struggling neighbour is against the spirit of self-preservation. Ultimately, the system of private property renders itself permanent, since in a system of equality there will inevitably come those who begin to hoard the possessions they come by. It is natural for human beings to want things for themselves.

The philosophical school of Epicureanism divided human wants and needs into natural and necessary desires (such as hunger), natural but unnecessary desires (such as sexual appetite) and unnatural and unnecessary desires (such as gluttony). The philosopher Epicurus and his followers lived in communes, relying on each other's support to overcome their natural human tendency to indulge in the unnecessary desires, and Karl Marx later wrote his doctoral thesis in part on theory of the Epicurean commune.<sup>48</sup> The Epicureans were viewed as pariahs by ancient Greek society, but it was Epicurus' hope that reason would eventually sway the people of Greece to his worldview. Just how far Epicureanism could be taken, however, was soon proven to be less extensive than Epicurus himself had hoped, when the Roman philosopher and student of Epicurus, Lucretius, wrote one of the foremost works on Epicurean thought, *On the Nature of Things*, which contains no mention of communes whatsoever. Lucretius treats the theories of Epicurus as a kind of mindfulness, a way of living with the inevitability of disease, natural disaster and death, whilst shunning Epicurus' more idealistic dreams of a society marked by detachment from the needs of the self and living purely for the needs of others.

It is undeniable that Epicurus was onto something, and this spirit of selflessness is embodied in religions such as Christianity. However, whilst the left interprets selflessness as distributing everything equally, it has traditionally been the place of the right to demonstrate that society can only flourish under inequality. But this does not mean that

it cannot be selfless. If Epicurus was more inclined towards the former school, and was a pariah, but Lucretius more towards the latter, and was part of the great and respected thinkers of the Roman Republic, we may easily judge which school of thought inspired the more prosperous variant of political society.

If we consider how the human mind works, then we shall see that it is by nature inclined towards inequality. The mind itself is a series of thoughts emitted from conscious or subconscious waves, which may concern an event in the past, present, or potential future. How these thoughts themselves are ranked determines our character. For instance, those who concern themselves with the problems of past or future actions are often inclined towards anxiety, those who live only for the present are either at ease with themselves or incredibly self-interested, depending on how the present moment is defined in the mind of the individual. Those concerned with the lessons of the past and how they might be applied to the future are somewhat calmer as well, since they consider history to be an opportunity for learning rather than a waste of time to think about. The human mind is an unfair judge, for it ranks thoughts according to importance rather than judging them all equally. As such, the human character varies from one individual to the next, and it is near-impossible to consider how this natural difference from individual to individual is to be overcome.

Humankind is not perfect, and in order to render equality permanent, it must be all perfectly the same. Attempts to render an unequal race equal only leads to vice and the destruction of community on every level. Virtue is therefore incompatible with equality.

## CHAPTER VI

# Population

THE SPECULATIONS of Thomas Malthus about a human population increasing exponentially beyond the possibility for self-sustenance has been debunked in recent years, with studies showing that the human population is likely to stabilise by the year 2070.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, the population of Earth has seen a huge increase over the past fifty years, with the United Nations estimating that the world population has increased from just over 2 billion in 1950 to 7.5 billion in 2017. In the worst-case scenario of continual growth, that number could reach over 10 billion in the future. This itself may lead to a decline in population on account of the increase in famine and lack of provision for the people of Earth, but assuming that the human race for the most part remains at such high numbers, the provision of equality for such a large number of people becomes a seemingly insurmountable task to perform.

The agrarian and localist values which define traditional communities to counter the detrimental effects of equality of income and property become harder to implement when a population of this size needs to be provided for. There have been many solutions offered over the years by various intellectuals to the problem of population. Marxist often suggest that the population itself would best be able to distribute its own needs among itself, and a dictatorship of the proletariat, with the proletariat's interests in mind, would best offer medicine and food amongst itself in ways which will be self-supportive. Godwinian radicals on the other hand suggest that a 'mind over matter' approach, and the enduring power of 'cheerfulness' serves as far greater medicine in the face of disaster than panicking over the material goods which mankind will struggle to equally provide for its people. Both of these solutions are inadequate, since while 'mind over

matter' may be useful for remaining calm in the face of hardship, it does not feed the hungry, nor does it heal the sick of the most violent infectious diseases. Equally, allowing the people of the world to distribute their own materials is a recipe for disaster, since it would lead to the same effects of envy and eventual violence that we have discussed in preceding chapters.

There is therefore little to conclude about equality in the modern world other than no matter how equal the governments of the world may endeavour to make a future society, some level of inequality will always exist, since it will be simply impossible for that government to accommodate the equality of every single individual in the world. Equality is therefore impossible in the face of such an overwhelming number of people who would require it.

# The Impracticability of Equality

**W**E HAVE CONSIDERED at length how equality is impossible in a future world. Finally, then, we must consider how the means of implementing equality is just as impracticable in detail. In making the steps towards creating a society where equal income and equal property are a very real possibility, the governments of the nations have a great capacity to sow disaster in their wake. If the population is not ready for the technological age which we stand at the cusp of, the repercussions could be dire for civilisation.

The natural state of community is for individuals to rely on each other's owned property to support one another. This does not mean common ownership, and individuals will be reluctant to give up what they feel is 'theirs'. Possessiveness is humanity. In bringing about equality, rationality is out of the question. If people will not give up what they possess, then it must be wrenched from out of their hands, and when persuasion fails, force must be implemented. The right to safety therefore can only ever be violated by the implementers of equality, since for the purposes of redistribution of income or of property they will need to take from others that which they seek to redistribute. If this is met with opposition, then violence on the streets is possible. Those who do not flee will be arrested, their possessions seized; those who rebel will be imprisoned if not killed for their dissent; and those who do successfully flee will likely be pursued, since upon the implementation of equality, it is likely that other nations will follow suit to prevent the envy of their own populations. Fleeing from one country into another will only yield yet more attempts to flee from the enforcers of the equal system. If they have their automata by this point, facing creatures of superior strength is possible, and the Gothic vision forewarned in Chapter II comes back to haunt us.

Even if the implementation of equality passes by without much violence, then an intellectual war will certainly rage. In an attempt to reinforce the dogma of equality, academics, intellectuals and respected public figures who need not even be of intellectual stock will be placed on public pedestals to hammer home the supposed benefits of equality almost every hour of the day. Those who question the efficacy of the equal system will be silenced and removed from positions of respect in order to prevent the disorder that it might otherwise encourage. This is the only way to ensure a smooth transition to equality, but its consequences could include the end of the virtuous political discourse. If free dissemination of opinion is what political discourse relies upon, then the implementation of equality across nations must rely upon the tyrannical suppression of opinion which questions the new discourse of equality. The freedom of society and libertarian values which allow for moral improvement will therefore be non-existent, and if society itself is unable to bring about moral improvement, the debauchery of equal society which we have previously considered is more likely to become a reality.

If something like an equality of income is to be imposed by government, then we cannot escape the question of cost. It will in one sense be necessary to raise incredibly high revenues to offer the public a basic income, but if the public are not working, a smaller number of businesses will exist. The public cannot be taxed, since it is the government who is offering them wealth in the first place, therefore it must be businesses who offer revenue in the form of taxation. But to tax businesses to such a high degree in order to pay for the income of the remainder of the population is sure to produce its own problems, since taxation would surely have to be much higher than it has been in recent years. The free-market economic system is sure to be lost and replaced with an oligopoly of businesses which are still able to operate and collude with one another in order to protect their own interests and make as large profits as possible after taxation. Such businesses will have the entire non-working population of the equal Earth to serve

after such a move, and therefore be at no loss of a market for their goods. For the people of equal Earth, however, there will be much less choice, and commodities will likely be divided between different companies, leaving individuals with the choice of either using the product of a particular company or going without that product until such time as they require it.

All these implementations would require a great deal of unnatural optimism within the general population. It is not fair to assume that just because a group of individuals in government believe that the system could work, the entire population shares that same sentiment. Misery and distrust will infect communities, and the practicality of helping communities to bring an equal Earth future into realisation is called into question. Such a system would require universal cooperation, and the cynical would be left behind. The uncooperative and the cynical must therefore either be punished or left without participation in the equal state. Therefore, the implementers of equality have already created an unequal world in the process of trying to create equality.

Even Godwin, who desired equality of property as the long-term goal of mankind, warned against rushing headlong into the implementation of equality with ‘a certain rashness’. However, it is almost certain that the implementation of equality will be implemented rashly. Governments have already proven in recent years that they are unable to conduct business in a well-considered and careful way. The UK government of 2010–2015 removed certain qualifications for welfare and imposed taxes without proper consideration for the consequences,<sup>50</sup> and a future government, captured by the excitement of implementing the new equal state, or perhaps enthusiastic at the opportunity for the oppression of vast swathes of the population, would implement equality in a matter of months rather than a great many years, and therefore require the violence which we have warned against in order to see their vision of society realised in such a short

space of time.

Equality must begin somewhere, and it will inevitably begin with the abolition of the distinctions which delineate privilege and difference between individuals in society. Titles, awards and honours will be removed, as will institutions of government which appoint individuals on a hierarchical basis. No longer will the legally schooled judge try cases, but the private individual invited off the street on account of his sexuality or gender in the name of 'equality'. This may seem a ridiculous notion for some, but if equality is to be accepted, it must govern political institution itself. What this means of course is that, whilst not formally so, political institutions are at least informally abolished insofar as their true purpose is lost, and a form of organised anarchy takes hold of the population. Wealth will be laid aside and the government will speak of 'liberty and equality' as though the two have finally been joined in a singular love of man which unites the people of Earth regardless of heritage of customs. The abolition of these customs for the sake of equality, however, can only stagnate society, as the rest of our argument in this book has proven.

This vision of the future is virtueless; it is morally corrupt and socially stagnant. No longer is there any value in real virtue and real honour, since with equality set as the foremost goal of mankind, a dead humanity walks the streets. The shuffling corpses of wage slaves — slaves to their governments, who seem to many to be the benevolent hand of equal income and equal rights — are left to rot in a social system which is neither truly equal nor hierarchical. There can be only two classes of people, the proletariat and the lordship. Concepts of citizenship and duty are no longer relevant: the individual only concerns himself with collecting his next source of income, whilst the new lords of society create that income by whatever means they like, overseeing the lives of the people with a fine toothcomb, eliminating dissenters and extending their power over the entire world. Imagine staring into the empty eyes of a human race which has lost its soul and

consider this: is this the future which the human race deserves? *No* is the answer, but the future is worse than that, for it shall surely lead to the destruction of the human race, if not literally then at least spiritually. The future on equal Earth is cold, and it is most certainly a vision of the future where a boot stamps on a human face, forever.

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We cannot say for certain that this future will become a reality, but if the means for ensuring that a technological future does not lead to the collapse of society and community are not put in place, the future seems bleak indeed. The questions of the near future involving UBI and the goal which many societies have set for themselves — equality — are problematic, and those who endorse them have much to answer for. A future society governed by reason and cooperation is possible, but not under the system that the left proposes. The identity of nations and the spiritual purpose of humanity must not be lost, even if it is the ideological agenda of those who endorse equality to destroy it.

# Conclusions

**S**O CONCLUDES OUR SWEEPING discussion of political justice. We have uncovered much about history and applied it to the present. Our conclusions from this discussion will be somewhat lengthy but composed of no more information than that which we have already discussed. Ultimately, we may say that political and civil society must walk hand in hand, with virtue in mind, if the nations of the world, but particularly the Western world, are to survive and maintain true notions of political justice. The philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer remarked that there are two sorts of writer: the writer who writes for the sake of writing, and the writer who writes because he has something to say. I sincerely hope that by guiding my reader through all these varied issues, I have properly and coherently put across what it was that I wished to say. If some in the future may agree with me, and if by some miracle even a few of the ideas presented here come to fruition in society, then I cannot say that my work was undertaken in vain.

Happiness as the goal of life is perhaps the most misleading philosophy ever to have been propagated among the nations of Earth. Happiness is not something to be obtained by short-term actions, but by deeds which last well beyond the plane of mortality. It would be equally misleading to say that this means that celebrity should be the goal of all, or that dying as a hero on the battlefield is the only honourable life; rather, to understand the history of our ancient ancestors is to understand the value of truth, piety and heroism. The attitude towards life and death which the ancients adopted, from the time of ancient Persia through Greece and Rome and even in the supposedly barbarian peoples of Europe who ruled during the Dark Ages, can be an inspiration to all of us who wish to participate in

political society. This attitude is one of living for something greater than the moment of one's mortal life (and life on Earth is indeed only a moment, a flash of light in the face of the eternity of the Universe); the modern world has come to view the individual as the only moral end of life, as opposed to the community of his neighbours and the community of his nation which is defined not by the assignation of passports, but by a set of cultural and historical values which are spiritually inseparable from the nation state.

Materialism and egoism can only lead to the adoption of societal customs which detach the individual from any sense of loyalty or respect for his fellows. The average man is no longer concerned with the needs of his own family, but his own body, and he is plagued with the desire to constantly sate his hunger for yet more instant self-gratification. When the leaders of governments and the leaders of the institutions which support government are also infected by this moral disease, it is no wonder that the whole of society is kept in a destructive cycle which can only reinforce the ideology of selfishness.

The problems which face the modern world are becoming harder and harder to resolve because of this moral sickness. The nations of the world no longer have any moral direction, having lost their cultural identity and religious spirituality. It is akin to a sailor piloting his ship under dark clouds without a compass; he has no way to know where he is or where to go, and so he sails around blindly, with far greater risk of leading his ship astray. We cannot turn to God for our salvation — he left the path open to us, to choose virtue or vice, and it is up to us to divert our course. The solution to these problems can only be found within the individuals who know that the present state of society is deeply flawed, and in the attitudes of those who have the power to prevent the moral sickness which pervades society from spreading or worsening. Within every human, there is something which draws us towards what is beautiful and pushes us away from the ugly. No matter what the cultural narrative is that we are fed, there is a reason why a

painting of Caravaggio is more beautiful than a painting of Mark Rothko; there is a reason why the music of Beethoven is superior to that of Skrillex; the base can only destroy whilst the beautiful can send the mind on a journey beyond the body and into the understanding of our own souls. This attraction to the beautiful and the noble is derived from the spiritual Creator of the Universe. The Universe that is so beautiful to observe — many of us feel the same feeling looking at the night sky as we do when listening to a beautiful piece of music. That logic, that reason which created the Universe is contained within man, for we are the creations of God, made in the image of God. Different religions have tapped into the spirit, and call God by many names, and some refuse to call him God at all (such as the Nirvana of the Buddhists), but the spirit of belief is still the same. That is the source of truth, which in turn is the purpose of moral improvement which should be the goal of every nation.

Humanity still has the capacity for self-improvement. It was that spirit that drove humanity from mere reptiles who crawled out of the ocean billions of years ago, into apes and ultimately into the *Homo sapiens*, who diversified into many different cultures and subraces, and it is that same spirit that will drive him on to become something like *Homo sapientior*<sup>51</sup> in years to come. But whether or not the next stage of natural and moral evolution will be possible relies on us recognising that spirit. Man strives endlessly for perfection, even if he can never reach it — and it is that struggle for perfection which will improve his race. Even if he does not know it, Man continues to strive, for he can do no other, though he hinders himself if he refuses to believe it.

We have the moral codes which will drive our civilisation on into ever higher planes of intellectual and physical existence, perhaps into space, perhaps into levels of consciousness we have never before explored, for we are the children of God, the image of God, and morality is our purpose. Because of this, short-term approaches to

achieving real justice — moral justice and ultimately political justice — the happiest state of man, must be achieved through long-term planning and recognition of our duty to our fellow citizens. The Romans called this duty to their fellow men *pietas*, and that *pietas* is the piety of a future informed by the traditions of the past. People who tap into this duty, this piety, are the heroes of that future. The holy trinity of truth, piety and heroism therefore are the instigators of true political justice.

Truth, which is rooted in identity and history, moves beyond the short-term problems which the politicians of today desperately squabble over and try to amend, and the electors of the Western world demand that their politicians resolve in return for a short-term vote of political support. In a world in which lies and falsehoods seem to be so readily believed, it is no easy task to ask the people of the world to suddenly place truth as their ultimate goal. This, however, no matter how hard a task it may seem, is the ultimate answer to the problems which restrict the development of communitarianism, national values and moral coherency.

This path will involve pain for its advocates, and it will be greatly opposed, but pain is often necessary for true happiness to be achieved. Happiness is not about self-gratification, but the defence of justice, liberty and the natural rights of the human being. We who were born of God, or gods, or Providence, or whatever the Divine Spirit which governs the Universe is called, must realise that justice is innate within us, and if we can only recognise it, then the path to the maintenance of prosperous nations and communities within nations is not as difficult a task as many fear it to be. The Orthodox Christians believe the ultimate destiny of the human soul to be *theosis* — oneness with the Divine, and they are right. Our life on Earth is nothing, and a spiritual life beyond it is just as important. If great lives on Earth, however, are what pose the test for us in achieving that spiritual goal then justice, especially within the political sphere which governs nearly every human

interaction on this Earth, must be what we strive to defend.

A traditionalist taps into the truth that his ancestors pursued, the justice of deed and recognition that eternal life is founded in actions on behalf of the community rather than the individual. Many of these ancestors likely had no comprehension of why they did the great deeds which we now remember them for, but they knew that what they were doing was right, was for something good which would benefit humanity no matter what their personal perspective on the whole community was. If this spirit, if this truth is taken on by the governments of the nations, then true political justice is only a few steps away. One thing is for certain: in the age in which we live, with so many problems and obstacles facing us in the pursuance of political justice, the following quote, probably misattributed to Thomas Paine, rings home ever more truthfully for those who wish to participate in political society.

*'Lead, follow, or get out of the way.'*

FINIS

# Select Bibliography

THE FOLLOWING LIST of works are those which are either of most importance that have been cited in the text, or those which have been a principal influence on the ideas contained within this book. The reader may find some of these books to be of interest to his political mind, even those which seem diametrically opposed to his own viewpoints. The principal instigator of the writing of this book, Godwin's *Political Justice*, is listed first, followed by the rest, arranged by alphabetical order of the authors' surnames. The versions listed are of the own editions which I own, though the reader may find different versions of just as good quality.

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\* As a final note, the reader may have noticed that discussion of environmental issues is almost non-existent in this work. I did not deem discussion of climate change, manmade or otherwise, worthy of note during its composition; however, for a fairly accurate representation of my own opinions on how to approach the issue of environmentalism from a conservative communitarian perspective, the reader may be interested in the following:

Roger Scruton, *How to Think Seriously About the Planet: The Case for an Environmental Conservatism*, OUP USA, 2012.

# Acknowledgements

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*Archeofuturism 2.0*

*The Colonisation of Europe*

*Convergence of Catastrophes*

*A Global Coup*

*Sex and Deviance*

*Understanding Islam*

*Why We Fight*

**Daniel S. Forrest**

*Suprahumanism*

**Andrew Fraser**

*Dissident Dispatches*

*The WASP Question*

**Génération Identitaire**

*We are Generation Identity*

**Paul Gottfried**

*Morning Crafts*

*Philip*

*William's House (vol. 1-4)*

**Raido**

*A Handbook of Traditional Living*

**Steven J. Rosen**

*The Agni and the Ecstasy*

*The Jedi in the Lotus*

**Richard Rudgley**

*Barbarians*

*Essential Substances*

*Wildest Dreams*

**Ernst von Salomon**

*It Cannot Be Stormed*

*The Outlaws*

**Sri Sri Ravi Shankar**

*Celebrating Silence*

*Know Your Child*

*Management Mantras*

*Patanjali Yoga Sutras*

*Secrets of Relationships*

**George T. Shaw**

*A Fair Hearing: The Alt-Right in the Words of Its Members and Leaders*

**Troy Southgate**

*Tradition & Revolution*

**Oswald Spengler**

*Man and Technics*

**Tomislav Sunic**

*Against Democracy and Equality*

*Homo Americanus*

*Postmortem Report*

*Titans are in Town*

**Abir Taha**

*Defining Terrorism: The End of Double*

**Paul Gottlieb**

*War and Democracy*

**Porus Homi Havewala**

*The Saga of the Aryan Race*

**Lars Holger Holm**

*Hiding in Broad Daylight*

*Homo Maximus*

*Incidents of Travel in Latin America*

*The Owls of Afrasiab*

**Alexander Jacob**

*De Naturae Natura*

**Jason Reza Jorjani**

*Prometheus and Atlas*

*World State of Emergency*

*Standards*

*The Epic of Arya (2nd ed.)*

*Nietzsche's Coming God, or the Redemption  
of the Divine*

*Verses of Light*

**Bal Gangadhar Tilak**

*The Arctic Home in the Vedas*

**Dominique Venner**

*For a Positive Critique*

*The Shock of History*

**Markus Willinger**

*A Europe of Nations*

*Generation Identity*

# NOTES

[ ← 1 ]

Locke, *On Government* 2.7.

[ ← 2 ]

'Blank slate'.

[ ← 3 ]

According to John Rickman's census of 1831.

[ ← 4 ]

Morgan Freeman in an interview with Don Lemon of CNN, 3rd June 2014.

[ ← 5 ]

Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*.

[ ← 6 ]

*De oratore 2.*

[ ← 7 ]

Roger Scruton, *A Political Philosophy*.

[ ← 8 ]

Adapted from a similar conundrum offered by Godwin 2.2.

[ ← 9 ]

In Greek, *ta deonta* 'those things which are necessary'.

[ ← 10 ]

Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

[ ← 11 ]

Edmund Burke, *Second Speech on Conciliation with America*.

[ ← 12 ]

See the *Politics* of Aristotle.

[ ← 13 ]

Edmund Burke, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*.

[ ← 14 ]

*Reflections on the Revolution in France.*

[ ← 15 ]

'Thus ever for tyrants'.

[ ← 16 ]

By which, for the sake of non-British readers, we mean very expensive but very ancient privately run schools such as Eton College and Harrow.

[ ← 17 ]

Circa \$50,000.

[ ← 18 ]

The word *minister* itself derives from the Latin for 'servant'.

[ ← 19 ]

We should remember that titular privilege, and a seat in a House of Lords-style assembly, does not equal legal privilege.

[ ← 20 ]

As shown in an extensive 2016 poll of British Muslims by ICM.

[ ← 21 ]

Benjamin Disraeli, or the 1st Earl of Beaconsfield, was twice Prime Minister of Britain (1868, 1874–1880) and developed an ideology which is divided into two major camps. The traditional variant, described above, is derived from his own Victorian ideas based on hierarchy, authority and moral responsibility. A more modern variant sometimes called ‘one-nation politics’ by British leaders today is more akin to social liberalism than conservatism.

[ ← 22 ]

Tracey Emin.

[ ← 23 ]

Yoko Ono.

[ ← 24 ]

Mark Rothko.

[ ← 25 ]

Nick Land, *The Dark Enlightenment* 2013.

[ ← 26 ]

Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy* 3.1.

[ ← 27 ]

According to J. A. Rothchild in *Introduction to Athenian Democracy of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC*.

[ ← 28 ]

A quick Google search for 'TTIP gagging' will reveal a plethora of articles explaining the nature of the agreement that representatives were forced to sign if they wished to read the details of the treaty itself.

[ ← 29 ]

B. Franklin, *Proceedings of the Pennsylvania Assembly* 11 Nov. 1755.

[ ← 30 ]

Authorised King James Version, St. John 8:7, 10–11.

[ ← 31 ]

Reported by CNN on 28th July 2017 by Ben Westcott.

[ ← 32 ]

Quran 2:216, 3:151, 4:89, 4:95, 5:33, 8:12 are just a selection of such passages.

[ ← 33 ]

B. Franklin as quoted in *An Exploration of a Life of Science and Service* by Carl Van Doren, 1938.

[ ← 34 ]

By the U.S. Census Bureau.

[ ← 35 ]

Based on an article in *The Huffington Post* by Kathy Kaveh, 14<sup>th</sup> December 2016.

[ ← 36 ]

Cited in R. H. Helmholz's *Marriage Litigation in Medieval England*.

A note on the definition of marriage itself: Of course, the extension of marriage to homosexuals in recent years has been met with controversy among conservative circles. On the one hand, the marriage of homosexuals has slightly increased the prevalence of marriage among the general population; on the other hand, marriage has traditionally existed for the natural procreation of children, and representation of the divine and unique link between male and female. Due to the strength and stability of marriage itself, and state encouragement of otherwise unstable homosexual relationships to enter this union, some conservatives have praised the redefinition of marriage in this way. For the reason above, I have always personally opposed the move to redefine marriage; however, so long as the heterosexual community continues to turn away from marriage for the six reasons listed at the start of this chapter, I and people like me cannot really blame homosexuals for wanting to have access to such a special and eternal commitment. Attitudes towards marriage must change if the institution is to have any meaningful bearing in society once again.

[ ← 38 ]

Section 4A of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

[ ← 39 ]

Norm Franz, *Money and Wealth in the New Millennium*.

[ ← 40 ]

It may amuse the reader to learn that taxes were first introduced as a temporary measure, with instigators such as the British Prime Minister William Pitt setting the rate at 2 pennies from every pound for incomes of over £60 (c. £6000 modern).

[ ← 41 ]

Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*.

[ ← 42 ]

M. Bakaoukas, *The Conceptualisation of 'Crime' in Classical Greek Antiquity*, 2005.

[ ← 43 ]

<http://en.unpacampaign.org/>.

[ ← 44 ]

The video can be viewed on YouTube: *Caught In Providence: Tough Year*.

[ ← 45 ]

During the Trump election campaign, many pro-Trump speakers suffered this, and censorship on University campuses became a national issue not just in America, but across the world.

[ ← 46 ]

Often described as *infamia*, the origin of 'infamy'.

[ ← 47 ]

This information is sourced from two places: the quarter of a million figure is that estimated by the UK charity Shelter at the end of 2016; the information regarding race, somewhat ironically, is taken from an article in the UK *Guardian* by Kevin Gulliver (6th July 2017) claiming that the homeless problem was 'racist' since 36% of homeless people were non-white and in some cases non-British. If anything, the fact that something like 64% of the homeless are white British raises more questions concerning citizenship and governmental loyalty than it does about ingrained racism.

[ ← 48 ]

K. Marx, *The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature.*

[ ← 49 ]

According to a 2017 study conducted by the State University of New York at Stonybrook, the population of Earth will peak at just over 9 billion around 2070 and then begin to decline.

[ ← 50 ]

*Vide* e.g. 'The Bedroom Tax'.

[ ← 51 ]

*Wiser man.*